Her comments were definitely nuts.
Anyone with a conscience would have resigned in disgrace instead of denying the obvious. She blew it!
Instead she claims no one was at fault and they did the best they could. (I see no evidence of that.)
They assumed that since the foam had not brought the shuttle down before, it would survive and that there was nothing that could have been done anyway so they did not even try.
What a bunch of crap.
They blew the call and should take the fall.
SHE said...Ok, so I'm from a "previous generation" of engineers...(removing foot from mouth). Conclusion faulty based on preconcieved datapoints.
OK, the above being said, I wouldn't climb into the left seat of anything that SHE had anything remotely associated with, I don't care if it was a Piper Cub (rear seat in this case LOL) that she ordered recovered with new Ceconite fabric. And that's for me, a big deal, because at this point, I would give about anything to get my medical back, and be able to climb into the left (actually, any seat, as long as there were controls there) seat of ANYTHING capable of flight ;-)
I am, as I always have been, ready to accept risk, such as occurs with flight in any high performance aircraft, as is any motivated pilot, as long as the risks are understood, and I have a chance to evaluate my options prior to any given flight. NASA, however, seems to be holding cards that those who will command/pilot the shuttle can't see, and are making decisions based on ?????. Since the Shuttle Commander is limited in what inspections they can make prior to launch, simply by the vehicle configuration and position, and the value of such inspections limited because some faults one just can't see, they have to go on reports of others, who allegedly perform good inspections and tests. Whooops, allegedy simply isn't good enough.
If one buys into the failure mode, then one buys into the huge negligence of putting questionable items back into flight hardware. If I bent a seal almost a thousand times, I wouldn't reinstall it on a Cessna 150, let alone the Shuttle. If I saw video/film of multiple ET foam failures, I would have shut down there and then, the first time it happened, and find out WHY.
Sorry, people, but standard Aerospace Practice and Inspection/Qualification requires requalification of the entire system if a component of mission critical status is changed in any way, shape, or form, from the original, accepted design. The foam was changed, big time, thus, demanding requalification of the whole system. These yahoos just sat there, watched multiple launches where the darn foam came off the tank and impacted the shuttle wing. Since I am not "in the loop" as to the postflight inspections of these previous "foam impact" flights, I can't speculate on what damage was found. We, on another thread, have discussed the almost burnthrough of the elevon actuator shaft. Man, If that had been my area, and I the engineer responsible, would have sent up red flares/flags, and hectored anyone I could, and If I had to, would have issued a grounding order myself.
Ok, NASA management would probably have fired me on the spot, but at least I would have done what was both professionally and morally responsible, and what would have been expected of any designer in any other aerospace project. One just doesn't deliberately put aircrew at risk of a known failure mode, without fixing the defect which would cause said failure mode. I was always taught from day one, that I should always put myself in the position of saying "YES, I would personally fly that, I have no reservations", and be willing to back that statement up, if necessary, by strapping on whatever flight hardware is in question. A very powerful guarantee, indeed.
Maybe if some of the staff (HAM) were handed LES and told to "get aboard NOW" (boot up posterior optional) , their reactions (how much blood drained from their faces, magnitude of shaking, and percent "pucker factor") would be some extremely good datapoints in regards safety of flight issues. If nothing else, it would be worth a few feet of videotape, showing the panic reaction setting in.
One then scrubs the flight, and looks for the problem they are covering up. Simple, forceful, and instantly doable.
Greg