It's interesting to note that Mylroie was a foreign affairs advisor to Clinton during the '92 campaign.
The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Mylroie:
Woodruff: The author is Laurie Mylroie. Her book is "Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror." Laurie Mylroie that is quite a large, shall we say, allegation. Some people would look at that and say, "How in the world can you say the government itself is trying to stop the war on terror?"
Mylroie: Well, it's sharply stated, but it is the case that significant elements in both the CIA and State Department opposed going to war with Iraq and sought to undercut that war and then subsequently the rationale for that war.
Woodruff: But isn't that because they had different beliefs than you and others do about Iraq's role in the war on terror and in the 9/11 attacks?
Mylroie: Well, they developed a view under the Clinton administration that Saddam was no threat. They were unwilling to reconsider it even after September 11th, and even when you put before them evidence of Iraq's involvement in terrorism, of the dangers posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction ... at least some of them (are) prepared to deny that, without giving reasons, and then they leak it to their allies in the media. And that has significantly hampered the public understanding of the reasons for this war.
Woodruff: What is the proof that Iraq is connected to 9/11 and al Qaeda?
Mylroie: It's the terrorist master minds. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, they're all Pakistani-born and raised in Kuwait. The Iraqis, while they occupied Kuwait, used the occupation of Kuwait to develop false identities for key agents.
Woodruff: And if that's the case, and if you have this information, and you had it for some time, why doesn't the Bush administration have it?
Mylroie: I don't think the senior people understand and ... the president, and those below them face serious bureaucratic obstructionism in the pursuit of that information.
Woodruff: You've been arguing this point for some time, your book is now coming out. I know you're talking to people throughout the government all the time. What do you think is going on there?
Mylroie: Well, what they told me in February was we cannot pursue this question of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's identity because of the bureaucratic obstructionism that was raised over Youssef's identity. Of course at that time, they thought they'd find weapons in Iraq. It may be now that they might be more willing to pursue it despite the bureaucratic obstructionism.
Woodruff: All right, let's quickly say Ramzi Yousef involved in the original attack on the World Trade Center back in 1993, tell us again who Khalid Sheik Mohammed is.
Mylroie: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is supposed to be Youssef's maternal uncle, he was involved in the '95 plane plot, became the head of al Qaeda's military committee and the mastermind of 9/11. His identity too is based on documents in Kuwait that predate Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation.
(Editor's note: In 1996, Mohammed was indicted in New York for his alleged involvement in a Philippines-based plot to blow up 12 U.S.-bound commercial airliners.)
Woodruff: But to get back to your larger allegation that the CIA and the State Department tried to obstruct all this. Are you saying that it goes all the way to the top to Colin Powell and George Tenet?
Mylroie: No, it's ..mid-levels within the bureaucracies, they don't want to acknowledge the mistake they made that left us vulnerable on 9/11. I don't think either the secretary of state or the CIA director understand that.
Woodruff: So are you saying that people in the agency and CIA and State are just ignoring what's before their very eyes?
Mylroie: That's right. They refuse to see what's before their eyes; they say there is no evidence when there is in fact evidence.
Woodruff: Why in the world would that prevent them from doing what you say ought to be done just because you say they don't want to admit that they've made a mistake in the past?
Mylroie: It's very common within bureaucracies for people to have very narrow agendas, not to think above their pay grade, to look to their personal and institutional interests, and not to think at the bigger picture and part of that is to avoid embarrassment.