Independence Day

While the United States celebrates its independence day with fireworks and the rockets' red glare, China will be celebrating a holiday of military might.

China has announced that it will soon test its latest war rocket. The People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps is planning to test-fire a series of missiles, starting with its latest ICBM capable of striking the U.S., the new DF-31 mobile missile.

The DF-31 reportedly can carry a single 3-megaton H-bomb or three 90-kiloton nuclear warheads. The missile has an official range of over 4,800 miles.

The critical part of the DF-31 test is the fact that it is being conducted from the Lop Nur missile range, close to the Chinese nuclear weapons development facility. The test at Lop Nur indicates that the PLA missile troops are training with dummy nuclear warheads under live combat conditions, indicating that the missile is being moved from testing to actual deployment in the near future.

The Dong Feng 31, named "East Wind" after a Maoist slogan, reportedly is equipped with U.S. missile and warhead technology that was obtained by China through espionage, and legal and illegal technology transfers from the Clinton administration.

The PLA navy also announced plans to test its newest long-range missile, the Julang (Great Wave) 2, or JL-2.

"From open sources one cannot assess the real range of the JL-2," noted Richard Fisher, a senior fellow and defense analyst at the Jamestown Foundation.

"Most sources note it is the sea-borne counterpart to the DF-31, which is credited with a 8,000km (4,800mi) range. However, there is some unconfirmable reporting that the JL-2 may have longer range."

U.S. Navy sources expressed concern that a JL-2-armed submarine could sail to within a few hundred miles of the U.S. western coast. Such a move would place West Coast cities at "point blank" range, enabling the Chinese submarine to shower Los Angeles or San Francisco with nuclear warheads. The move would also place most – if not all – U.S. cities within range of the H-bomb-equipped missile.

"It is likely that the goal for the JL-2 is to be able to reach the Western U.S. from the Yellow Sea, an area that the PLA can defend with near current ship and aircraft resources. But of course, if the Type 094 SSBN is able to reach launch points outside this area, the JL-2's reach will increase," stated Fisher.

"India also fears this new SLBM as it expects that the PLA will produce enough Type 094 SSBNs to pose a credible second strike presence in the Indian Ocean," noted Fisher.

The Chinese army also announced a new series of tests from the northern Wuzhai launch site, to include the current DF-21 missile. The DF-21 has a range of 1,200 miles and reportedly carries a single 300-kiloton H-bomb.

Unlike the DF-31, the DF-21 is currently an active part of the PLA Second Artillery Corps arsenal. The tests are thought to be a new variant of the DF-21 equipped with an active radar imaging guidance system. The new guidance system may give the DF-21 an accuracy of less than 30 feet.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), not to be outdone by its rocket-firing counterparts in the Chinese army, has also unveiled its latest military creation, the FC-1 light fighter.

The FC-1 is being developed by CAC-1, formerly Chengdu Aircraft Corp., with partial funding by Pakistan. The FC-1 draws its design lineage from the Super-7 fighter program, a cooperative development between Chengdu and then Grumman Corp. The agreement was signed in 1988, but fell apart after Beijing's violent reaction to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989.

However, the FC-1 incorporates many features from the U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon design. The F-16 features appeared during the 1990s after Pakistan transferred a single F-16A fighter to China in exchange for DF-11 missile technology.

Russia also has contributed to the FC-1 project. The FC-1 reportedly incorporated several features of the now-defunct MiG-33 lightweight fighter project rejected by the Russian air force. The Russian MiG design bureau dedicated several teams of engineers to the Chinese fighter after the fall of the Soviet Union. A single modified MiG-29 engine, the Klimov RD-33, dubbed the RD-93, powers the FC-1.

The Pakistani air force eventually could buy up to 150 FC-1s, but this purchase depends on whether the aircraft meets performance expectations.

