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FRN Columnists' Corner - "What Will George Bush Do About North Korea..." by Tom Adkins
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| 8-12-03
| Tom Adkins
Posted on 08/13/2003 2:12:10 PM PDT by Bob J
FR Columnists' Corner "What Will George Bush Do About North Korea?
How to win without really trying"
by Tom Adkins
Now that Iraq has been somewhat tamed with a swift and decisive campaign against Saddam Hussein, the United States is in the middle of a complex nation-building process. During the past 18 months, however, the Bush administration handled another, possibly greater threat with amazing diplomatic maneuver. Yet few recognize the victory. Let's look at the Korean Crisis as it simmers on our back burner. Early in the Bush Presidency, the Korean peninsula was so quiet that South Korea asked us to consider removing our troops. But when 9/11 signaled the start of a long war against terrorism, President Bush pointed out North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung was part of the "Axis of Evil." Kim took the bait and showed his hand. Believing America was vulnerable, Kim revealed he had duped Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter, admitting a nuclear weapons program. Now, he threatened to use nukes to stop American "hostile policies," fend off South Korean threats, and take on the evil Japanese. It wasn't a bad gamble. The last time North Korea rattled the nuclear saber, Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter capitulated like frightened Cub Scouts listening to scary campfire stories. Clinton gave North Korea free oil, food and light water nuclear technology in exchange for a promise to stop playing with nuclear toys. Kim agreed, a bargain any fool knew he'd never keep. This time, Kim threatened all sorts of trouble. And after 9/11, George Bush was in a theoretically weakened position.
But Bush has performed a master stroke. Recognizing a nuclear loose cannon in North Korea is a far greater threat to China than the United States, Bush simply ignored Kim. This warned all surrounding nations: they had a direct stake in the outcome. Suddenly, South Korea asked us to stick around. Japan is now seriously considering a nuclear defense. And the last thing China wants is a greater American presence, a better armed North Korea, and six nuclear neighbors (Russia, Pakistan, India, North Korea, South Korea, Japan). The more nukes in the neighborhood, the less valuable China's Loral-guided fleet of ICBMs, which protects its Pacific expansionist designs, becomes.
China, supplying energy and food to North Korea's failed communist economy, is in a unique position to rope in their crazed ally. Wisely, they waited to observe Bush in action. But this week, after our decisive victory and Bush's firm commitment in Iraq, China took the reins in the Korean discussions, essentially telling Kim to knock it off. At that moment, George Bush had his brilliant diplomatic victory.
By doing absolutely nothing, the burden of keeping Kim in line defaults to China in perpetuity, and rallies our friends. North Korea began by threatening the United States, but Bush maneuvered China into the dirty work and made them pay the price. Diplomacy doesn't get any sweeter than that. And there's another benefit: As China grudgingly pays Kim's debts, they admit communist failure while the whole world watches.
And what sweet revenge! On the 50th anniversary of the divided stalemate created when a million Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, George Bush has hung the massive North Korean stone around China's neck, the last-place ribbon in a high-stakes gamble.
It all goes back to President Bush's decisive military action and commitment to victory. Funny
Bush set the war dogs on Saddam Hussein, and the world's bad guys suddenly became "cooperative." Syria kicked out Uday Hussein. Iran got more enthusiastic about getting inspected. Al Qaeda is still homeless. Saif al-eslam Gadhafi (Moammar's son) asked the United States to bury the hatchet with Libya. And after Uday and Qusay got their 50-caliber enema, China kicked Kim Il Sung back into the doghouse.
North Korea played the same trick on two presidents. Clinton had far better position and lost. Despite much worse position, Bush gained diplomatic advantage. This proves fighting wisely from a modest position can bring more success than capitulating from a strong position. As Sun Tzu noted, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. The victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for courage." Of course, the pundit class appeasers are behind the curve, still wondering what George Bush intends to do about North Korea. They can't comprehend victory without a big photo-op signing ceremony with flags, papers and pens flying about. Meanwhile, the battle has been won, without a shot.
Like Reagan, Bush will receive no credit for a brilliant victory nobody recognizes. But then again, they rarely do.
©2003 Tom Adkins
Tom Adkins is the publisher of CommonConservative.com
TOPICS: Free Republic
KEYWORDS: frncc; northkorea; tomadkins
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1
posted on
08/13/2003 2:12:10 PM PDT
by
Bob J
To: Bob J
Good post and hope the future proves the win(not that it'll be hailed as a win).
