Get me one of these made out of RPG-proof Unobtainium, and I'll quit making fun of the Stynkers.
Oh well. Back to the wash rack for Motor Stables....
Posted on 08/26/2003 6:13:43 AM PDT by .cnI redruM
Edited on 07/12/2004 4:07:10 PM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
Of the Rasczak's Roughnecks. Later known as Rico's Roughnecks after the untimely death of "the Lieutenant."
I'm open enough to being convinced I've been wrong, but preferably from hands-on experience with the equipment under consideration, hopefully with a shakedown period before it comes under hostile fire. It looks like at least some Stryker crews going to Iraq won't be getting that opportunity, and some of them will likely die.
There are lots of agendas on the loose here. Very few of them seem to be designed to develop a better equipped and more capable army. Rearm and refuel, this fight is not over. I'll try to help cover your flank during the next engagement.
Just so. Mine is much less to develop a better equipped and more capable army than to insure the survival of those in the crew, platoon/squadron, company or troop using those vehicles. I would hope that by doing so a better equipped and capable army overall would result, but that's more a desirable byproduct than a concern that overrides my primary interest.
Have we learned nothing from the deaths of the lightly armored tank destroyer halftracks whose crews perished in Tunisia early in WWII? The answer was not that we needed to do away with the TD concept, leaving the infantry without sufficient protection from enemy armor, but that those vehicles taking on enemy tanks had to be able to at least offer minimal protection from enemy tank gun fire, as the successful M10 and M36 tank destroyers did.
That beat the ½-inch thick armor of the M3 halftrack with 3-inch gun by a good deal. Or the ½-inch thick plating of the Stryker....
-archy-/-
Design of armored vehicles revolves around an equation of firepower/mobility/protection (as if I'm telling you something you don't already know). Sounds like you come down on the protection side of the equation. I have seen nothing, including the classified data, that convinces me that there is a significant difference on this measure between the M113 series and the LAV III. I have seen first hand the effects of RPGs on M113's, M551's, and all many of odd armored vechicles including many Warsaw Pact types. RPG's can penetrate the crew compartments of most, excluding the M1 tank. The question is, how to mitigate this risk. Stand-off armor, applique armor, active armor, spall liners, etc. all help to some degree. The trade-off is on the mobility side of the equation. Stryker has well-known vulnerabilities, but so does ever other vehicle in the 20-ton weight class. The Army has made a choice that has clearly upset those with M113's to sell, but its a reasonable choice in my view.
We are not talking about tanks here. SBCT's are not designed for a tank battle, and likely won't ever see one. They will provide vastly increased mobility, firepower, and protection to light infantry units that did not have enough firepower to fight their way out of a wet paper sack.
Light armored vehicles (all of them) are designed to provide protection against small arms fire, artillery fragmentation, and limited protection against lightweight anti-tank weapons. The laws of physics don't permit anything else. Now, if your argument is about wheeled vs. track, then you are on more solid ground. The Army abandoned wheeled armored vehicles after WWII. Many believe that its a mistake to go back to them. Advocates argue that the improvements in suspension, driving, mobility technologies swing the argument. Appears to me that its a close call. On balance, it looks to me like the Stryker is delivering a much needed capability, and that the Army has done a pretty remarkable job getting the brigade up and running in a very short time. Of course, the MGS is missing, and this is the big question mark. Some are saying it will never see service. They may be right.
By the way, I saw a M36 tank destroyer in a ditch in Bosnia. Appears to have been taken out by a RPG. And whatever happened to the Tank Destroyer Corps anyway?
Concur; I crewed aboard an MP Cadillac Gage V100 hit by an RPG2/B-40, and later for a short while aboard a AML90 *Eland* as a replacement for those aboard when it had been hit by a probable PG7 grenade from an RPG. And the RPG-7 is not by far the most advanced or effective handheld antiarmor weapon in the former Soviet inventory, though still one of the world's most widely distributed, and one we can expect to encounter for the next two or three decades at a minimum.
I remain less impressed by studies, classified or otherwise, than by neat little holes about the size of a nickel burned through my vehicle's front slope armor. Maybe copies of the reports could be compressed into bricks, and used for standoff protection....
The question is, how to mitigate this risk. Stand-off armor, applique armor, active armor, spall liners, etc. all help to some degree. The trade-off is on the mobility side of the equation. Stryker has well-known vulnerabilities, but so does ever other vehicle in the 20-ton weight class. The Army has made a choice that has clearly upset those with M113's to sell, but its a reasonable choice in my view.
Subject to review after casualty rates by vehicle types are compared. But if the Stryker's mechanical faults or transport limitations prevent its immediate widespread use, that may help keep the casualties down some. It won't be like the NTC where they could cover the Strykers' MILES laser sensors with rucksacks to keep the number of hits on them down.
We are not talking about tanks here. SBCT's are not designed for a tank battle, and likely won't ever see one. They will provide vastly increased mobility, firepower, and protection to light infantry units that did not have enough firepower to fight their way out of a wet paper sack.
Agreed; and hopefully, logistical support as well, when helos are unable to fly due to inclement weather and conditions are unsafe for unarmored trucks. Think of Patton's *Red Ball Express,* only with Strykers, and of 20-ton Strykers and 30+ton Bradleys [about the weight of a WWII Sherman] coming to rescue the Airborne at Bastogne....
