Army Dismisses Report On Vulnerability of Stryker As Inaccurate

Rowan Scarborough wrote an article on this report. That thread can be found at:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/970584/posts

Note that the author of the report is Victor O'Reilly. I had never heard of Victor O'Reilly, and the only name that popped up on a google search was some goofy novelist. Well, imagine my susprise when this article reveals that the author of this earthshattering report is none other than that same goofy novelist. One can only hope that serious decisions about defense policy do not depend upon information from the Victor O'Reilly's of the world.

I have the report. O'Reilly misidentified a swimming BFV as a swimming M113. Photo is in the report.

...an option that has been declined in recent operations by commanders seeking increased mobility, sources say."

So give the BFV a bigger engine and slap on the extra armor. Upgrade the suspension system. Do what it takes.

Archy, you up yet? Fire when ready.

I have the report. Can you post it? Ought to be good for laughs, and I suspect largely pulled from the LAVdanger website, a veritible font of information.

Well, imagine my susprise when this article reveals that the author of this earthshattering report is none other than that same goofy novelist.

It reads like a novelist had his paws on it- full of rhetorical flourishes and emotional, sweeping statements that undermine the credibility of his arguments. It's hard to take criticism seriously (and serious criticism does exist) when the author sounds like he's about to burst into tears.

It is 108 pages long, but here is an excerpt:

Written by Victor O’Reilly for Congressman Jim Saxton, D21 Aug 22, 2003 103

10. CONCLUSIONS.

To have bought a small number of Strykers to evaluate as road patrol vehicles in a low threat environment might have made some sense (if one ignores their high costs).

To try and build no less than 6 complete fast deployable brigades around them, given their extensive limitations, and the fact that are too heavy to C-130 deploy, makes no sense at all. They are no faster to deploy than M1A1/2 tanks and Bradleys, bring far, far, less punch to the fight, have poor off road performance, poor urban performance, are not survivable, and are extraordinarily expensive both to purchase and to operate.

No mystery about the Stryker fundamentals.

There are unknowns and uncertainties about the Stryker story, especially in relation to the degree and extent of financial corruption involved, but there is really no mystery about the Stryker fundamentals.

This is a story is about a new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, back in 1999, who wanted to establish his place in Army history regardless of the realities or, it might be thought, the welfare of his soldiers, and who pursued the direction he had chosen regardless of the growing accumulation of contrary facts.

Why? Blind ambition, fear of losing face, or merely a flawed management style. That is for others to judge. But whatever the inner motivation, aspects of this story are singularly unsettling.

His plan was that the Army was going to move to wheels for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (which later became known as Stryker Brigades) regardless of the military logic, because such a change, along with the choice of the Black Beret, would show that the new Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) meant business.

He would go down in Army history as ‘the Chief who made the difference.’

He would be the CSA who put the Army on wheels instead of tracks.

‘Irreversible momentum!’ But what about the Constitution?

In the fourth and final year of his administration he stated that his vision (Army for plan) had “Irreversible momentum” – an arrogant and truly frightening statement given that the Chief of Staff of the Army is entirely subordinate to civil direction under the Constitution and, that the President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Services. Then there is the issue of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the Defense Acquisition Executive to whom the Chief of Staff of the Army is clearly subordinate in this matter.

If the facts don’t fit the plan, suppress the facts & shoot the messenger.

Where contrary views were advanced as to the deficiencies in the Army or the flaws in the CSA’s vision, or the fact that there were other more urgent priorities, General Shinseki responded by terminating careers, cutting senior generals out of the loop and otherwise crushing opposition in such ways as were possible. He became extremely effective at keeping opposition suppressed, but in the process created a Command Climate that ruthlessly stultified innovation, initiative and fresh thinking – a frightening waste of human talent given that the Active Component of the US Army alone comprises over 480,000 men and women.

A reasonable person might be inclined to tap into such human potential. General Shinseki preferred to impose his vision and to ride roughshod over all opposition (This writer has talked to many serving senior officers including two 4 stars before reaching this finding).

