China,Burma,Singapore,Global Crossing, Information Warfare Supremacy

While China may be the most obvious country trying to win over Burma's affections, Rangoon has, in fact, received significant advances from an altogether more subtle suitor, as William Ashton reports.

EVER since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have been persistent claims that Burma's military government has been secretly supported by Singapore. Rumours of a close strategic relationship continue to circulate under the SLORC's successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the formation of which seems to have been prompted by representations made to General Ne Win during his recent Southeast Asian tour. While Singapore's motives clearly include a wish to take advantage of the commercial opportunities flowing from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies, wider strategic factors are just as important.

Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation of the SLORC in September 1988, Burma was severely criticised by most of the international community. Aid and financial flows critical to the survival of the military regime were suspended. In addition, Burma's traditional arms suppliers announced that they would not sell it any new weapons or military equipment. Even West Germany, until then the main source of Burma's military technology, suspended co-operation on indigenous arms production. The SLORC, faced with the country's economic collapse and fearful of a link-up between ethnic insurgents in the countryside and urban-based dissidents, was desperate to restock its depleted armouries. China and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the first country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact Singapore.

DETAILS are hard to come by but, according to one regional journal, in October 1988 hundreds of boxes marked 'Allied Ordnance, Singapore' were unloaded from two vessels of Burma's Five Star Shipping Line in Rangoon's port. These shipments reportedly included mortars, ammunition and raw materials for Burma's arms factories. The consignment also contained 84 mm rockets for the Burmese army's Carl Gustav recoilless guns, which were made by Chartered Industries of Singapore under licence from Forenade Fabriksverken in Sweden. The shipment thus violated an agreement under which the original export licence had been negotiated, requiring that any re-exports only be made with the permission of the Swedish Government. No such clearance was granted.

In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the SLORC when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel were trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of SKS Marketing, a newly formed Singapore-based joint venture with the Burmese military regime. There have been reports that these latter shipments included second-hand 40 mm RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57 mm anti-tank guns of Eastern Bloc origin. One well-informed Burma-watcher has suggested that this equipment may have come from Palestinian stocks captured in southern Lebanon by Israel in 1982 and re-sold to Burma.

It is highly unlikely that any of these arms shipments to Burma could have been made without the knowledge and support of the Singapore government.

THESE gestures of practical assistance to the SLORC, at a time when it felt most vulnerable, won Singapore some powerful friends in the military regime. Largely because of this high-level support, the bilateral relationship has blossomed. Since 1988 there have been frequent exchanges of senior visitors, including the heads of state of both countries. Economic ties have also greatly expanded. Singapore is now Burma's largest foreign investor, with over US$1 billion committed to nearly 50 different projects (mainly in hotels, property development and tourism). Both governments appear to be prepared to overlook the fact that some of these investment dollars have been generated by narcotics production in the Golden Triangle. Notorious traffickers like Lo Hsing-han are thought to control a number of companies in Singapore that are investing heavily in Burma. The flow of illicit funds can also go in the opposite direction. For example, it has been suggested that in 1991 foreign currency generated by narcotics sales was used by the SLORC to pay for a large shipment of arms from China, with the money being passed through a bank in Singapore.

The close political and economic ties that now exist between Singapore and Burma are well known, but much less publicity has surrounded the bilateral co-operation that is occurring in a number of more controversial areas. Burma's armed forces, for instance have apparently continued to order arms and ammunition from Singaporean companies. They also seem to have turned to Singapore for military training, intelligence advice and defence technology. This has placed Singapore in a category reserved for Burma's special friends, a category currently shared only by the Burmese junta's main financial backer and strategically: China.

SINCE those early consignments, a wide variety of additional arms and ammunition has reportedly been shipped to Burma from firms based in Singapore, and Singaporean brokers appear to have facilitated the sale of munitions to Burma from other suppliers. The details of these deals are not always clear, but they are believed to have included M16A1 automatic rifles and 5.56 mm ammunition (apparently in violation of another export agreement attached to their licensed production in Singapore), 7.62 mm assault rifles and ammunition, communications equipment of various kinds and at least one (but possibly more) British Aerospace Bloodhound Mk 2 surface-to-air missile systems with Scorpion target illuminating radars. If this latter report is true, then Singapore would be responsible for providing the Burmese armed forces with their first guided missile system.