2
posted on
08/13/2003 2:17:29 PM PDT
by
MEG33
To: Bob J
WAIT FOR A STRONG SOUTH WIND AND GIVE THEM A DOZEN OF WHAT THEY ARE WORKING ON!!
To: Bob J
I was a bit disappointed in this article for lacking one key point:
The pivotal moment in Kim Dynasty-led North Korean history, that can be seen as possibly precipitating their own downfall, came mid-year/last year. This was Kim Jong il's bold admission (and risky gamble enough) that 'rogue elements' of his DRPK regime in the 'special services' had in fact kidnapped Japanese citizens through the years and brought them to Pyongyang. He played this stunning hand, thinking he could get a bargain in return from Japan. What he got instead was unprecedented outrage from Japanese power elites, mass media and the grassroots, and streams of more questions upon questions. Panicking, to 'plug the dam's hole', he sent several of the kidnappees to back Japan on a kind of 'sabbatical', but to his surprise, after several months, they 're-defected' back to free Japan and thereupon condemned North Korea, providing even more grist for the mill for Japanese officials and the public. It is from that point that Kim went into his corner, ratcheted up the nuclear position, (albeit sandbagged underground at Mt. Paektu as he watched precision bombing of Baghdad 24/7 via CNN) and now comes to the negotiating table in the most intransigent mood ever, as even more plutonium rods are reprocessed at Yangbyon and various secret facilities outside our purvey.
This FR article may unfortunately sound the clarion call of victory long before we have even obtained a 'win' even in the opening battles with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is premature to assume this will be solved under either this Administration nor the next one, nor that some kind of mega-catastrophe might not occur in the meantime on one of the most volatile peninsulas of the face of the earth. We should be careful of any kind of overconfident Bush Administration Triumphalism and counting our chickens before they are even hatched. Powell accepting wording on a multilateral basis for a non-agression agreement guaranteeing the existence of the illegitimate DPRK regime will be the first signs that the Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration before it, has failed. (This, in fact, may well be coming in the next three weeks. Just watch.)
4
posted on
08/14/2003 6:10:18 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: AmericanInTokyo
I don't know. Say, what do you guys (Korea specialists) think here?
We've been thrown the ringer on the DPRK more times that I can count, with heightened hopes, then dashed hopes, then more of the same. This has been through Democratic and Republican administration alike.
Total isolation, subversion, rock solid regime change, be it overt or covert, really seems to be our only dwindling hope to slay this demon of 60 years before they become the Wal Mart of mini-nukes (later this year) to every worldwide anti-American terrorist to ever come down the pike.
5
posted on
08/14/2003 6:17:44 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: OahuBreeze; TigerLikesRooster; Steel Wolf; yonif
#5 meant for you guys, sorry.
6
posted on
08/14/2003 6:20:02 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: CROSSHIGHWAYMAN
right. and perhaps kill or seriously radiate 35,000 Americans and perhaps millions of South Koreans in the process. brilliant strategy.
7
posted on
08/14/2003 6:44:00 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: AmericanInTokyo
Re #5
I agree that Powell is talking too soon. This will make N. Korea more stubborn, which will in turn vindicate hard-liners. Powell is in a way doing a favor for his detractors. Is it intentional on Powell's part or not? I do not know.
This talk is a long way from its final agreement, if there is ever an agreement. Agreeing to the format of talks is just a small beginning step in a long walk. Some people indeed make too much out of this.
