Posted on 10/08/2003 4:28:59 AM PDT by a_Turk
Better late than never.
As the foreign minister Abdullah Gul revealed in this space last week, postwar public opinion has changed in Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to reassert that secular Muslim nation's historic position as America's stalwart strategic ally. At the moment the coalition most needs a boost, leaders of the powerful Turkish Army are now ready to provide a division of peacekeeping troops.
Yesterday, the Turkish Parliament approved by a whopping 2-to-1 majority the government's proposal to take an active part in stabilizing Iraq. Unlike Russia and Pakistan (our allies in name only), and unlike France and Germany (our outright diplomatic adversaries), Turkey's government does not insist on a new U.N. resolution stripping control from the U.S. and Britain before lending a hand. That will affect other countries now hanging back, as well as the U.N. resolution itself.
Credit our State Department's counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black, with some deft diplomacy in Ankara. The big obstacle, from the Turks' point of view, was the P.K.K., a renegade Kurdish force that for decades has been trying to bite off a piece of Turkey in a separatist guerrilla war that cost 35,000 lives. (Even today, some of these terrorist Kurds make up much of Ansar al-Islam, the Al Qaeda affiliate fighting us in Iraq.)
From the point of view of the peaceful Kurds who, protected from Saddam by allied air forces based in Turkey, built a democracy in the past decade the big obstacle was not just the longtime Turkish oppression of its Kurdish minority, but the habit of Turkish troops of staying in parts of Iraqi Kurdistan just in case the P.K.K. terrorists should regroup.
To allay Turkish concerns about terrorist bases near its border with northern Iraq, the U.S. promised to help suppress the P.K.K. To reassure the democratic Kurds who fought Saddam, we are setting up ways to transport and supply Turkish troops without establishing that army's presence in cities like Mosul and Kirkuk. A sea route may be the solution.
But every solution begets a new problem. The Iraqi Governing Council that we appointed now brings to mind the old television commercial in which a testy bride insists, "Mother I can do it myself!" Many of its appointees are reluctant to welcome any more peacekeeping troops from any foreign country. Months away from a trained police force of their own, these Iraqi politicians know that the way to local voter appeal is to assert independence loudly from the occupiers who brought them freedom and are currently taking casualties to restore order.
Now is the moment for Iraq's Kurdish leaders, their anti-Saddam credentials unassailable and their gratitude for the coalition's intervention sincere, to take the long view. Neither Massoud Barzani nor Jalal Talabani is running for the top job in the new Iraq; the interests of Kurds are now best served by their support of secular Shiite or even Sunni leaders who will respect Kurdish autonomy within a federal Iraq.
The three dominant voices in the council are Ahmad Chalabi (secular Shiite, once the Pentagon's choice), Iyad Alawi (secular Shiite with some Baathist background, formerly the C.I.A.'s choice, this month in the rotating chairmanship) and Adnan Pachachi (Sunni, former foreign minister, supported by the Egyptians, Saudis and Jacques Chirac). Alawi is gaining political strength. All three know the council is far from ready to hold elections, much less able to hold down the Baathist remnants and Afghan Arabs seeking to sabotage the nascent government.
Because the Kurdish leaders need not pander to potential Iraqi voters by outwardly resisting the help sought by the coalition of fresh foreign troops, they have become the crucial element in ensuring free Iraq's future. They should be aware of two dangers: (1) rushing the end of occupation before the rule of constitutional law is established, and (2) encouraging neo-isolationism in America and the cutoff of foreign aid by biting the hand that freed them.
Message to Massoud, Jalal, Barham and Hoshyar: cooperate with the coalition and work out Iraq's deal with the Turks to stay only one year. That's what the Turks want, too, as well as your American friends. This is a big moment. Don't miss the historic opportunity for your people.
If we're going to talk about the "longtime Turkish oppression of its Kurdish minority" let's not swoon too much over the "peaceful Kurds." Missing from Mr. Safire's words is mention of the war fought between the Kurdish PDK and PUK in the late 1990s.
Missing also is just how things may have been different prior to the war if U.S. civilians had been willing to address Turkey's concerns over the Marxist terrorist PKK. Better late than never.