The aircraft is favored by the Chinese naval aviation arm but has found little support from within the PLAAF itself. The Chinese air force is currently testing another lightweight fighter named the J-10. The PLAAF leadership feels that the FC-1 is a waste of time and a costly duplication of the J-10 effort already under way.

Despite the increased testing of advanced weapons, the Chinese military is also carrying out its political war. Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Cao Gangchuan is slated to visit the U.S. this fall as part of a high-level military exchange.

Gen. Cao is well-known inside Pentagon circles but not as a field commander. Before taking the top Defense ministry post, Cao ran the highly effective techno unit of China's government known as the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).

From 1996 to 1998, Cao ran COSTIND's effort to exploit, purchase, borrow or steal advanced U.S. military technology. Cao had his job cut out for him due mainly to the overwhelming success of his predecessor. Cao took over COSTIND following the retirement of Gen. Ding Henggao. By 1996, Ding had already purchased his way into several U.S. corporations such as Loral, Hughes and Motorola.

Ding's efforts led to a massive inflow of advanced satellite, rocket, communication, computer and electronic technology authorized by the Clinton administration. Ding even personally participated in the acquisition of an advanced fiber optic communications network for the Chinese army.

Ding's right-hand man and second in command at COSTIND, Gen. Shen, not only managed to acquire Hughes satellites for the Chinese army but also landed his son a job at a classified position inside Hughes. COSTIND also obtained critical nose-cone design software from Hughes that now serves the DF-31, JL-2 and DF-21 missiles well.

Ding retired in 1996 but not without honors. The Central Communist Committee awarded his unit, COSTIND, the lead role in all future Chinese space projects, including manned space flights.

The close relationship between COSTIND and the Clinton administration is clearly illustrated in correspondence obtained by the Freedom of Information Act. In 1995, then Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote Gen. Ding a letter congratulating the Chinese general on "the 46th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China."

"Advancing the military relationship between our two nations remains an objective which we agree serves the long-term interests of peace and stability," noted Perry in his letter to Gen. Ding.

"We are making arrangements for the visit of a delegation of Chinese defense managers to the United States in the near future. This group will be hosted by the Departments of Defense and Commerce, as well as by U.S. industries. At the same time, we are exploring the possibility of providing assistance in facilitating intern programs for defense conversion specialists."

"Let me close by again conveying my respects to your on your National Day and by reiterating my support for our bilateral military relationship," concluded Perry.

As America celebrates its Independence Day, the words of William Perry are a chilling reminder of the new Chinese army weapons pointed at the United States and our allies.

I don't see (a) as an option. Indeed there is a slow 'invasion' into Russia, but given their lack of response by now I have to assume that this is a done deal between those in both governments. Russia is a very paranoid country when it comes to countries invading her on any level, thus she will react without restraint.(I could hear the cry now 'for the sake of your homeland we must defeat the invaders and remember the last time we won against the last invaders, the Nazis, we shall not surrender'[or something to that effect].) However, the two have concluded the Good Neighborly and Friendship treaty on 7-16-01 and a whole host of talks ranging from low, mid, and high level officials on both countries soils. Otherwise, the nukes would have flown long before over this when China was weaker. Now she grows in tech and heavy industry on a scale not seen in some time. Not to mention Russia's willingness to give a certain amount of tech as well fabrication abilities for components of China’s own modern weapon systems. The only question so far is what is Russia getting out of the deal?

They both supply support for the DPRK which is a major thorn in our side. Should war occur here and we are taken off guard, then China has the most to gain and by extension of the region so does Russia though to a lesser extent. At the moment the two countries have far more to gain by working together rather than in competition or outright hostility. After all, if America takes it on the chin in this region and possibly others, then we loss our power base which creates a power vacuum. So who has the ability to fill this power vacuum? The only other countries that can are China and Russia. And nothing brings two enemies together than the common hatred of another enemy. Should they succeed in this endeavor, no doubt the two would return to the old view as each being the enemy since they no longer have to worry about us. Its simple strategy, eliminate your greatest threat with your lesser threat and then take out your lesser threat since no one is there to stop you. So far the two have shown remarkable cooperation underneath, while keeping out of the world spot light as much as possible.

