Replies

Justice William Rehnquist made an extensive study of the history of the First Amendment. In his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree (472 U.S. 38, 48, n. 30 [1984],) he stated: `There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the `wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson. . . . But the greatest injury of the `wall' notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. . . . [N]o amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The `wall of separation between church and state' is a metaphor based on bad history. . . . It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. . . . Our perception has been clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of an unnecessary metaphor. It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights, as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today, to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from endorsing prayer. George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God. History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.'

Ah, thanks to Jwalsh, I can cut-n-paste my way to a decent retort to that bizarre notion that religious motivation in a public official makes otherwise legal action illegal ...

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I cannot join for yet another reason: the Court's statement that the proposed use of the school's facilities is constitutional because (among other things) it would not signal endorsement of religion in general. Ante, at 10. What a strange notion, that a Constitution which itself gives "religion in general" preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement of religion in general. The attorney general of New York not only agrees with that strange notion, he has an explanation for it: "Religious advocacy," he writes, "serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents, and yields a benefit only to those who already believe." Brief for Respondent Attorney General 24. That was not the view of those who adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It suffices to point out that, during the summer of 1789, when it was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress enacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance of that the Confederation Congress had adopted, in 1787 - Article III of which provides, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to "religion in general" is not what our cases, both old and recent, demand. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 -314 (1952) ("When the state [508 U.S. 385, 401] encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for church property); Lynch, 465 U.S., at 673 (the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions. . . . Anything less would require the `callous indifference' we have said was never intended" (citations omitted)); id., at 683 ("Our precedents plainly contemplate th that, on occasion, some advancement of religion will result from governmental action"); Marsh, supra; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption for religious organizations from certain provisions of Civil Rights Act). " - Justice Scalia