You're continuing to read more into my statements than there actually is. I didn't say that the task of determining what the law says is easy or that its meaning is obvious. I said that its meaning is fixed. Can you at least agree on that much, that the law has a fixed meaning, even if that meaning is not immediately clear?
I dispute right off the bat this contention that there is any way of knowing "for a fact" that something is Constitutional or not, other than in the sorts of law-school hypotheticals where the law is literally antonymous to the Constitution - the sorts of hypothetical cases that don't actually exist in reality, IOW
Let me see if I understand what you're saying. You're saying that, at least in "law-school" theory, there can be a case where a law or court ruling is obviously unconstitutional, but that it'll never happen in reality? So in other words, there's a certain range of possibilities within which rulings can legitimately fall, and if they fall outside of that range, then we can say it's "obviously" unconstitutional. And furthermore, you're saying that in reality it'll never fall outside of that range. Well then in that case what's the whole deal with judicial review in the first place? Why not just allow representative bodies to pass whatever laws they like, since they would never pass anything that's "obviously" unconstitutional, since everyone can see that it's unconstitutional.
The alternative view, which I take, is that it is indeed possible to "know for a fact" what the law says, even if it's not immediately obvious in a particular case.
We have now exactly the same disputes as existed before the law - the law merely provides a means of peacefully resolving those disputes. Now I invoke the law when I find you in possession of my ox, rather than simply bashing your skull in as I might have done in a simpler time.
Except now I know that it's against law for me to be in possession of your ox in the first place, whereas before it was a purely subjective matter. Without the law, who's to say that it was even "your" ox to begin with? So yes, the law has prevented a dispute from arising, even if it doesn't prevent all disputes. The ones that remain are, as I said, residual.
Of course, if you're a lawyer, or even if you have an interest in following legal disputes, it's going to appear to you that law is all about conflict, because that's the aspect you've focused on. But by focusing on it, you're taking for granted the extent to which law prevents disputes from arising. It's the absense of disputes which proves its success, and of course absence is the hardest thing to see.
And my rejoinder is the same - what is the practical value of a fixed meaning if it is essentially unknowable? You keep returning to this notion of fixed meaning of the law, but knowing that there exists such a thing, or even thinking that you know what it is, is useless unless you can persuade others to ride that train along with you. And how is your claim of fixed meaning distinguishable from everyone else's - how is an interested outsider supposed to know whether your notion of fixed meaning is correct or not?
You say that the law has a fixed meaning - I say, great. Now what? Where are we supposed to go from there, and how do we know it's the right direction?
Let me see if I understand what you're saying. You're saying that, at least in "law-school" theory, there can be a case where a law or court ruling is obviously unconstitutional, but that it'll never happen in reality? So in other words, there's a certain range of possibilities within which rulings can legitimately fall, and if they fall outside of that range, then we can say it's "obviously" unconstitutional. And furthermore, you're saying that in reality it'll never fall outside of that range.
No, what I'm saying is that cases where the language of the law is clearly in opposition to the language of the Constitution are few and far in between. What you see instead is what you see before you in this case - two competing interpretations of the law and the Constitution, both with evidence and logic to support their positions, and where the final verdict is entirely dependent on one's interpretation of the law, the Constitution, and Judge Moore's actions. You say that we can find a "fixed meaning" to know which interpretation is correct, but how will we know what that "fixed meaning" is? And that's the part you're glossing over so far - yeah, great, there's a fixed meaning. Now, what is it? How do we know that's the actual "fixed meaning", and not simply your opinion of it?
Except now I know that it's against law for me to be in possession of your ox in the first place, whereas before it was a purely subjective matter. Without the law, who's to say that it was even "your" ox to begin with? So yes, the law has prevented a dispute from arising, even if it doesn't prevent all disputes.
All we've done is reduce from possession being ten-tenths of reality to it being nine-tenths of the law - possession was ownership way back when, and mostly, it still is. Now we invoke the law to resolve a dispute over who should possess our ox, and use the state to impose our wills on one another, instead of taking up pointy sticks to impose our wills on each other, but the dispute is still the same. And so is the end result - I have an ox, and you don't. The means have changed, but the disputes haven't, and neither have the results, other than the obvious fact of fewer concussions ;)
:^)