Indeed there is a slow 'invasion' into Russia, but given their lack of response by now I have to assume that this is a done deal between those in both governments.

You seem to be mistaking slow reflexes on Ivan's part for deal-making on both parties' parts.

Russia is a very paranoid country when it comes to countries invading her on any level, thus she will react without restraint.(I could hear the cry now 'for the sake of your homeland we must defeat the invaders and remember the last time we won against the last invaders, the Nazis, we shall not surrender'[or something to that effect].) However, the two have concluded the Good Neighborly and Friendship treaty on 7-16-01 and a whole host of talks ranging from low, mid, and high level officials on both countries soils.

It's called "international relations" because it consists of sovereign nations trying to f*** each other.

Otherwise, the nukes would have flown long before over this when China was weaker.

Ivan always calculates the likely gain against the likely loss.

China can do a s**tload of damage to European Russia. Are a few tens, hundreds, even a few thousand illegal immigrants worth starting a nuclear war over, given the likely consequences?

Now she grows in tech and heavy industry on a scale not seen in some time.

Not to mention Russia's willingness to give a certain amount of tech as well fabrication abilities for components of China’s own modern weapon systems. The only question so far is what is Russia getting out of the deal?

Hard currency. But that ain't enough to deal with the likely consequences.

They may yet regret this decision. Remember, on June 22, 1941, trainloads of Russian goods rolled west into the Greater German Reich minutes before Operation Barbarossa got underway.

They both supply support for the DPRK which is a major thorn in our side.

A "major thorn?"

Try "an annoying chihuahua."

Should war occur here and we are taken off guard,

A very BIG "if" that is unlikely to happen, except in the context of Joe Citizen getting surprised by a US invasion of North Korea.

then China has the most to gain and by extension of the region so does Russia though to a lesser extent.

How so?

At the moment the two countries have far more to gain by working together rather than in competition or outright hostility.

That can easily change. China is Enron with nukes. If their cashflow goes south, they might decide to try to establish the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" by kicking the round-eye barbarians out of Siberia.

After all, if America takes it on the chin in this region and possibly others, then we loss our power base which creates a power vacuum.

OK, China has to actually engineer the loss of out power base.

Kind of how you make Kodiak Bear stew. All you have to do is bag yourself a Kodiak Bear. Of course, to do that, all you have to do is make sure (a) you're alive and (b) the bear is dead. Of course...that last part is easy to say, but rather challenging to actually DO.

So who has the ability to fill this power vacuum?

Japan and India come to mind.

The only other countries that can are China and Russia.

Russia is in no shape to do it. That leaves China--which is, as I've observed, Enron with nukes.

And nothing brings two enemies together than the common hatred of another enemy.

And nothing divides them more quickly than the question of "is he really going to back this potentially suicidal move, or is he just going to stab me in the back?"

Should they succeed in this endeavor, no doubt the two would return to the old view as each being the enemy since they no longer have to worry about us.

Step #1 in Kodiak Bear Stew: catch the bear.

You are right, other academics are also beginning to ring the alarm bells in line with your assessment, but the State Dept./CIA and Condoleeze are apparently asleep at their posts. E.g.,

Insight on the News - Fair Comment
Issue: 07/22/03

Fair Comment
U.S. Must Stand Its Ground on the Korea Peninsula
By Alexandr Nemets and John L. Scherer

Is there a new Sino/Russian/North-Korean alliance that is reshaping the politics of Asia? Despite growing evidence of trilateral teamwork, the U.S. State Department has not yet acknowledged it. Though some observers consider North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il's recent behavior irrational and unpredictable, his actions in fact are bold and efficacious when viewed in the context of this burgeoning alliance.

