Yes, but my point was that BP forces the adversary to switch his attack from a mode for which the was previously NO defense (ground-based missiles) to modes for which we already had SOME defense, even if it isn't perfect.
Even if our anti-sub capability was slightly porous, it would require an ENORMOUS capital investment in nuclear missile subs by an opponent if he wanted to be assured he would sneak enough missiles through to take out the US deterrent capability with his sub-launched missiles.
In the end, the ultimate testimonial to the brilliance of Brilliant Pebbles is that the Soviets didn't bother to devise a counter strategy. And, based on their own testimony, it wasn't for lack of trying. They simply realized that anything they tried to do to give themselves a successful first-strike capability would break the bank in the face of BP defense scenario. And shifting the attack mode really didn't deliver the mail, because we already have defenses, admittedly imperfect, for submarine and air-launched strategic attacks.
At this point, I pretty much forgotten what exactly that we we arguing about. I think our differences can be resolved by stipulating that BP isn't touted as a system that makes nuclear warfare impossible in all theoretical circumstances; but rather that it made successful nuclear warfare under the circumstances that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States in the waning years of the Cold War economically impractical.
Under different circumstances, with a different adversary and a different defender, BP might not seem so brilliant, but then it wasn't dreamed up in a vacuum -- Teller and his pals were working from the specific scenario of a Soviet Attack on the US, and their sole objective was to find a strategy that would make it impractical for the Soviets to prevail. In this limited sense, I think they acheived their goal.
Yet another reason why "intellectuals" couldn't stand the guy.
For every defense, there is a counter. If this nation suffers a nuclear attack, it will not be from a missile - it will be a Ryder truck with a smuggled warhead on it. And with an impenetrable missile defenses, yet essentially open borders, how long before it occurs to Ivan to simply pre-position nukes in major American cities?
...but rather that it made successful nuclear warfare under the circumstances that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States in the waning years of the Cold War economically impractical.
But that was already the case, though, under the doctrine of mutually-assured destruction - the reasoning behind MAD is indeed pretty horrible in its implications, but it's also very logical. Essentially, the only possible rationale behind SDI was to insure that the US was the only country in the world to have a viable nuclear arsenal. And not to put too fine of a point on it, but once we can fire our nukes with impunity, then what?
Today, with the SM-3, and Aegis cruisers optimized for missile intercepts, and routinely deployed around the national coasts, we could also likely catch the attacking SLBMs as they were launched, in either boost phase or before they could deploy any MIRVs.