Where the media were concerned, General Shinseki learned from his experiences over the Black Beret business. There, he was badly criticized over his decision to make all soldiers wear a Black Beret (an order that entirely ignored the fact that the elite 75 th Ranger Regiment already wore the Black Beret as a symbol of their hard earned, and very special, status).

Next, control, or at least contain, the media. Infowar.

This time around, where the Stryker and his vision were concerned, General Shinseki determined to control the media through access, and other favors, and mounted a sustained and highly successful media management and manipulation campaign under the control of his aide, retired Colonel John Gingrich.

One general referred to this campaign as ‘Infowar’ and, based upon the investigations and experiences of this writer, that is a fair description. Colonel Gingrich had a special Strategic Communication fund stated to be approximately $10 million to support his efforts. The true figure may well be higher.

The effect of this quite ruthless media campaign was, amongst many other things, to suppress the majority of stories which were negative to the Stryker and to foster those which were favorable. This enterprise was assisted by the efforts of the manufacturer of the Stryker, General Dynamics (as they are now).

It should also be said that there was also a desire by a number of journalists to support Army Transformation, especially in the light of the criticism of General Shinseki over the Black Beret issue. In effect, the Stryker decision achieved some degree of cover from the normal swing of the media pendulum plus patriotic fervor after 9/11.

Advance under cover of ignorance.

Throughout all this period, it should be realized that very few people had a completely clear idea as to what the Stryker actually was. Some understood the principle of purchasing armored vehicles that were lighter than tanks but not many understood the details and even fewer had ever seen an actual vehicle. In fact, they could not see the Stryker as such because the LAV III, which had been chosen, was being modified by the various commands in ways which would lead to its becoming grossly overweight – too heavy to be C-130 transportable – and thus fundamentally undermine the whole project.

Alliances in Congress.

General Shinseki dealt with Congress by reaching alliances with Senator Inouye of Hawaii and Senator Stevens of Alaska. One brigade of these vehicles would go to each state together with substantial investments of about a billion dollars each for supporting facilities.

Other alliances were also made. In particular, a waiver was issued by Jacques Gansler, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to allow the Army to put the Stryker into Low Rate Initial Production (normally 10-15% of a planned buy) before being independently evaluated by Operational Test & Evaluation. That decision was stretched beyond prudent acquisition oversight to allow the Army to buy nearly half their planned buy of some 2,131 vehicles without any independent evaluation.

In effect, the normal checks and balances built into the procurement process were being bypassed.

Friends in high places.

One may well ask how General Shinseki and his Stryker team got away with this? Part had to do with his having friends in key places. Secretary of the Army White was one. A senior official in the GAO was another. Then there was the fact that he had enlisted strong Congressional support in key areas in a manner that effectively undermined the wishes of the Secretary of Defense.

In addition to all that, the time after 9/11 was a period during which there was a widespread feeling that the Armed Forces should be supported uncritically. After all, we were at war.

We still are at war.

None of this would matter if the Stryker had proved effective.

However reprehensible the behavior of General Shinseki and his colleagues, it would be of limited interest after his retirement in June 2003, if the Stryker had proved to be an effective vehicle. However, as has been shown in detail in this document, the Stryker family of vehicles constitutes an expensive fiasco where the outcome has been to produce brigades of vehicles which are too heavy to deploy by C-130 (even though that was a Key Performance Parameter), unstable, fail to provide needed protection, and which bring far less punch to the fight than the tanks and Bradleys in the so called Legacy Force.

Neither fish nor fowl. Too light and yet too heavy, but not lethal.

In operational terms, they are neither fish nor fowl. They are too heavy to deploy any more easily than the tanks and Bradley yet they are too light and vulnerable to do the same job. Strykers also lack the urban and off road capabilities of these vehicles.

Further, soldiers cannot fight this vehicle.