To: AmericanInTokyo
I agree with you entirely: don't count your chickens before they're hatched. Bush, did, however, (as I'm sure you agree) gain a stunning, quiet, victory in diplomacy. Former-top-rank defector Hwang Jang Yop, once again, speaks the clearest: he says, push the human rights issue -- let me explain.... The human rights situation in NK is deplorable -- better said, there is no human rights situation in NK. Kim follows Kholmeini's line of thinking, that such concepts as human rights are not applicable in his country. But basically, in this "we are the people" world, outside of the facist dictatorships, every country pretty well gives lip service to the ideal of ensuring human rights (it works for China, so they do, too). Russia is particularly vulnerable to this. Hey, here's the key question we should be asking our comrades in Moscow and Beijing: why should we offer security guarantees to a non-elected nepotisitic, totalitarian regime which slaughters its people wholesale and kills the rest of them through inept, innane economic planning policy. Hey boys, time's up, the regime's gotta go. You are defending a regime which has no concept of law when you have the power to crush them and free their people to a normal existence, a chance for happiness, freedom. We have China and Russia on the record for saying they want to keep this going on. Let's make this record as well known to the public as we can. Russia and China are not defending a country -- they are defending a fascist, egotistical regime on the order of Timberlane -- they are not defending it out of fear of it -- they are defending it because they see it to their political advantage -- they, therefore, could care less about the hellish nightmare 22 million people live (and die) with every day -- what does this say for when it becomes to their own political advantage to do the same to their own populations (well, I guess Tienammen answers that...). Let's ask the citizens of Russia that. Okay, you want to oppose US hegemony -- but are you really willing to slaughter 22 million unconnected innocent human beings to accomplish your goals??? This is deplorable.
Someone said a while back on FR, in hindsight the whole idea of allowing the Kim regime to exist from day to day is going to seem deplorable. This is true. It is one of the biggest hypocracies of our world today. He's a wimp, let's end it... by forcing China and Russia to put pressure on Kim's exodus and trial in the Hague -- this is one of the few solutions I see to freeing the North Korean people without making the people of South Korea and USFK take numerous casualties in the certain military defeat of the inhuman scoundrels up north. Semper Fi.
To: OahuBreeze
We are doing the best we possibly can with Bush in charge, certainly over Clinton, but one thing troubles me here. There was so much MORAL CLARITY delivered in Bush's post-9-11 speech before Congress, that supposedly set the tone for his whole administration and policy, regarding an AXIS OF EVIL.
OK, one down, two to go.
IRAQ..... IRAN.....NORTH KOREA
IRAQ-Invaded, Toppled, Occupied
IRAN-Regime change still outstanding
N. KOREA-Regime change still outstanding.
To deliver a clear cut AXIS OF EVIL speech, and then two years later have a Secretary of State work out multilateral language, under pressure from Russia, China, Japan and South Korea that the regime in North Korea will not be attacked and it's existence is 'recognized' and guaranteed, seems to be completely contradictory.
To in any way guarantee an axis of evil members' illegitimate power to continue is akin to Reagan having said:
"Mr. Gorbachev, TEAR DOWN THIS WALL......well, maybe just some parts of it near Potsdamerplaz or Reichstagefur"......
10
posted on
08/14/2003 9:33:17 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: AmericanInTokyo
But you, I, & GW all know that this thing is not settled -- you know as well as I that NK is going to walk into the first meeting, then walk out, stall a few more months, come back (yadayadayada); why not give the Russians and Chinese more room to hang themselves. I'd like to think there's a plan back there somewhere. I, too, am puzzled by Colin Powell's take at times, unless it's just good cop/bad cop.
You don't even want to talk to me about Iran.... They've been first on my list since the early eighties: want to topple terrorism, get rid of the mullahs in Iran.
To: OahuBreeze
the 'wedges' are already being driven. between us and japan over prominence of the kidnapping issue in the talks. between russia/china and usa on written assurances of n.k's security and legitimacy, beween s. korea and us on whether to give n.k. aid before or AFTER it is proven they will comply. etc. etc. etc. we can probably expect some fishing boat incursions or DMZ shootings in the next few weeks, certainly 24-48 hours before the start of the talks....
12
posted on
08/14/2003 10:04:35 AM PDT
by
AmericanInTokyo
(Still think the Administration's BIG failure was not to dispense with N.Korea before Iraq!)
To: AmericanInTokyo
Interesting -- right out of Sun Tzu. Provocations are more interesting. You know, they have the Universiade Games about to kick off down here, with 500 NKs (100 atheletes, 300 cheerleaders, and 100 and something "sporting officials") participating -- this could make that scenario kind of interesting....
The abduction issue is right on point: we should stick with the Japanese govt on this issue. Key question will be, will the Japanese govt stick to this issue....