THE close bilateral relationship is also reflected in links between the armed forces of both countries. For example, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have provided training in Singapore to specialist units like the Burmese army's parachute team, and there have been persistent rumours in Rangoon that the SAF are providing the Burmese army with artillery training in Burma. Another version of this story has it that the SAF are, in fact, undertaking artillery training on Burmese ranges. This is one explanation given to account for the occasional visits to Rangoon of Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Fokker F-50 and Lockheed C-130 transports. In fact, RSAF aircraft regularly stage through Rangoon on their way to Bangladesh, reportedly on 'navigational training' flights. While some of these reports are difficult to prove, the relationship between the armed forces of the two countries is clearly much closer than publicly acknowledged.

Singapore is also believed to be the main source of information technology being obtained by Burma's military regime. For example, a Singaporean firm, or group of firms, has apparently installed computers throughout Burma's Defence Ministry and helped to upgrade its communications links with the 10 Regional Military Commands.

Singapore is probably also the source of the equipment installed in the ministry's 'cyber war centre' (created a few years ago under a new Directorate of Defence Services Computers). This centre is reported to be closely involved in the monitoring and recording of foreign and domestic telecommunications, including the satellite telephone conversations of Burmese opposition groups. A recent study has also suggested that Singapore may have provided the Burmese armed forces with modern frequency-hopping radios and encryption devices to protect their own signals from interception.

Bilateral co-operation may have also been extended to other intelligence areas. One Australian analyst has recently cited a claim that Singapore is providing intelligence training to Burma's 'secret police' in central Singapore. Hundreds of Burmese officers are reported to be involved. There has also been at least one credible press report that Singaporean intelligence officers have been observed in Burma near the Thai- Burma border. The current Singaporean ambassador to Burma is a former senior SAF officer and a past director of Singapore's defence-oriented Joint Intelligence Directorate. This appointment may simply be a coincidence, but it is curious that Singapore has chosen to assign someone with a military background to this new member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and not one of its many capable professional diplomats.

There have also been repeated, if still unconfirmed, reports that a Singaporean company, or group of companies, has stepped in to help modernise and expand Burma's arms industries, drawing on Singapore's well-developed expertise in this field. Singaporean technicians, for example, have apparently replaced the German technicians formerly based at Padaung, across the Irrawaddy River from Prome and close to one of the regime's well-guarded defence industrial complexes. Once again, these claims are difficult to verify, but Singaporean involvement in these factories would be consistent with the SLORC's (and now the SPDC's) aim of making Burma more self-sufficient in arms production. Singapore is less likely to face the kinds of domestic pressures which in 1988 forced Germany to reconsider its support for Burma's arms industries.

EVER since they began to surface, these rumours and news media reports have been consistently denied by the Singaporean government. Indeed, Singapore has shown considerable sensitivity to any suggestion that it is secretly supporting the military regime in Rangoon or turning a blind eye to Burmese money-laundering operations. Some of the reasons for this sensitivity are obvious. Despite ASEAN's ambivalent attitude toward Burma since 1988, there would be considerable diplomatic embarrassment to Singapore if it was known to be actively supporting an international pariah like the SPDC in such a fashion. Singapore can hardly accuse Western countries of interfering in Burma's internal affairs (by condemning the military regime's repressive policies) when it is helping to provide the same regime with the means to retain its iron grip on power. Nor does Singapore wish to lose its reputation as an honest dealer in regional affairs and a staunch opponent of narcotics trafficking.

There is another explanation for Singapore's sensitivity on this issue, however, and that is its wish to avoid any potential difficulties in its developing relationship with China. Despite statements to the contrary from elder statesmen like former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore is acutely conscious of China's growing economic strength and strategic influence. It has watched China's behaviour in the region, including its rapidly growing links with the military regime in Burma, with some concern. In order to avoid pushing the SPDC further into the arms of the Chinese, Singapore and the other ASEAN states have refused to join in the widespread condemnation of the Burmese junta for its abuses of human rights and have undertaken instead to 'constructively engage' the Rangoon regime.

These countries have included in their efforts the pursuit of commercial opportunities in Burma and in some cases modest defence ties, but in Singapore's case a close (and hidden) strategic partnership appears to be a very high priority.