Foreign-policy experts on Asia in general and North Korea in particular are asking: "Why has everything became so bad after everything seemed to be so good?" In 1994, Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, agreed to end his program of research and development of nuclear weapons in return for fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors to generate electricity. Pyongyang fulfilled the agreement until last year, when its reactors began to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

By April, North Korea had at least two nuclear warheads. By the end of this year, the number could total eight to 10. North Korean Taepo Dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles could deliver nuclear warheads to targets in Alaska and the continental United States.

Specialists have proposed combinations of carrot and stick to resolve this threat, tempering toughness with concessions. That always sounds good at least. This would involve economic sanctions and assistance to North Korea, especially sizable deliveries of food and fuel. Such a policy is both contradictory and conciliatory.

The Bush administration has solicited help from the People's Republic of China and Russia, which have closer relations with North Korea than does the United States. The United States has urged them to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear program. China, for example, provides half of North Korea's food and fuel imports. North Korean leaders have said they would regard economic sanctions as an act of war, and neither Moscow nor Beijing has responded positively.

Russia has suggested instead that Washington recognize the North Korean regime and provide economic assistance. In return for termination of its nuclear-, chemical- and biological-weapons programs, Pyongyang would sign a nonaggression pact that would guarantee no U.S. invasion of North Korea. Pyongyang then also would stop exporting missiles. If Washington accepted these proposals, North Korea would have gained diplomatic recognition by nuclear blackmail, an ugly precedent.

After the 1994 agreement, Washington ignored and virtually forgot North Korea. U.S. policy toward the country did not alter between January 2001 and September 2002, even under new Secretary of State Colin Powell. In October 2002, Pyongyang announced its program to build weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was back on track.

U.S./Chinese/North-Korean talks in Beijing collapsed at the end of April. In June, Washington stated it would pull back U.S. troops from the 150-mile border with North Korea and offered economic aid. All of this suggested confusion about events in the Pacific, or policy in disarray.

Chinese/North Korean ties have been enhanced since Kim Jong Il's unofficial visit to Beijing in May 2000. Beijing helped organize the unprecedented summit between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June 2000. This allowed Kim Dae-jung to launch his "Sunshine Policy" that seeks to avoid confrontation with the North. Many East Asia hands consider the policy - offering economic subsidies, political concessions and, possibly, bribes to North Korean leaders - appeasement. To hold the summit, Kim Dae-jung may have paid Kim Jong Il $1.7 billion, which North Korea used to purchase components for nuclear weapons and 40 fighter aircraft.

Beijing increased its economic support of Pyongyang following the May 2000 meeting. Exports from China to North Korea - primarily crude oil, oil products, grain and food items - jumped from around $330 million in 1999 to a little more than $450 million in 2000. Chinese imports from North Korea decreased from nearly $42 million to $37 million. Exports minus imports amount to subsidies from Beijing to Pyongyang, and these grew from $288 million to $413 million.

Military relations also warmed. In April 2001, a delegation of commanders from the North Korean People's Army signed an agreement in Moscow to resume deliveries of Russian weapons after a 10-year interruption. The Russian media trumpeted the agreement without providing details.

In July 2001, China and Russia signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation that codified the existing alliance between the two countries. That August, Kim Jong Il made a "triumphal visit" to Moscow, traveling by special train. Security was so tight that traffic on the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad was paralyzed for three weeks. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il initialed a series of cooperation agreements, then issued a joint statement demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Similar appeals appeared in the Beijing media.

In September 2001, President Jiang Zemin arrived in Pyongyang, the first visit of a principal Chinese leader to North Korea since 1992 when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations. The Jiang-Kim encounters resulted in strengthened economic and political cooperation and increased Chinese subsidies to North Korea.

The events of July-September 2001 have resulted in a de facto trilateral Moscow/Beijing/Pyongyang alliance. Although not yet codified, relations today are based on the bilateral agreements and treaties concluded during 2000-01. Official treaties have been supplemented by secret bilateral agreements concerning technological and strategic military cooperation.

