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Some of these suggestions are reasonable, and should be heeded. Gen. John Abizaid, the head of the U.S. Central Command, says he does not need more troops--but it seems prudent, all the same, to provide him with more. Take them from Bosnia, if necessary. (It also seems prudent to make longer-term plans to expand our armed forces, notwithstanding Secretary Rumsfeld's claim that various reforms can free up existing troops.) Gen. Abizaid says that what he really needs is better intelligence. If more resources can be used to beef up intelligence capabilities, they too ought to be provided. Additional funds to improve infrastructure would also be money well spent. Success in Iraq is more important than keeping the deficit down, let alone providing a prescription-drug benefit. We think the public would not balk at the expense if the president made the case for it. The demand for internationalization, on the other hand, is based on the idea that Iraqi reconstruction is proving too great a burden for America. Our men in Iraq are risking their lives every day. But the occupation has endangered neither our military nor our economy. To speak impatiently about reducing the American presence in Iraq signals a lack of resolve to see the reconstruction through. Such signaling is dangerous. Nor should we be deluded into thinking that putting a non-American face on Iraq will mollify our enemies. That idea should have gone up in smoke with the U.N. bombing. We are in a war on terrorism. At this moment, the top priority of our enemies in that war is the failure of democracy in Iraq. To achieve that goal, they are willing to kill Iraqis in large numbers. They will not shrink from killing Swedes. It would be foolish to turn down sincere offers of help. Some countries (notably India) may be willing to send troops if the United Nations first blesses their doing so. If we can get a U.N. resolution to that effect without making concessions that would cripple our efforts, by all means we should do so. We will know that the U.N. is prepared to play a constructive role when it recognizes Iraq's new Governing Council. For all the dubious complaints, and real casualties, we are making progress in Iraq. That progress has not even been slow, except by the standards of the media. We have secured most of the country. The economy is improving. Vital services are increasingly provided. Democratic institutions are in the first stages of forming. More needs to be done, of course. But the next few steps will involve strengthening Iraqi authorities: creating government ministries that answer to the council; getting more Iraqis to participate in civil defense; using the new Iraqi bodies to gather needed intelligence. If we need to transfer some of the burden of governing Iraq to anyone, it is not the United Nations. It's the Iraqis themselves. Iraq-ization, anyone? |
he Bush administration's Iraq policy faces substantial obstacles: simmering unrest, factional disputes, impatience, distrust. And that's just in Washington, D.C. In the aftermath of the United Nations bombing in Baghdad, Bush faces increasing criticism. Pundits on the left and the right say that we need to have more troops and civilian personnel in Iraq. Democrats want those boots on the ground to be filled by non-Americans. John Kerry and Robert Byrd say that it's mere "pride" that has kept Bush from asking other countries to help us in Iraq. There are various proposals to give the U.N. more authority. The occupation needs, in the buzzword of the day, to be "internationalized."