Worse yet, the Strykers are replete with problems from armor difficulties, to being under-gunned, to unreliability, to poor off road performance, to escalating costs – and so it goes.

The list is endless.

An additional dilemma is that Strykers are horrendously expensive to operate, so, if you put them somewhere which looks safe, to merely patrol, they still impact upon the fighting force because they eat up operational funds and drain external support agencies which could be put to much better use elsewhere.

Too expensive to run.

The issue of high Stryker running costs has not yet been faced up to by the Army. It is exacerbated by the fact that the Army chose not to buy the Technical Data Package which would allow competitive suppliers for spare parts to be solicited. That means that the contractor, as the monopoly supplier of parts, can charge what he likes.

This is folly.

A disturbing lack of intellectual honesty and moral courage.

A seriously disturbing aspect of this entire Stryker exercise has been the lack of intellectual honesty and moral courage that has pervaded the process. The Army Leadership made it clear from the beginning that this project was going to be pushed through regardless of any data indicating it should be stopped, or careers would be destroyed.

That is exactly what has happened.

Negative findings have been suppressed or massaged; negative reports have been re-written; concerned Army personnel have been broken or cowed; worried contractors have been dismissed or paid off; simulations have been re-run with more positive assumptions; tests have been rigged.

One may well ask why so many in the Army’s Officer Corps went along with this corruption. Is not the West Point motto: ‘Duty, Honor, Country?’

The reality is that the Army culture, where the Officer Corps is concerned, interprets ‘Duty,’ in the main, as unquestioning loyalty to one’s immediate superior, regardless of the issue. There is the right way, the wrong way, and your superior’s way.

Of course this is not just a cultural issue. There is a strong careerist element as well based upon the practical fact that an officer’s promotion is virtually entirely dependent upon the good graces of one’s superior and a zero defect mentality.

In short, the system dictates, or can dictate, near mindless obedience; and precedent over decades shows again and again the unpleasant consequences of questioning the Army culture.

This system has fostered careerism amongst Army officers to an extent where it is becoming detrimental to National Security. ‘Careerism’ is defined as putting one’s career ahead of the wellbeing of one’s service or one’s country.

Of course careerists do not see it that way. They argue that they are merely doing what is necessary to advance their interests because that is what the system demands, and personal ambition is part of the American way of life.

There is a well known saying about Army officers which is worth repeating: “An officer of the US Army will sacrifice his life for his country, but rarely his career.”

Very true.

In practice, since the Army is not a democracy, a great deal depends upon the tone set from the top – or, what is known as the ‘Command climate.’

If the Command Climate crushes dissent, dissent will be crushed. Such was the case when General Shinseki was Chief of Staff.

Not all CSAs are this way. Some years earlier, General Gordon Sullivan, when Chief of Staff of the Army, articulated the principle that “Disagreement is not disrespect.”

Asked upon his retirement what achievement he was most proud of, General Ridgeway, the commander who stabilized the situation during the Korean War, commented: “Saving the mavericks.”

That is a statement worth thinking about.

There is a further dimension that underpins careerism, and that is the fact that for senior officers, the Army, to an extent that would have been inconceivable decades earlier, has become a stepping stone to a lucrative second career with the defense contractors and consultants who proliferate around the Beltway.

If you question the system you are risking not one career, but two – and the second can be very lucrative where general officers are concerned. A general’s star, today, can easily make you a millionaire.

It takes a great deal of moral courage to question the system when the rewards for conformity and subservience are so high.

The paradox is that the Army contains some of the finest people that you will ever meet, but independence of thought and moral courage would rarely be listed amongst the attributes of their character.

It is unfortunate, and it needs to be changed, but it helps to explain why fiascos like the Stryker are allowed to continue.

‘Data-less analysis.’ Who needs facts when you have vision?

The phrase ‘data-less analysis’ has been much used about the approach used by the Army Leadership in relation to the Stryker.

Unfortunately, that is putting an overly charitable interpretation on events.