You do know, the ROK National Assembly just proposed some legislation to do a five-year manhunt for collaborators during the period of Japanese occupation. ...This is so typical. Where is the manhunt for the present NK collaborators trying to subvert the government? -- they abound. Hey, this all gets back to common sense: you know, justice is justice, but Comrade Roh talks about legalizing Hanchongnyon, an openly pro-juchefruit group, when NK has tried on at least three occasions to assassinate ROK heads of state (killing Pak Chung-hui's wife in the process of one, numerous cabinet members in another), has shot up numerous innocent civilians, policemen and soldiers during infiltrations, bombed KAL 858 killing all aboard, has threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire", killed six ROK sailor last year in the West Sea, kidnapped thousands of ROK citizens, along with a plethora of other acts of terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion directed at overthrowing the ROK government.... This spells one thing to me: cowardice.
To: OahuBreeze
Today's collaborators are more odious...
To: AmericanInTokyo; Bob J
It is too early to declare victory, no question. That having been said, Bush has set the course for endgame, and will either destabilize the regime or provoke a war within the near future. Given the situation, I'd have to admit that it's the least bad solution to a colossal problem. I also have to say that Bush is going way out on a limb on this one. The only analysis of his actions that make any sense is that he intends to resolve the North Korean problem slowly, carefully, and decisively.
Everything from the Axis of Evil speech, the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the global war on terror shows that Bush is direct and deadly. This is in stark contrast to his predecessors. When he threatens to interdict North Korean shipping, he is taken seriously. If he rattles the sabre, it means that Gulf II could be followed by Korea II. (The occasional appeasment-like blurbs from the State Department allow Bush to give the fish some slack before he starts reeling again, a cheap trick which amazingly still seems to work.)
Bush may not be a linguist, but he speaks North Korean just fine.
This is important not because Bush is bluffing, but because he's serious, and needs to be understood clearly. Looking back, you can see that the road to Pyongyang had to lead through Baghdad. Bush has now been established as a leader that will go all the way, damn the neighbors, and damn the consequences. This image is crucial for his strategy against North Korea to work. Every official in the DPRK now understands that if Kim can't get the U.S. to back off at the negotiating table, they'll be forced into either a war they will neither win nor survive, or total economic meltdown.
Once you remove 'maybe' and leave only a pair of cold, hard, life-or-death choices, people get very focused.
Kim knows he can't run the country by himself; even if he were the brain, he'd still need the generals and the officials to move the body. So long as Kim can demonstrate that his leadership will allow them to continue their way of life, they will support him. If we shut them down at the negotiating table, and blockade their 'island', (to say nothing of destroying the Yongbyon site) they'll know that Kim will not be able to keep the machine running for long.
Bush is right to move slowly on this. Sudden moves could play into Kim's hand, especially if they appear menacing. The incremental increases give the elites time to worry, conspire, and make contingency plans.
The best case scenario is that the elites force Kim into exile (or death), blame him for everything, and sue for peace. Worst case, Kim is able to mobilize enough of his military to mount a devestating offensive. Either way, it is preferable to a North Korea that can sustain itself indefinitely by selling nuclear weapons. This is a very high risk course of action, but in the long run, the least risky one available.
15
posted on
08/14/2003 10:41:50 AM PDT
by
Steel Wolf
(Stop reading my tagline.)
To: AmericanInTokyo
To deliver a clear cut AXIS OF EVIL speech, and then two years later have a Secretary of State work out multilateral language, under pressure from Russia, China, Japan and South Korea that the regime in North Korea will not be attacked and it's existence is 'recognized' and guaranteed, seems to be completely contradictory. To in any way guarantee an axis of evil members' illegitimate power to continue is akin to Reagan having said:
"Mr. Gorbachev, TEAR DOWN THIS WALL......well, maybe just some parts of it near Potsdamerplaz or Reichstagefur"......
I personally would love to hear a 'Mr. Kim, you have 24 hours to vacate North Korea. After that, I start a race to see which of the four branches of the U.S. military can kill you first.' speech. As much as I would be pleased if cooler heads stopped prevailing in the speechwriting department, it doesn't appear that Bush is particularly interested in talking to Kim Jong Il anyway. (more on that in a sec).
Unfortuately for my sense of justice, I think Bush is doing the right thing. There's a time for moral clarity, and a time to hide your moves from your opponent. The diplomatic lures are so much bait; were Bush inclined to do any of those things he would have already done them, declared peace, and swept the DPRK under the carpet for the next president. This is an obvious trap.
