How Bush Got Religion

Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas seemed uncomfortable in the official meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Ariel Sharon, and President George W. Bush at their summit in Aqaba, Jordan, last week. So Bush stepped in and did what he does best: he schmoozed. Leaving aides and interpreters behind, the President took the two leaders outside, where they sat under the shade of palm trees for 40 minutes and discussed ways to give a fresh start to the peace process. "I wanted...to observe the interplay between the two," Bush said later. "Did they have the capacity to relax in each other's presence? I felt they did. The body language was positive."

George Bush sitting under a tree with Israeli and Palestinian leaders? That sight is a striking turnaround for a President who spent the first two years of his term carefully rationing his personal involvement in a conflict that had undone so many of his predecessors. But last week even many Arab leaders — who have long been skeptical of Bush and frustrated by his unbending support for Sharon — were impressed by the President's determination and depth of knowledge. "He spoke without notes, without help from his aides, and he really knew the details," says a member of an Arab delegation. "The difference between now and a year ago is amazing."

Bush's enthusiasm was genuine. One diplomat, who was in the room at a summit of Arab leaders in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh the day before the Aqaba meeting, said Bush delivered a blunt message: "Look guys, if I didn't think I could do this, I wouldn't be here. I wouldn't waste my time and come all this distance if I didn't know I could do it." White House aides later said that the President's words were not so self-referential, and that he didn't mean to suggest he alone was responsible for the future of the Middle East. Indeed, Bush spent a lot of time stressing that all parties need to take steps toward peace. But the President's decision to get personally involved in that effort — risking diplomatic embarrassment abroad and political backlash at home — was remarkable.

Bush's evolution — some might call it a conversion — on the road to peace began last June when he gave a speech declaring his support for the creation of a Palestinian state. But that support came with a catch: a change in Palestinian leadership. Critics charged that this was just a convenient excuse for doing nothing. Over the past two years the Administration has been content to stand by as Palestinian militias continued to take a heavy toll with suicide bombs and Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Palestinian towns in the West Bank. But Bush's aides argue that disengagement was a strategy designed to force changes in the Palestinian Authority. Only when the unreliable Yasser Arafat was shunted aside would the President act. That happened in April, when U.S. pressure, Israel's isolation of Arafat and a sense of hopelessness among senior Palestinians combined to force Arafat to agree to the appointment of Abbas. "What took place last week never would have been possible if Abbas hadn't happened," says a senior Bush aide. "And Abbas happened because of the President."

The summits last week also happened because of pressure from Arab leaders. A month after the President's speech, King Abdullah of Jordan and his Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher, went to Washington to plead with Bush to follow up his words with a plan. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser, rejected the idea. But in the Oval Office, King Abdullah and Muasher appealed directly to the President. The parties needed a guide, Muasher told Bush, to reach the goals laid out in his speech. "Sounds like a good idea to me," Bush replied. Suddenly the road map was born.

The road map in itself was nothing new. What was new was Bush's personal involvement. As his advisers wrote and rewrote each draft, the President steadily increased his engagement with and understanding of the issues. When he publicly backed the text of the road map last December, Bush, who once seemed to want nothing to do with the peace process, became inexorably linked to it. Says a former Administration official: "At first, it was basically the Jordanians saying 'You're going to war in Iraq, and we're going to help you, and we need this to cover our ass.' But now it's come to have this kind of canonical status."

Bush's conversion has a lot to do with one of his personal canons: keep your word. Last year, as he lobbied European and Arab leaders to join the coalition against Iraq, Bush swore that in return for their support he would dedicate himself to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Aides say Bush believes that without the support of Britain's Tony Blair and the tacit acceptance of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, war against Saddam Hussein might not have been possible. "When he needed their help, he made these guys a promise," a senior adviser to the President says. "It sounds like spin, but he takes that stuff seriously."