But what's this?encouraging neo-isolationism in America and the cutoff of foreign aid by biting the hand that freed them.
Our new Kurdish pals are sitting on the worlds 6th largest oil field. After they get themselves organized a bit, they should start paying us! Any biting going on here, it's American taxpayers and gasoline buyers should be doing it!
One other teensie thing: the Kurds ain't exactly "Nature's Noblemen." They are ferocious mountain tribesmen. Just because several factions (out of about 10) are united and armed at the moment, it won't take long for them to start shooting each other, if wiser heads (ours) don't prevail.
Giving these Kurd wild boys oil $billions to play with is like giving a baby a locked and loaded UZI. Let's keep an eye on these troublesome, colorful and quaint folks and their oil.
Excellent advice.
Geopolitical Diary, Wednesday, Oct. 8, 2003
The Turkish Parliament has voted to send troops to Iraq to support the U.S. occupation. Many of the details are blurry, particularly the timing of the insertion of troops. However, it appears that the Turks have agreed to send about 10,000 troops, nearly a division, that will deploy in the Sunni triangle -- the heart of the guerrilla war in Iraq.
Turkey's reversal of its noninvolvement policy is a major achievement for the United States. In fact, it is the first major shift in the United States' favor in a long while. The United States needs a cohesive force to engage in operations in the Sunni region. That is to say, it does not really need more international divisions whose various elements can't speak to each other. Moreover, the United States needs the active support of Islamic countries. The Turkish government is moderately Islamic, even if the regime is institutionally secular.
The Turks lend political cover to the United States -- globally and in the Islamic world. The cover is hardly comprehensive, but it's more than the United States had yesterday. The United States also needs troops to share the burden. Obviously, a price will have to be paid. Some of the cost is already visible, and some is not.
The visible cost is with the Kurds. Turkey vehemently opposes the creation of an independent Kurdish state, and doesn't particularly want to see Kurdish autonomy even in Iraq. The Kurds are one of the United States' firmest assets in Iraq. Kurdish forces are patrolling the Iraq-Iran frontier, as well as conducting other operations in the northeast. Unless the Kurds and Turks have accepted some sort of prior understanding, the United States and the Kurds will have some real issues.
This also raises a question that we have been discussing for quite a while -- the affect on the evolution of U.S. relations with the Shiites and Iran. Clearly, the decision to keep the Turks in Sunni areas is conditioned by military reality. It is also affected by political reality. The United States is shifting responsibility in the south to the Shiite community. They can probably live with the Turks in the north, so long as they don't come south.
The real mystery is why Turkey shifted its position. Part of the answer concerns geopolitical reality. For all the stress and strain, the reality is that the United States occupies Iraq and is the dominant military power in the region. Turkey has interests in Iraq and cannot afford to be frozen out of U.S. planning for the region. Another part concerns internal politics. The Turkish military is secular and pro-United States. The government is Islamic and has mixed feelings about the United States. The military is institutionally the guardian of the secular character of the regime. In plain English, that means that the military can stage a coup if it wants. A coup wasn't near, but any Turkish government tries to take military sensibilities into account. Still, the United States promised something beyond money to Turkey. Turkey's decision is a godsend to the United States and the Turks know it. There is a price, as yet undisclosed.
It should be noted that Syria had a really bad day today. The Israelis hit it from the air and massed on the Lebanese border. The Americans probed along its eastern frontier. And apart from all this, the Turkey-U.S. deal creates a major threat from the north. Syrian-Turkish relations have not been the warmest, to say the least. Renewing cooperation with the United States puts Turkey into play to Syria's north. Apart from everything else, Damascus is feeling the heat.
In a way, this puts the U.S. core strategy back on track: first, occupy Iraq; second, bring pressure to bear on surrounding countries. Turkey's decision bolsters the U.S. position in Iraq. It also massively increases the pressure on, and isolation of, Syria. It goes without saying that it also increases the likelihood of al Qaeda striking Turkey at the first practical opportunity.
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I have to say, I have a long memory for what Turkey did at the start of the war, and also for what the Kurds in Northern Iraq accomplished. We can't pretend otherwise.
I hope to see that from Turkey in the present circumstances.
What does that have to do with the price of tea in China?
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