Even the bait is cheap. Recognition for a dying regime is diplomatic fluff. We're not backing away from demanding inspections, cutting off their sources of illicit income, or anything of substance.
Same goes for the 'security' guarentee. They're only getting a taste of what they so desperately want. I'm certain that once they read the fine print, they'll cry foul and walk away.
Back to what I was saying earlier, Bush isn't talking to Kim. He's talking to the rest of the North Korean power structure. A wave of relief will wash over them when they think Kim can get them security guarentees, and when that is yanked away (because Kim won't allow unrestricted inspections, or whatever hidden price tag we'll have attached), they'll feel even more desperate and vulnerable than before. Openly exposing an opponents weaknesses is a great way to reduce his fighting spirit.
16
posted on
08/14/2003 11:23:55 AM PDT
by
Steel Wolf
(Stop reading my tagline.)
To: AmericanInTokyo
right. and perhaps kill or seriously radiate 35,000 Americans and perhaps millions of South Koreans in the process. brilliant strategy.I said to wait for a strong south wind........blow the stuff into China.
Better a few million Chinese than a few million Californians........
Wait a minute.........I take that back!!
Let them have their nukes if they can only hit Japan and the left coast.
To: Bob J
Another viewpoint featured on the Cato Institute website: August 15, 2003
Overestimating China's Willingness to Pressure North Korea
by Ted Galen Carpenter
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author or editor of 15 books on international affairs.
The Bush Administration is determined to forge a united diplomatic and economic front of East Asian nations to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. China's assistance is the most crucial component of that strategy. Indeed, the administration apparently expects China to exert whatever diplomatic and economic leverage is needed to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Those hopes are likely to go unfulfilled.
Beijing's record to date has been mixed at best. During his trip to East Asia in February, Secretary of State Colin Powell privately urged China to do more to pressure its neighbor, but the Chinese did not seem overly sympathetic to the Secretary's objectives. Indeed, in the midst of Powell's, trip Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Kim Yong Nam, president of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, issued a joint statement pledging to boost ties between their two countries.
China's cooperation in attempting to get Pyongyang to back away from its nuclear ambitions has improved only marginally since then. China does seem more troubled about North Korea's actions than it did during the early stages of the crisis, but PRC officials have proceeded cautiously when it comes to pressuring the North Koreans.
Washington overrates both Beijing's willingness and ability to get North Korea to remain non-nuclear. True, China does have significant economic leverage over the DPRK. Seventy to 90 percent of North Korea's annual energy supplies, approximately 30 percent of its total outside assistance, and an estimated 38 percent of its imports come from China. But it is leverage that Beijing is reluctant to use to its full effect.
Chinese leaders do seem willing to exert some diplomatic, and occasionally even economic, pressure on Pyongyang to keep the Korean Peninsula non-nuclear. For example, Beijing temporarily suspended energy shipments to North Korea in late March to get Kim Jong Il's regime to abandon its insistence that all talks with the United States must be bilateral rather than multilateral. In July, the PRC again prodded Pyongyang to agree to a new round of multilateral talks.
China repeatedly insists that it is working hard on the nuclear issue through quiet diplomacy. But that defense illustrates an important point. China sees itself as an intermediary between the United States and North Korea, not as Washington's partner in a campaign of isolation and coercion. China has repeatedly urged the United States to negotiate with Pyongyang without preconditions. It also is revealing that Beijing's most visible role to date has been to host the April 2003 trilateral talks involving the United States, North Korea and China.
A few Sinophobes in the United States charge that China is in league with the North Koreans and would not mind seeing a nuclear armed North Korea. Former congressional staffer William C. Triplett II states bluntly that "the idea that Beijing shares our desire for a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula is nothing more than a dangerous self-delusion." Triplett alleges further that if the Chinese "disapproved of North Korea's WMD activities, they could end them with a telephone call." Most evidence suggests, however, that Beijing is not eager to see nuclear weapons introduced on the Peninsula. Among other drawbacks, such a development would increase the chance that Japan would respond by building a deterrent of its own, and a nuclear armed Japan is the last thing China wants to see.
