Is this still true? Certainly most of them have received their battle experience in SE Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East, which would bode well for the change in perspective which you suggest.
I believe that the focus of many Army officers has certainly shifted since Gulf War I, but the institutional transformation has not yet occurred. Throughout the 1990s, the Army still had to dedicate too much of its energy and resources to an outdated mission in Germany. But even after the head has changed, the body must also adapt to a new reality.
GWI was highly successful, but the campaign involved a ponderously slow transport and buildup of a massive force which was built for a pitched slugout with the Soviets. The long and unopposed buildup at Al Jubayl's custom-built port was a luxury that we may never enjoy again. GWII was an improvement, but only because Rumsfeld selected those units which could be most flexibly deployed.
What will change next is the structure of our forces to support this new expeditionary strategy. The Air Force has already transformed itself into an expeditionary force, and the Marine Corps has always been a flexible blend of expeditionary air-ground task forces. The new Army will become a more nimble combination of heavy and mobile forces which can deploy more rapidly and respond more flexibly.
Change is necessary but hard, and Rumsfeld will have to overcome strong opposition from entrenched Army leadership. Round one just ended; the new Army Secretary is the old Secretary of the Air Force and a Navy veteran. Next will be General Shinseki's replacement as the new Army Chief of Staff. Let's wish the Army well in its transition...