The plan itself was originally described in a more basic form to me here on FR by Travis McGee and then included in a more detailed fashion in my book series, THE DDRAGON'S FURY SERIES, about World War III arising out of an unholy allinace between Red China and the fundamental Islamic nation. I present it here as a suggestion, alternative or starting point for discussion.
1. You talk about the " Palestinian people " however, there has never been such a people...It is all an invention. They are Arabs from Jordan and Egypt.
2. Therefore, even if they get rid of the terrorists, which will not work, because of the fact these terrorists not only are in those territories, but from the entire Arab world. For example, Islamic Jihad and Hamas are based in Syria. So even if the territories were "empty" of terrorists, I'll be more would be sent into them after they become a state.
3. The new state, even if it is democratically elected, etc. will be aligned with the Arab world, therefore, defense pacts with other states will raise, etc. and the Arab world will just continue their plans of using that state to finally destroy Israel, because it would now be at its suicidal borders of 1967. Terrorism will restart.
4. But overall, I believe like you, we must give those Arabs an altimatum like we gave 48 hours to the Taliban regime.
Please see this plan by a right-wing minister in Sharon's government: Click here
For any plan of this sort to work there will have to be buy in from a majority of the existing Arab/muslim countries in the area.
No existing country is willing to take in the 'palestinians'. H*ll, most of the 'palestinians' came from Jordan initially.
I've given this some thought over the last few months. Here's what I have managed to read of the situation.
IMO, the wall that Isreal is implementing has a 50-50 chance of working well. How long can the 'palestinians' exist when cut off from the only country, Israel, that is willing to give them work or trade with them for anything?
For the Israeli security model to work, economic relations between Israel and 'palestine' will have to be ruptured. The idea of controlled movement of large numbers of workers, trucks and so on across the border is not compatible with the idea of the fence as a security barrier. Once movement is permitted, movement is permitted. Along with that movement will come guerrillas, weapons and whatever else anyone wants to send across. You cannot be a little bit pregnant on this: Either Israel seals its frontier, or the fence is a waste of steel and manpower. If the wall is not continual and unbreached, it may as well not be there.
If this goal is achieved, regardless of where the final line of the fence will be, then economic and social relations between Israel and 'palestine' will cease to exist except through third-party transit. Forgetting the question of Jerusalem -- for if Jerusalem is an open city, the fence may as well not be built, unless another fence is put around Jerusalem -- this poses a huge strategic challenge.
'Palestinians' historically have depended on Israel economically. If Israel closes off its frontiers, the only contiguous economic relationship will be with Jordan. In effect, 'palestine' would become a Jordanian dependency. However, it will not be clear over time which is the dog and which is the tail. Jordan already has a large 'palestinian' population that has, in the past, threatened the survival of the Hashemite Bedouin regime. By sealing off 'palestinian' and Israeli territories, the Israelis would slam 'palestine' and Jordan together. Over the not-so-long term, this could mean the end of Hashemite Jordan and the creation of a single Palestinian state on both sides of the Jordan River.
In this case the 'palestinians' could, in effect, take over the country of Jordan and become a true 'palestinian' country.
Two other scenarios exist. In one, the Hashemites survive and drive many of the 'palestinians' on the east bank of the Jordan into the West Bank; the Israelis maintain their cordon sanitaire and the 'palestinian' nation-state becomes an untenable disaster -- trapped between two enemies, Israel and Jordan. Israel would not object to this, but the problem is that the level of desperation achieved in 'palestine' might prove so chaotic that it either would threaten Israeli national security or set into motion processes in the Arab world -- and among Israel's Western allies -- that would increase pressure on Israel. In other words, the Israelis would wind up strategically where they started, with the non-trivial exception of fewer or no suicide bombings.
The other scenario is that the 'palestinians' do merge with Jordan, but -- given the dynamics of the Arab and Islamic worlds -- the new nation-state does not moderate but instead generates, with assistance from other Arabs, a major military strike force for whom the fence represents at most a minor tactical barrier rather than a strategic force. Under this scenario, the consequences would be a return to the strategic situation of 1948-1967 (except for Egypt's participation), with a potentially more powerful enemy to the east. If Egypt were to change its policies, the outcome could be strategically disastrous for Israel.
The fence strategy works only if the 'palestinian'-Jordanian relationship yields a politically moderate Palestinian state. That might happen, but there is no reason to be certain that it will. The essential purpose of the fence is to give Israel control of its security. The problem is that Israel can control the construction of the fence, but not the events after the fence is built. At some point in the process, Israel becomes dependent on the actions of others.
This is Israel's core strategic dilemma. At some point, no matter what it does, it becomes dependent on events that are not under its control.
As is the case in this world a lot of times, Israel does not have good choices. It has to make some bad ones work.