But while maintaining the non-nuclear status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be a significant Chinese objective, it is not the most important one. Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the U.S. sphere of influence in northeast Asia (although it also clearly wants Kim Jong Il's regime to reform). As North Korea's economy has languished in recent years, resulting in mass famine, China has worried that the North Korean regime might implode, much as the East German system did in 1989. Such a development would lead to the sudden emergence on China's border of a unified Korea allied to the United States. It might also lead to a massive flow of North Korean refugees into China. As two prominent experts on East Asia note: "To guard against this event [China] will ultimately allow fuel and food (sanctioned or unsanctioned) to move across its border with the North."
The overriding objective of keeping North Korea as a viable country places a distinct limit on the amount of pressure that Beijing is willing to exert on Pyongyang. In theory, China might be able to use its economic leverage as North Korea's principal source of energy and other vital commodities to compel Kim Jong Il's regime to put its nuclear weapons program back into the deep freeze. In reality, though, China fears the possible consequences of using that leverage.
And as far as diplomatic influence is concerned, the United States overrates Beijing's clout. China may be North Korea's closest ally, but that is only because most other countries (with the partial exception of Russia) have nonexistent or utterly frosty relations with the reclusive, Stalinist state. The North Korean elite is not especially fond of China. In addition to the wariness with which a small state typically regards a much larger neighbor, Pyongyang considers the Beijing government a communist apostate for its extensive flirtation with market-oriented economic reforms and its tolerance of a considerable amount of social pluralism for the Chinese people.
The North Koreans may listen to China's diplomatic message that it is dangerous and counterproductive to pursue the nuclear option, but it is not at all certain that they will heed that message. New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof correctly concludes, "China's influence on North Korea has always been wildly exaggerated. North Koreans speak openly of their contempt for Chinese officials."
In short, if U.S. officials are counting on China to "deliver" a non-nuclear North Korea, they may be making a miscalculation. Beijing probably will try to be helpful on the issue, but its willingness and its ability to influence Pyongyang are quite limited.
This article was published in In The National Interest.com, Aug. 6, 2003.
18
posted on
08/15/2003 10:42:50 PM PDT
by
dr_who_2
To: dr_who_2
In short, if U.S. officials are counting on China to "deliver" a non-nuclear North Korea, they may be making a miscalculation. Beijing probably will try to be helpful on the issue, but its willingness and its ability to influence Pyongyang are quite limited. I would agree with the statement insofar as China has been unwilling to help seriously contain the North Koreans. As far as their ability, that's another matter entirely.
Economic: The article points out that China contributes huge ammounts of energy and food to the DPRK. This lifeline could be cut off tomorrow if China wished. They allow North Korean flights to pass through their territory, carrying contraband of all kinds, and generally allow all kinds of illegal activity to let them support themselves. North Korea could not survive for long without China's active and passive support.
Diplomatic: China provides all sorts of diplomatic cover for the DPRK. They shield North Korea like a big brother, stepping in when other powers align to contain them. China does this out of self interest, but the effect is the same.
Military: China sits on North Korea's vast and relatively unguarded backsides. (Russia only has 19 miles of shared border) There is no concievable way that the DPRK could defend against both a southern and western threat.
A large military buildup in Heilongjiang would be in China's interest, as they could advance down towards the DMZ while US/ROK forces fought the KPA juggernaut, sieze Pyongyang, and take control of the country themselves. (As 'peacekeepers' of course. China has as much right to use them as we do.)
Just a buildup alone, even without the threat of using it, would signal to the regime that their days are numbered. Therein lies the real problem about Chinese support; it gives the elites that run North Korea hope. Cutting off hope is as vital as cutting off oil.
China definitely has the ability to mortally wound the DPRK, and they can do it without firing a shot.
19
posted on
08/15/2003 11:37:11 PM PDT
by
Steel Wolf
(Death before electability!)
To: Steel Wolf
I can't stress enough the psychological effect of having China as a hostile threat would have on the average North Korea. The officials may have contempt for China's weak adherence to Communist principles, but the guy in the street has been raised to think of China as the DPRK's only friend. Their military propaganda posters often show Chinese soldiers side by side with KPA troops, smashing the USFK/ROK enemy. They're the cavalry that ride to the rescue at the last minute.
If they had to shift troops west in huge numbers, it would have three effects. It would weaken the DMZ forces, complicate their near depleted logistics, and shatter the morale of the entire country. Couple this with a reduced income and worsened econony, and the situation would look utterly hopeless.
20
posted on
08/15/2003 11:48:41 PM PDT
by
Steel Wolf
(Death before electability!)
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