Iraq Climate Devastates US Chopper Fleet

StrategyPage.com ^ | August 9, 2003

[John Jorsett]

August 9, 2003: The U.S. Army has made great strides in improving the reliability of its Apache attack and Black Hawk transport helicopters. Over the last few years upgrades and improved components has increased the average time between failures from 400 flight hours to 1,140. As a result, stocks of repair parts could be lowered. Then came the Iraqi campaign. Combat damage to the Apaches and heavy use by the Apaches and Black Hawks in sand storms, and the hot and dusty Iraqi climate, has caused a lot of unanticipated damage and wear and tear. As a result, it's going to cost over half a billion dollars in new spare parts, and up to 24 months, to get hundreds of helicopters in the same shape they were in before the Iraqi operations. The helicopters performed well, and they were designed to take damage and heavy wear without failure. But eventually, repairs have to be made and worn parts replaced. The bill has come due.

[eno_]

I kept hearing they got cut up pretty bad in every engagement. Is this fleet effective?

[AntiGuv]

The fleet is necessary regardless of its effectiveness. In any case, it's far and away the most effective in the world, which is the most one might insist on...

[SJSAMPLE]

The Apache was designed to destroy tanks. However, that War mission was largely relegated to Close Air Support in the latest Gulf excursion. Apaches that were designed to sit back 6km and take out armor with the laser-designated (and later, milimeter-wave radar) Hellfire were now closing with infantry and Air Defense Artillery, well inside the targets effective ranges. If you limted the (admittedly) fantastic A-10 to 100mph and 200 feet, they, too, would have the shit shot out of them. Nature of the beast.

You can only armor a helicopter so much, because it still has to fly. But the Apache did its job. So much so that, although many were shot to hell, the vast (VAST) majority made it back to base.

This reminds me of the test where they blasted a Bradley with a tank round in the mid 1980s. The Bradley promptley blew up and the press had a field day. What they forgot (or never actually KNEW) was that the Bradley was NOT A TANK. Neither is the Apache and this should always be remembered by strategy planners in the press, at the Pentagon and at the Division-Level staff.

[Burkeman1]

I had heard that the Apaches performed poorly. There was an incident involving 33 Apaches that were ordered out ahead of the 3rd ID to attack a Republican guard regiment outside of Karbala. 30 of them were shot up quite badly by small arms fire and RPGS. One was shot down and two crew members taken captive. They limped back to base having failed ot achieve their objective. For the rest of the war they were assigned to recon or to engage small clumps of armored vehicles. The A-10 took up the Apache slack.

[Burkeman1]

But then again- I guess the lesson learned is one the Soviets still had not learned in their final assault on Berlin- don't send in armour without infantry support to fight enntrenched infantry positions. Perhaps using Apaches in conjunction with ground troops would have been more effective in the Karbala action.

[MissouriDirtFarmer]

Whatever happened to the Apache that the Iraqi's had on the back of the flatbed truck in Baghdad?

[lavaroise]

30 of them were shot up quite badly by small arms fire and RPGS.

There is a ratio of enemy firepower to survivability. What I heard was that the Apaches there resisted well above expectations caught in such hornets' nest. Would a Russian hind survive better?

In any case Marines in Cobras used sweep and shoot tactics that were better than the Apaches' stand and shoot tactic, and thus the Cobras used with superior tactics did not have the same problems as the Apaches simply because of better tactics using a less armored helicopter.

For forest or other accidental terrain, the Apache is invaluable. On open desert they can be a liability, and there A10s are best suited. In the end a combined force is necessary or a technological mean to see and hit without being seen nor hit. The Apache will need improvements, no doubts, and it is in replacing its rate and breadth of fire with its lack of armor. Superior tactics and multiple designation attacks is key.

[Burkeman1]

Good question? Hopefully it was recovered. But it wouldn't be hard to imagine some enterprising Iraqi soldiers stripped it of it's electronics and weapontry and sold them to interested foreign governments either.

[Burkeman1]

Whatever the case- I am sure the Pentagon guys whose job it is to study this stuff carefully will make the proper adjustments in either design or future use of the Apache.

[Burkeman1]

As for a Russian Hind surviving better? Not sure. Not a Janes guy. Does it have more armour? It certainly appears to be less manuverable than either a Cobra or an Apache. The Russians were slow learners in Afghanistan but I believe they eventually started using the Hind only in conjugation with infantry and ground armour. Still- by the time the stinger arrived on the scene the Sovs were losing either a copter or a plane a day in Afghanistan.

[Little Ray]

I heard that part of the issue was how the attack helicopters were used.
Marine drivers would make fast firing passes against targets roll out and come around again, just like they were flying fixed wing attack aircraft. Army drivers would just hover and shoot, making nice, stationary targets.

Anybody know the truth of the matter?

[HardStarboard]

See #8 above.....yep, its true.

[Free Vulcan]

Don't care how good it is, if it is the wrong machine at the wrong time, in the wrong place, used in the wrong way, with bad tactics to boot, it's going to fail miserably. Seems they performed much better than expected, considering the circumstances.

[Walkingfeather]

sad because there is a company in Norther california http://www.fdc-aerofilter.com/ that has a filter to solve this problem. As you can imagine the helo engine manufactures are not to thrilled. anyway FYI

[armymarinemom]

My son has mentioned that they go through blades really fast over there on Blackhawks.

[Fee]

The Russian Hind helicopter gunship would have a better survivability rate. It is large and very heavilly armored. The Soviets regard their helicopter gunships as flying tanks and they build them like one. Their only disadvantage is their huge size. Easier to detect by radar due to large signature and harder to fly nap of the earth. All helicopters are vulnerable to manportable SAM and top down gunfire (Afghans on higher ground were able to use HMG to shoot down a Hind flying below).

[SJSAMPLE]

ANY other helicopter wouldn't have made it back.

Remember, it's a HELICOPTER. One 30mm chain gun is no match for hundreds of small arms rounds pounding it, left and right.

And, the A-10 didn't engage infantry soldiers, either. It lacks the ordinance to deal, one on one, with the infantryman in urban operations. Helicopters were a bad choice for those operations, all around. Unfortunately, we've become too itchy about sending ground troops in to do the mission they were trained for.

[SJSAMPLE]

Post #8 is a comment, not PROOF.

There were cases in which Apache pilots, who were trained to hover behind hills at great range, left themselves open. But, in an urban environment, it's impossible to strafe into a target area and engage targets with any real effect. It's just too hard to discern specific targets and then to accuratly engage them. The Apaches were put into a mission that they were ill-equipped to deal with, pure and simple.

[SJSAMPLE]

LACK of armor?
You're kidding, right?