I would hardly characterize the assault on July 3rd as being moronic. Frontal assaults over open terrain were nothing new and "Pickett's Charge" was not a tactical abberation. You might wish to consider that Grant utilized a direct frontal assault against entrenchments no less, in 1864 at Cold Harbor, suffering horrendous losses and igniting a mini mutiny in the 2nd Corps.
The action on Cemetary Ridge on July 3rd has been studied in tremendous detail and only a poor historian simplifies it. Be reminded that Barkdales men had attacked Cemetary Ridge on July 2nd, just to south of the route of Pickett's assault and had come very close to breaking the Federal Line (read about the suicidal charge of the 1st Minnesota Infantry). The failure of the assault on the 3rd can be chalked up to several factors 1) a planned attack (Johnson) on the Federal right wing at Culp's Hill early on the morning of July 3rd didn't take place as dictated (this attack would have drawn off troops from the Federal center prior to Pickett's assault). 2) the Confederate artillery under E.P. Alexander was poorly handled during the pre-assault bombardment. Alexander himself admitted that his artillery fire was off the mark and didn't have the desired effect (much of the Confederate artillery fire impacted several hundred yards to the rear of the Federal line, causing damage in reserve units and among the reserve ammunition trains but very little damage to the front line infantry or the artillery batteries supporting them. Some of this poor fire was attributed to faulty ammunition.). 3) Confederate artillery was short of ammunition (the supply trains being far in the rear) and didn't have an adequate supply to correct and maintain their fire once it was discovered that they were not having the desired effect. Nor was there enough ammunition to properly prepare the lane of assault by destroying fences along the Emmitsburg Road which slowed the advancing troops greatly while they were in canister range from Federal artillery) 4) during the Cemetary Hill assault, a number of howitzers had been designated to follow up the infantry and provide some close artillery fire support. Longstreet had orders to do this but neglected to follow through once the assault began. 5) Kudos to Meade (the Federal commander). On the evening of July 2nd he made a guess as to where the next assault would be and ordered reinforcements to that area. He guessed right. 6) The Confederate Cavalry flanking movement on July 3rd ended at East Cavalry Field, never achieving it's objectives.
As Gordon said in his memoirs, there never should have been a July 3rd at Gettysburg, nor even a July 2nd. He blamed Early for not pushing the tremendous success of July 1 late in the afternoon when the Confederates were on the verge of victory. This is where the presence of Jackson could have made a big difference. Gordon felt that Early stopped fighting when Jackson would have kept pushing.
The events of July 2nd don't make Longstreet or Johnson look good. Longstreet's attack on the Federal left was mishandled (they lost several hours marching on the wrong road and then countermarching). Even with the very late start time, the Confederates came within minutes of securing the tactically important ground of the Round Tops. Johnson's attack on the Federal right at Culp's Hill was very successful but fate intervened and Johnson unknowingly halted his victorious troops within 200 yards of cutting of the important Baltimore Pike. If his troops had cut this road, they would have totally compromised and made untenable the Federal Cemetary Hill position.
Finally, much has been said about Lee being a fool for fighting on the offensive at Gettysburg. I feel that he really had no choice. He did not pick Gettysburg for a battle, it just worked out that way. He was deep in enemy territory and in that position, you simply don't go on the defensive. In enemy territory, every hour you stall, gives the enemy time to concentrate their forces against you. We can see that happenening at Gettysburg where the Federal strength increases as the battle evolves (some Federal troops still arriving on July 4 when the battle was essentially over) while the Confederate strength peaks on July 2 and then remains constant. When you are in enemy territory, it is very difficult to withdraw in the face of a hostile foe without fighting. I think Lee recognized that once the major fighting at Gettysburg started, he had to try to defeat the enemy in front of him while he had the chance. In his defense, he was unaware of the positions of the entire Federal Army until the battle was completely under way. If he had known what Federal units were moving toward the battlefield, he might have declined to fight there.
First, I agree that numerous Confederate errors (and, you might say, Yankee skill and courage) delayed or disrupted the Southern advance on 1 & 2. I'm not going to re-fight every aspect of the battle, but the notion that the Confederates "nearly broke through" is misleading in the least. There were five CORPS waiting behind the hills. After perhaps some initial confusion in Union ranks, rest assured there would have been a massive counter-assault and the result would have been the same.
I thoroughly disagree that Lee had no choice. He had every choice. Falling back towards Washington would have forced Meade to follow, and given his Army command inexperience, he likely would have blundered into a well-laid Confederate trap, although certainly Lee did have to worry, himself, about being pinned between armies in Washington and Meade.
I assume you have been to Gettysburg. I don't know how anyone can look across that plain and expect 15,000 men, regardless of their artillery support, to attack troops who were dug in, and who outnumbered them. I stand by "moronic."
As for Grant, his attack at both Cold Harbor and right outside of Vicksburg under EXACTLY the same conditions was equally "moronic," and the only saving grace I find for Lee is that he only made that mistake ONCE, while Grant made it twice. But Sherman, on the other hand, managed to avoid those kind of frontal charges. But, then, that was partly due to Grant using up his own army in keeping Lee pinned.
I don't subscribe to the "Longstreet was late" theory. Lee was responsible for the destruction of the Confed. Army at Gettysburg. A more attuned commander would never have attacked once he lost the tactical advantage and certainly would not have moved without his cavalry providing intel.
Indeed, if Lee was as good a general as many think, he above all would have learned from BURNSIDE'S mistake at Fredericksburg, as the situation was almost exactly a mirror image.