It's clear that Bush now takes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seriously too. His performance was the primary reason that almost all the Arab, Israeli and Palestinian participants left last week's meetings expressing cautious optimism. But there are countless ways the process could unravel. If Abbas fails to rein in the militants, Sharon could be forced to respond aggressively and expose Bush to charges from hard-liners at home that he's jeopardizing Israel's security in a misguided quest to be a peace broker. Just two days after Aqaba, Hamas, one of the most militant terrorist groups operating in the Palestinian territories, scuttled a meeting with Abbas to discuss a cease-fire. And if Bush sides with Sharon, the stature the President has only just secured with the Arabs will disappear. "The summit was fine and dandy," says a senior Arab diplomat who participated in the sessions. "But there will be a snag. If Bush steps in and clears it up, everyone will fall into line behind him. If he doesn't, they'll write him off." And yet the risks for Bush may be less than they seem to be. "The public has low expectations of success because they know so many U.S. Presidents have tried this before," says a top aide. Bush will get credit from American voters for trying, even if he fails — an important consideration just 17 months before the election.

Winning over leaders is one thing; convincing wary Palestinians, Israelis and Arabs that this peace process will lead somewhere is another. Few Palestinians share the optimism felt at Aqaba. They doubt Bush's sincerity, are suspicious of Sharon's intentions and fear Abbas is an American puppet. "The problem with the Americans," a Palestinian Authority official tells TIME, "is that they get bored with the Arab-Israeli conflict very easily."

Bush subscribes to the great-man theory of history — the idea that individual leaders can have an outsize impact on the course of events. For now, he is full of optimism and enticed by the prospect of success. "A lot of Presidents have tried," Bush said as Air Force One left Aqaba. "Every President should try. We ought to use the prestige of America to try for peace... [And] maybe history is such that now we can achieve it." Even if Bush suspects that the road isn't likely to lead to everlasting peace, he at least knows he has to start traveling it.

That's it? That's all it was, a 'you scratch my back I'll scratch yours?

Before the war with Iraq, I thought Bush was telling Sharon to back off on Arafat until we stabilized more countries in the Middle East.

If this article is accurate, Bush was calling for restraint from Sharon to satisfy the Arabs.

If this is true, Bush is a fool. He has given the go ahead to the terrorists and the Arab nations who are not our friends. They will not stop at Israel and we will be next. Again.

you're overestimating the palesinians. sharon can make any gestures he pleases--because the israeli position is written into the "reservations" to the agreement with bush's roadmap. meanwhile the palestinians keep blowing things up.

this thing is no different from any of the other "peace processes". The only question is who is the onus on when the "peace process" fails.

sharon is doing his bit to make sure that that finger does not fall on him--or Israel. He serves Israel's interests well.

But in the Oval Office, King Abdullah and Muasher appealed directly to the President. The parties needed a guide, Muasher told Bush, to reach the goals laid out in his speech. "Sounds like a good idea to me," Bush replied. Suddenly the road map was born.

And...

Says a former Administration official: "At first, it was basically the Jordanians saying 'You're going to war in Iraq, and we're going to help you, and we need this to cover our ass.' But now it's come to have this kind of canonical status."

Ping.

"Arab leaders — who have long been skeptical of Bush and frustrated by his unbending support for Sharon — were impressed by the President's determination and depth of knowledge. "He spoke without notes, without help from his aides, and he really knew the details," says a member of an Arab delegation. "The difference between now and a year ago is amazing.""

The only thing that gets Arab leaders this excited is high oil prices and the smell of Israeli blood.

A year ago Bush was perceived as supporting Israel. "The difference between now and a year ago is amazing".

And disgraceful.

"Bush's conversion has a lot to do with one of his personal canons: keep your word. Last year, as he lobbied European and Arab leaders to join the coalition against Iraq, Bush swore that in return for their support he would dedicate himself to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Aides say Bush believes that without the support of Britain's Tony Blair and the tacit acceptance of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, war against Saddam Hussein might not have been possible. "When he needed their help, he made these guys a promise," a senior adviser to the President says. "It sounds like spin, but he takes that stuff seriously."

He should have never made that promise. I think it puts us in violation of some prophecies. But having made the promise, Bush is right that he needs to follow through. It's a done deal.

The only Biblical example I can think of is when the canaanite tribe misrepresented themselves to Joshua as foreigners and asked to be Israel's slaves. Joshua accepted without consulting the Lord. It put Israel in violation of God's command not to allow any of the canaanites stay in the land. But once the deception was known God didn't tell Israel to go back on their word.

It seems to me like that is the position the US is in now. If we go forward we are likely one of the countries that God accuses of "dividing His land". If we go back, we break our word.