The reality is that the Army Leadership have kept the closest control of the Stryker program and have been well aware of the facts, but instead of acting on them have chosen to deny them, and to proceed regardless of the consequences to their soldiers, to the taxpayers and to the National Interest.

‘Irreversible momentum’ to re-quote the phrase applied by General Shinseki to his vision for Army Transformation has meant, in practice, ramming through projects regardless of the facts.

Corruption of the process.

The process has been corrupted to an extent which is terrifying and it raises the most serious questions about the integrity of the Army Leadership, the effectiveness of civilian defense control and the oversight role of Congress.

Then there is also the issue that military equipment is bought for the reason that it is fundamental to National Security and that lives are at stake. The purchase of the wrong items or flawed vehicles is likely to result in the unnecessary death of American soldiers.

How we know what we know. Many concerned soldiers and citizens have tried to do the right thing.

Readers may well ask how do we know that the many statements made in this report are accurate, especially given the curtain of secrecy that the Army have endeavored to impose on the whole Stryker program (under the cover of a highly elaborate media blitz).

The answer is that despite the repressive Command Climate that existed under General Shinseki a great many of those directly involved in the Stryker project have tried to do the right thing, albeit without, in most cases, putting their careers at risk. As a consequence, a steady stream of information has been given to this writer and to others. In addition, there is a considerable amount of information in the public domain which, when added to the other data, adds up to a very clear picture. Further facts have been released by Army speakers at conferences who, perhaps, did not realize the significance of what they were saying or, perhaps, had more positive motives.

It has been our job to piece together the jigsaw.

Vast effort has gone into verifying our findings, normally by contacting friends in the Army. In addition, as can be seen in this report, we have been sent much photographic proof.

Piecing together the jigsaw has been time consuming but not that difficult. Simple physics underpins a great deal of our findings on the Stryker.

Overall, we are satisfied that the picture of the Stryker Program that we have painted, however disturbing, is accurate.

What is needed now is long overdue remedial action. End.

Thanks. Good hatchet job on GEN Shinseki, which was probably the intent of the report. I agree with your point that serious criticism does exist concerning the Stryker brigade concept and the vehicles. Unfortunately, its getting harder to find.

What is needed is a small Fire Team Vehicle. That means 6 guys inside instead of 9 or 12. 6 vehicles per infantry platoon, instead of 3 or 4. Think total height of 1.5 meters, instead of 3 meters like the Bradley. Collapse the suspension and total height is 1 meter.

Tracked. In fact, it needs two tracks on each side, so that if one is blown off, it can still get home. It should have dual electric final drives at front and rear for each side, and two engines, each driving a generator.

Armored. Small enough so that even with substantial armor it can be carried on a C-130.

Well armed. It should have a 120mm chassis mounted, breachloading mortar, to support the dismounted fire team, with the ability to fire antitank missiles. Add in sponson mounted machine guns (12 gauge and 7.62mmNATO) 12 gauge grenade launchers for the side, and firing ports out the back.

Visually impressive. It should have a dozer blade on the front, to help it dig in, and fold the dozer blade up to help it swim. Add a stegosaurus kit, to put large spikes and sharp blades on the front, and sides for "peacekeeping".

an option that has been declined in recent operations by commanders seeking increased mobility, sources say."

So give the BFV a bigger engine and slap on the extra armor. Upgrade the suspension system. Do what it takes.

Not enough. The Bradley's not certified for airborne operations, incapable of being parachute-delivered or LAPES extraction from a C130 due to failure of the Integrated Gun Sight system for the TOW/25mm/coax. That's also one reason the simple addition of a Bradley turret to a Stryker as a *Stryker Fire Support Vehicle* was dropped [though a Bradley turret aboard an M113A3 chassis has been fielded, but not for airborne forces use.