Light armored vehicles (all of them) are designed to provide protection against small arms fire, artillery fragmentation, and limited protection against lightweight anti-tank weapons. The laws of physics don't permit anything else.
Add in CBR/NBC protection, something we've been paying more attention to in the last 15 years or so...
Now, if your argument is about wheeled vs. track, then you are on more solid ground. The Army abandoned wheeled armored vehicles after WWII. Many believe that its a mistake to go back to them. Advocates argue that the improvements in suspension, driving, mobility technologies swing the argument. Appears to me that its a close call. On balance, it looks to me like the Stryker is delivering a much needed capability, and that the Army has done a pretty remarkable job getting the brigade up and running in a very short time.
Sacrificing firepower, amphibious capability and crew survivability to gain a very limited ability to be transported in C130 aircraft looks to be awfully short-sighted to me, even for the hopefully *intirim* make-do vehicle. And if it's not the vehicle for the job, and that vehicle isn't there, we'll not only lose Stryker crews finding that out, but those they were expected to support, and more when some other vehicle has to be brought up to speed to accomplish the same task. Three casualties fior the price of one is not a bargain.
Of course, the MGS is missing, and this is the big question mark. Some are saying it will never see service. They may be right.
That may not be such a terrible thing if Ground launched Hellfore or LOSAT is as successful as hoped, and can be deployed from the Stryker. But there's still going to be a crying need for 25-30mm gun support, for AA gun/missile capability, a mortar vehicle, a dedicated logistics support *truck* version, a medevac/casevac version, combat engineer configuration version, recovery vehicle, NBC warning version and other *funnies*. But some kind of just-in-case tank killer version sure seems like a real prudent idea, and something a little better than the 3 M72A1 LAWs clipped to the back door of the M114 CRV would seem called for.
By the way, I saw a M36 tank destroyer in a ditch in Bosnia. Appears to have been taken out by a RPG.
Probably one of the late Diesel-engined M36B1; see *this* for a similar report of one turning up elsewhere...there are still a few around.
And whatever happened to the Tank Destroyer Corps anyway?
After the *Peace Dividend* that came with the end of WWII, the Army division OOB was cut back to a triangular formation rather than the previous *pentomic* structure, buth as a less expensive way of doing business and in hopes of offering a less tempting set of eggs in one basket for a nuclear-armed enemy. Accordingly, we tried fighting Vietnam with a two-up, one back *high-diddle-diddle, right up the middle* mindset and it didn't work out that well; those fourth or fifth formations sure would have been helpful for operating base camps and providing division to battalion-level training to new troops in-country, but they weren't there.
Well, surely we're doing better now in Iraq, aren't we....
-archy-/-
That is precisely my point. The plasma jet formed by shaped charges will burn a hole through any existing light armored vehicle. The data was derived from shooting real ammunition into real vehicles and extrapolating into the effects against a standard definition of rolled homogeneous armor equivilent. That said, you cannot put everyone on the battlefield into a M-1 tank. Light armored vehicles have a place on the battlefield. Today, and into the near future. They must, however, be properly employed by leaders who understand both their capabilities and limitations.
It won't be like the NTC where they could cover the Strykers' MILES laser sensors with rucksacks to keep the number of hits on them down.
Don't believe all the urban legends that you hear on MC02. That's why God invented God guns and gave them to OC's. MC02 was an opportunity to showcase Stryker and to demonstrate its deployability. It was not part of the IOTE and the engagement pairings were not collected, much less analyzed.
Sacrificing firepower, amphibious capability and crew survivability to gain a very limited ability to be transported in C130 aircraft looks to be awfully short-sighted to me, even for the hopefully *intirim* make-do vehicle. And if it's not the vehicle for the job, and that vehicle isn't there, we'll not only lose Stryker crews finding that out, but those they were expected to support, and more when some other vehicle has to be brought up to speed to accomplish the same task. Three casualties fior the price of one is not a bargain.
I agree with you that the C130 requirement is oversold and overemphasized. We will rarely deploye armored forces by air and then only in small numbers to reinforce an airhead. However, we had this requirement in Northern Iraq after the 173d jumped in and were severly hampered because we were limited to using C-17. That's the point of having add-on armor. Don't install it for those rare occasions when you need to air land. Add it for all other cases.
After the *Peace Dividend* that came with the end of WWII, the Army division OOB was cut back to a triangular formation rather than the previous *pentomic* structure, buth as a less expensive way of doing business and in hopes of offering a less tempting set of eggs in one basket for a nuclear-armed enemy.
Actually this was a loaded question. The Tank Destroyer Corps was merged in 1947 with the Armored Force and the Cavalry to form the Armor Branch. Tank destroyers as such ceased to exist. You could make the argument that their present day counterpart is the TOW missle in its various configurations. Army divisions in WWII were organized in a triangular design, infantry divisions around three infantry regiments, armored divisions around three combat commands (CCA,CCB,CCR). The pentomic division was a cold war incarnation - five battle groups (large infantry battalions). The ROAD concept came about in the early sixties, eliminating regiments in favor of brigades (the modern-day equivilent of the WWII combat commands) comprised of a varying number of infantry and armor battalions.
Get me one of these made out of RPG-proof Unobtainium, and I'll quit making fun of the Stynkers.
Oh well. Back to the wash rack for Motor Stables....
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