If we go forward we are likely one of the countries that God accuses of "dividing His land".

The basic issue is a valid one. The problem is that the boundaries of the true Promised Land - and that of the putative Palestinian state, are unclear. It may very well be that there is a solution that maintains the integrity of the true Promised Land. I won't claim to know exactly where those boundaries are, but that's the point. Neither does anyone else.

Giving up all of Israel would clearly be wrong, just as it is clear that Jerusalem must be part of Israel. But it is also clear that there could be a Palestinian state in the area (perhaps not satisfactory to the Palestinian Arabs, of course).

Looking at it from the other side, and leaving out religion for the moment, the current situation is that the Palestinian Arabs feel they are without hope of equal status in a Jewish state (with justification - if they got it, the state would no longer be Jewish). While the tactic of terrorism is not at all justified, their desire for self-determination is reasonable and probably ineradicable. The two options are total exclusion (send all the Palestinian Arabs to Jordan), or giving them an independent state.

Being a pragmatist on this, I suggest giving them a state, once they show sufficient integrity to make their commitment to manage their own state meaningful (and not merely use it as a basis for continued terror attacks). It wouldn't be long before they run whatever state they have into the ground, but then the moral ground would be clearly - even to adversary nations - with Israel. The slogan could (and probably would be) "Let the Arabs care for the Arabs. We gave them their own state. It's not our problem." Is it a perfect solution? Of course not. But I don't believe there is sufficient commonality of basic premises to have a solution everyone will 'like', only one they may accept.

While the tactic of terrorism is not at all justified, their desire for self-determination is reasonable and probably ineradicable. Of course. But that has been done long time ago: Jordan is a "Palestinian" state. What is wrong with self-determination expressed there?

The two options are total exclusion (send all the Palestinian Arabs to Jordan), or giving them an independent state.

In view of the above, why do you view what was the original arrangement as exclusion?

But the question is, is the President in agreement with his own words?

On June 24, 2002, the President laid out conditions for the Palestinian Arabs to get their second state (after Jordan).

Have they met these conditions? I think not. The June 24, 2002 speech was a landmark event, a shock to the system of the Arab leaders that told them the U.S. was no longer going to do business as usual and had stopped tolerating the "Palestinian brand" of terrorism.

Many people had high hopes then and were full of admiration for Bush, myself included. I say he has gone back on his words. None of the conditions the President set out then have been met. The "road map" is a terrible idea, an abomination that cannot work.

In view of the above [Jordan as home for Palestinian Arabs], why do you view what was the original arrangement as exclusion?

Actually, the original agreement was that the area of the British Mandate in Palestine that became Jordan would be governed by Muslims, just as the area that became Israel would be governed by Jews, but there was never a requirement in either area that those living in those areas move to the region governed by others of their faith. The Arabs in Jordan expelled the Jews who had been living there since Roman times, but the Jews did not expel the Muslims who had been living in their area since Mohammed. It was allowed that they relocate, but not required.

But, on a larger note, I have long (though not in this forum) maintained that after some reasonable time, any territorial claims become moot if they are not actively pursued in an effective way (through state-to-state combat, or by mutually-acceptable legal means). As a general rule, I would use ten years as a 'reasonable' time. Under that standard, the Argentines were wrong to try and capture the Falklands, yet the Allies were justified in trying to free Europe from the Nazis.

Similarly, the boundaries after the 1967 war should be considered sovereign to Israel, though they have no claim on the entire area once ruled by Solomon (no legal claim that is - there might be a valid religious claim). Nor do Christians have a claim on all the area once conquered in the Crusades, nor do Muslims have a claim to Spain, etc.

In that context, the Israelis have a problem to address with the dissatisfied Palestinian Arabs within their borders. Because the nature of their (Jewish) state is incompatible with the Muslims achieving the self-determination they demand (as would most people, though of course terrorism is not a legitimate tactic to achieve their demands), the problem should be addressed by Israel as sovereign over the lands in question.

Returning to your question, I view it as exclusion to force Palestian Arabs to leave Israel, just as I would have viewed it as exclusion (happened before I was born) to force Palestinian Jews to leave Jordan and Syria and Egypt in 1948.

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