The Bradley has been developed into a useful and practical vehicle, one of the few in our inventory with at least a limited ability to swim rivers, though the vehicle has to be near-empty to do so. And the Australians, having tried wheeled APCs during their operations in East Timor, are now rebuilding their M113 fleet to their M113AS configuration, stretching their vehicles with the addition of a hull section carrying another road wheel [6 total now] and a new engine-transmission powerpack, rather than acquire or build more of their ASLAV-25 wheelies. M113AS upgrade/rebuild program PDF file info *here*.

The Aussies use a Cadillac Gage T50[Aust]commander's cupola with a .50 and .30 MG on their M113s, but in the past have fielded Fire Support Vehicles with the turret of the British Salidin armoured car, carrying a 76mm main gun and coax 7,62 MG.

Archy, you up yet? Fire when ready.

On the way!

Yes, I like 12 gauge. Lets you use slugs to open doors, number one shot for maximum lethality at close range, beanbag or baton rounds to hurt rioters without necessarily killing them. All that is needed is to provide a family of grenade rounds for armor piercing or fragmentation with a max range out to 800 meters. The police already have CS grenades.

an option that has been declined in recent operations by commanders seeking increased mobility, sources say."

So give the BFV a bigger engine and slap on the extra armor. Upgrade the suspension system. Do what it takes.

Not enough. The Bradley's not certified for airborne operations, incapable of being parachute-delivered or LAPES extraction from a C130 due to failure of the Integrated Gun Sight system for the TOW/25mm/coax. That's also one reason the simple addition of a Bradley turret to a Stryker as a *Stryker Fire Support Vehicle* was dropped [though a Bradley turret aboard an M113A3 chassis has been fielded, but not for airborne forces use.

The Bradley has been developed into a useful and practical vehicle, one of the few in our inventory with at least a limited ability to swim rivers, though the vehicle has to be near-empty to do so. And the Australians, having tried wheeled APCs during their operations in East Timor, are now rebuilding their M113 fleet to their M113AS configuration, stretching their vehicles with the addition of a hull section carrying another road wheel [6 total now] and a new engine-transmission powerpack, rather than acquire or build more of their ASLAV-25 wheelies. M113AS upgrade/rebuild program PDF file info *here*.

The Aussies use a Cadillac Gage T50[Aust]commander's cupola with a .50 and .30 MG on their M113s, but in the past have fielded Fire Support Vehicles with the turret of the British Salidin armoured car, carrying a 76mm main gun and coax 7,62 MG.

Yes, I like 12 gauge. Lets you use slugs to open doors, number one shot for maximum lethality at close range, beanbag or baton rounds to hurt rioters without necessarily killing them. All that is needed is to provide a family of grenade rounds for armor piercing or fragmentation with a max range out to 800 meters. The police already have CS grenades.

The Argentines make an excellent 12-gauge aluminum cased shaped-charge high explosive round that is said to be just the thing for stopping unarmoured vehicles at roadblocks and for surprising those who think their Level IV body armour means *bulletproof.* It's also said to be quite spectacular when it hits a filled 5-gallon/20 liter jerrycan full of gasoline.

I'd like to see a nice 12-gauge tracer round come out, a particularly helpful addition for those using semiauto [or full!] 12-gauge guns.

-archy-/-

Important to note that a repressive command climate was required to prevent mutiny under Clinton. Shinseki was clever enough to understand that.

Now: we agree, time for a change.

What is needed is a small Fire Team Vehicle. That means 6 guys inside instead of 9 or 12. 6 vehicles per infantry platoon, instead of 3 or 4. Think total height of 1.5 meters, instead of 3 meters like the Bradley. Collapse the suspension and total height is 1 meter.

Or at least as a recon unit vehicle, the way we used to use the M114 before it waqs replaced with the M551 Sheridan, which looked and sounded like a tank, so was used as such. The Canadians had a shortened and lowered M113 version called the Lynx [4 roadwheels], which came pretty close to the dimensions you describe.