OF all the ASEAN countries, Singapore is perhaps best placed to pursue this particular aim. It is not one of Burma's immediate neighbours and therefore does not have to cope with the territorial disputes and refugee outflows which tend to characterise Burma's relations with Thailand. Similarly, Singapore cares little about human rights, in particular the plight of the ethnic and religious minorities in Burma, which occasionally troubles Muslim states like Indonesia and Malaysia.

Also, having developed one of the region's most advanced armed forces and defence industrial support bases, Singapore is in a good position to offer Burma a number of inducements which other ASEAN countries would find hard to match.

Singapore seems to have decided that, in a number of ways, close links with the military regime in Rangoon serves its long-term national security interests. Having apparently assessed that Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy forces were unlikely to win power for the foreseeable future, Singapore has deliberately set out to forge closer ties with the real centre of power in Burma: namely the armed forces.

By assisting with arms sales, defence technology transfers, military training and intelligence co-operation, Singapore has been able to win a sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's official councils. From there, it is in a good position not only to encourage its own commercial interests but also to pursue wider strategic aims. These relate in part to Burma's own growing military capabilities, but also to China's future role in the Asia-Pacific region.

Singapore has recognised, perhaps more readily than most countries, that Burma has the potential to become a more influential factor in the region's changing strategic environment. As part of an ambitious expansion and modernisation plan, for example, the Burmese armed forces have grown from around 186,000 in 1988 to more than 400,000 - and at a time when all other regional countries are reducing the size of their armed forces. In addition, since 1988 the SLORC has acquired around 130 new combat aircraft, nearly 30 new naval vessels and large numbers of AFVs, multiple rocket launchers and artillery pieces. The Rangoon regime has also improved its command and control systems, and upgraded its military infrastructure. With one of the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia, newly equipped with a wide range of more modern weapons, Burma now has the potential to play a far greater conventional defence role than at any other time in its history.

MORE importantly, most of the new arms and equipment facilitating this massive military expansion programme have come from China, assisted by the provision of generous loans and special 'friendship' prices.

In addition, hundreds of Burmese servicemen have undertaken training courses in China, and up to 100 People's Liberation Army instructors have been posted to Burma at different times to teach Burmese personnel how to use their new weapons. China seems to have negotiated a comprehensive intelligence co-operation arrangement with Burma, which may even extend to the operation of joint signals intelligence posts scattered around Burma's long coastline. Since 1988 China has also played a major role in the development of Burma's civil and military infrastructure.

This dramatic departure from Burma's traditional neutrality in international affairs, along with its new strategic partnership with a major power like China, has sent ripples of concern around the region. There are fears that Burma may eventually become a 'client state' of China, provide support to Chinese naval deployments to the Indian Ocean or act as a stalking horse for Chinese interests in regional councils such as ASEAN. At times, these fears appear rather exaggerated and fail to take into account Burma's passionate nationalism and deep-seated suspicions of Chinese intentions. Some of these fears may in fact be politically inspired by countries like India in an effort to discredit China and garner favour with the ASEAN members. Even so, real concerns remain - including in Singapore - that China is developing such a hold on Burma's economy and armed forces that it will constrain the Rangoon regime's ability to act independently in the future.

THUS, Singapore has a number of immediate and obvious reasons for wanting to develop a close working relationship with Burma. These relate mainly to Singapore's own perceived commercial and political interests. Less obvious, perhaps, is Singapore's desire to cultivate better links with a regional country that is expanding its military capabilities and external contacts after decades of self-imposed isolation. In the final analysis, however, China's shadow falls constantly across Singapore's relationship with Burma, and it is concern about China's future role in the region that has prompted many of the steps taken by Singapore in recent years to consolidate its special relationship with the military regime in Rangoon.

While this remains the case, Singapore will continue to be very sensitive about any publicity which may complicate its long-term plans. These include a two-track approach of cultivating close relations with China while hedging its bets by supporting an independent Burma within ASEAN. In these circumstances, any prospect of Singapore's hidden partnership with Burma being re-examined as a result of international pressure seems remote.

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Not a new article. But interesting for connecting the dots in light of recent events. See this thread on Singapore and Global Crossing, which China was also a player in until recently. As the British used to say, nations have no friends, only interests.

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2 posted on 07/09/2003 5:35:02 AM PDT by Support Free Republic (Your support keeps Free Republic going strong!)

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