The nature of these secret agreements remains unknown in the West. An attack on one party might bring the other two into the fray. If this is the case, plans to eliminate the North Korean nuclear potential by a pre-emptive strike could result in unforeseen complications.

By autumn 2001, Kim Jong Il, the leader of one of the world's most impoverished countries, felt powerful enough to risk a military confrontation with one of his neighbors. In December 2001, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) fired on a North Korean spy vessel that had entered Japanese territory. The North Korean ship fled to Chinese waters.

Was it doing Chinese bidding? During November-December 2001, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Beijing media vehemently opposed Japanese SDF logistical support of U.S. operations in the Arabian Sea.

At the end of June 2002, North Korean forces attacked South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea in their bloodiest clash in years. As if nothing had happened, Pyongyang earned several billion dollars in trade with the South, welcomed South Korean tourists and obtained investment and direct contributions from companies close to the Seoul administration. Most of this money ended up in the hands of Kim Jong Il who, according to the South Korean media and intelligence community, had stashed at least $4 billion in Western European banks by the end of 2002.

One may speculate that Kim Jong Il's regime organized the naval clash to increase "tributes" from the South. Obviously, he was not particularly concerned about South Korean or U.S. retaliation. At an earlier summit in St. Petersburg, Jiang and Putin had decided to increase bilateral strategic cooperation and to solidify their positions in key regions, particularly the Korean Peninsula. With such backing, Kim Jong Il felt he could act with impunity.

During Aug. 20-24, 2002, Kim Jong Il made his latest journey to Russia. Visiting the Primorye (Maritime) and Khabarovsk regions - those nearest Korea - he toured workshops at the Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aircraft Co., which produce Su-27 and Su-30 fighters for the Chinese People's Liberation Army and other military enterprises. On Aug. 23, Kim Jong Il held talks with Putin in Vladivostok, focusing on expanding their arms trade and on large-scale, near-term, joint economic projects. Afterward, Kim Jong Il directly challenged the United States and Japan by renouncing curbs on his nation's nuclear-weapons program. Deliveries of Russian tanks, jet fighters and air-defense missiles undoubtedly gave him confidence.

In October 2002, during talks with a delegation from the U.S. State Department, North Korean representative Li Gun announced that his country had resumed the development and production of nuclear weapons. Had Pyongyang consulted with Moscow and Beijing about the announcement? At virtually the same time, vessels of the Russian Pacific fleet held joint maneuvers with the North Korean navy in the Yellow Sea for the first time in decades. Moscow-Pyongyang joint action has reached its highest level since the 1960s.

During October 2002-May 2003, the State Department tried to resolve these outstanding issues without using force. The State Department apparently thinks it is dealing with Pyongyang alone, but it is, in fact, confronting the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triad, and all three countries seek the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. To relinquish control of the Korean Peninsula to this new alliance in exchange for elimination of Pyongyang's WMD programs surely is too great a price.

We offer five observations: 1) Washington should not expect Moscow or Beijing to help resolve this problem. 2) The crisis is long term and need not be fixed by next Friday. Washington can wait for favorable terms. It is the world's only superpower after all. 3) The United States should not appease Kim Jong Il or succumb to blackmail. Major concessions will lead only to more Korean coercion. 4) Washington must not acquiesce whenever Pyongyang becomes belligerent, even if it is supported by Russia and China. The Bush administration should not offer diplomatic recognition, food aid, economic assistance or nuclear technology until North Korea ends its WMD programs and begins to cooperate in the family of nations. 5) A U.S. national missile defense (NMD) ultimately may blunt the North Korean/Chinese/Russian threat. Work on the NMD must proceed speedily.

Alexandr Nemets, who worked for many years in the Russian Academy of Sciences, is an expert on economic and military issues of East Asia. John L. Scherer has written several articles on foreign policy and is the coauthor, with Nemets, of Sino-Russian Military Relations: The Fate of Taiwan and The New Geopolitics.