Tracked. In fact, it needs two tracks on each side, so that if one is blown off, it can still get home. It should have dual electric final drives at front and rear for each side, and two engines, each driving a generator.

There are a couple of possibilities for drive, including Christie-system roadwheels that are themselves driven with traction motors, so the loss of a single drive sprocket or track doesn't provide a mobility kill. But in any event, it does need to be amphibious, a difficult enviornment for electrical drives, and it needs to be able to neutral steer/pivot steer, running the tracks in opposite directions at low speed, either for directional control and propelsion in the water or so it has the ability to turn around in its own length.

Armored. Small enough so that even with substantial armor it can be carried on a C-130.

And so that additional armor, applique or reactive can be bolted on. Likewise, it probably needs an underbelly antimine kit available, and maybe an overhead *roof* standoff protection from overhead attack missile systems like the Swedish BILL, US TOWII and Javelin...which blows that minimal height requirement, but maybe some active antimissile measures will come along, such as the anti 122 rocket lasers now being played with.

Well armed. It should have a 120mm chassis mounted, breachloading mortar, to support the dismounted fire team, with the ability to fire antitank missiles. Add in sponson mounted machine guns (12 gauge and 7.62mmNATO) 12 gauge grenade launchers for the side, and firing ports out the back.

Probably a mix of armament is required. The 120 breechloader would be nice for two of the 6-vehicle team, two might be equipped with a 25mm-30mm gun as per the Bradley or Russian Kliver turret, and two configured as long-range heavy gun or missile tanki killers. Some support teams, no doubt would be all mortar, Infantry support or TD configuratrion, others composite. And a medic track version would be a likely requirement.

Visually impressive. It should have a dozer blade on the front, to help it dig in, and fold the dozer blade up to help it swim. Add a stegosaurus kit, to put large spikes and sharp blades on the front, and sides for "peacekeeping".

I'd settle for a combat engineer-configured version with blade, foxhole auger and crane for powerpack changeouts and vehicle recovery, probably 2-4 per battalion or squadron. And a flamethrower version too, please!

Rolled chainlink makes a real nice RPG screen, too; a carrier for some of that on the sides would defeat PG7 grenades, and could be stowed inside for air shipment, then installed outside once delivered.

Canadian M113 Lynx CRV:
Length: 181 in
Width: 95 in
Height: 85 1/2 in
Weight: 19,300 lb
Engine: 6V53 diesel
Speed (Forward): 44 mph
Armour: 12-38 mm Aluminum
Armament .50 cal, 7.62 mm machine guns
Crew: 3

Note that the author of the report is Victor O'Reilly. I had never heard of Victor O'Reilly, and the only name that popped up on a google search was some goofy novelist. Well, imagine my susprise when this article reveals that the author of this earthshattering report is none other than that same goofy novelist. One can only hope that serious decisions about defense policy do not depend upon information from the Victor O'Reilly's of the world.

I understand Hackworth is working on a multipart report and analysis of the Stryker saga. That should be interesting, though I don't expect any big surprises one way or another.

What do you think of starting and maintaining a Free Republic Stryker ping list? I'd say there are several FReepers with a continuing interest in the specific subject, whether pro, con, or interested observer.

-archy-/-

I was speaking strictly in a mobility sense.

Now, not everything has to be dropped out the ass end of a C-130 does it? I know the pasty-faced ones in the building think so, but that's not reality. Also, just because you may have a requirement for fast deployability doesn't mean you are at the front of the line when it comes to MAC transport. Who gets on first is dictated by the Quartermaster.

Your point wrt LAPES is a good one. Solution there would be to improve the IGS for the TOW or invalidate the LAPES "requirement."

Can you tell me if there is a LAPES requirement for what used to be called the IBCT?

Thx. for the info on the Aussie M113 upgrades. 'Pod.

Upon review of the document Archy provided, the "swimming BFV does actually look like the Aussie M113 w/ turret. Plus, the photograph is fuzzy.

Its a PDF file.

I'll see what I can do.