So what happens next? How do the ensuing events proceed in China's favor, expecially after the boys and girls in the silos and subs turn their keys? Can any of the Sinophobes on this board kindly give us a credible theory of victory for China in this scenario?

Remarkable. You appear to be either negligently or willfully ignorant of the extreme vulnerability of the low-alert U.S. strategic deterrent posture to a pre-emptive first strike. Follow the trends. Four to five years downstream, the Chinese may have 20 JL-2 subs. Or even false-merchantmen with their SLBMs loaded in VLS tubes. (This was once a deterrent concept the US explored). Meanwhile, we will have gone further down the DE-Preparedness route. You falsely assume that there will be any 'boys and girls in the silos and subs' with keys to turn. The U.S. has no Looking Glass flights currently running. The U.S. is in a complete stand-down as far as launch on warning. Indeed the policy remains to launch only after their strike has landed. So much muscle and sinew has been atrophied, deactivated or cancelled, that going back to that high-alert posture will be seriously non-trivial.

And clearly, the political attitude of GWB himself on these issues borders on the cavalier treason of Clinton himself. His unilateral reductions of our retaliatory missile force to less than 1600 warheads will mean that there are just too few launch systems to survive a dedicated JL-2 attack launched from 400 miles off the coast with depressed-trajectories (which may well have been tested in that mode, I have no reason to believe you claiming the contrary, nor should you believe yourself, since this testing is so easily implemented...e.g., the Russians have done so with their missiles). Their Mirv warheads targetting each of the paltry remaining U.S. strategic assets that Bush/Rice have left us.

If the accuracy is good enough (in the depressed mode), (still to be shown, of course) they can credibly destroy the missiles in their silos. The bombers also already cut in half, and also on virtually zero-alert preparedness, with no planes ready on the flight lines, will not be able to scramble fast enough on warning before destruction. Clearly the Chinese accuracy is good enough for that. NORAD, and Space Command can each be taken out with a few shots of the larger warheads. The sole basis for our having any retaliatory capability whatsoever will then rest with the at-sea Trident submarines and our carriers. GWB has been directing Rumsfeld to save money and go down to ONE Trident sub at sea. And ordered further reductions in the fielded totals pursuant the stupid Moscow Treaty. The in-port Tridents (all conveniently bunched up in Walla Walla) will die. That leaves one Trident. They may be hoping that with just ONE submarine they can learn to do as we do in our HUK techniques, and quietly trail it as it leaves port in Walla Walla. If so ( a big if, but then look at the improbable, yet undeniable technical espionage successes already displayed by them), then a nuclear torpedo ends that Trident.

Which leaves, if we are lucky, at-sea maybe 4 or 5 U.S. Carriers in the Pacific or Indian oceans. The Chinese may be mistaken, but from their literature, they appear to be hoping that they can target the carriers beyond the South China Sea with their IRBMs with satellite-based radar 'painting' of the ships, and either destroy or degrade them with a near-nuclear strike.

The long and the short of it is, I would maintain that we should take steps to reverse trends initiated by GHWB/Clinton/GWB. Instead of simplifying....we need to complicate the issues for a Russo-Sino first-strike threat, we make it inviting to their war planners. Better to deter it in the first place by doing those things, whether marginally more expensive or tedious, so that we are prepared for the worst-case. We will have the proof of their intentions or at least their threatened intentions, if they do dramatically deploy 250-300 of the JL-2s or improvements thereon.

With the slow U.S. political/military reaction time, it is always good to have then thought through a proper response well ahead of time if it calls for deployments of new defenses. In this case, clearly an NMD with 360-degrees azimuth would be a dramatic discouragement to Russo-Chinese schemes. Note just how vociferous were their (and their ancillary International Socialist allies) objections to our even inching up to that objective capability. This is the one potentially bright spot in the future trends of the GWB posture. Hence you can count on the Chinese to HEAVILY finance the campaign of Hillary in 2004, so that the NMD program gets either defunded, or neutered in some other way.

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