Joint Forces Command Plans Report On Lessons Learned From Iraq

Defense Daily | May 9, 2003 | Hunter Keeter

[Stand Watch Listen]

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is preparing a report for Pentagon leaders on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom in joint warfighting at the operational level, with results expected this summer, according to a top admiral.

"We have about 30 people in Qatar...collecting information and lessons learned on things the services at the joint level need to fix," Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, JFCOM commander, yesterday told reporters attending a Defense Writers' Group breakfast in Washington, D.C. "I will brief [Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Air Force Gen. Richard Myers and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld] in mid-June...we will provide [Rumsfeld and Myers] some insights prior to 16 June."

Following a September 2002 directive from Rumsfeld, JFCOM has a mandate to advocate "jointness" across the services, and to support development of an acquisition strategy for achieving "coherent joint operations," particularly regarding investments in command and control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); strategic lift; close air support; and simulation and training.

Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom are expected to support the effort to derive a revised, joint concept of operations for all services--one that will emphasize networked operations with forces on land, sea and in the air joined via datalinks and other communications capabilities--and a revised acquisition strategy to accompany that.

"That's what it means to drive jointness down to the lowest level," Giambastiani said. "We find that [networked forces] allow us a more lethal, quicker, more responsive fight."

Among the material now being developed into JFCOM's report on Operation Iraqi Freedom is an assessment of the "robust" presence and performance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) during the war, particularly those at the tactical level, which Giambastiani noted would "proliferate."

"The question is, to what level do we command and control these UAVs?" he said.

Including UAVs, the gamut of command and control, and ISR capabilities employed during Operation Iraqi Freedom is under review.

"How do we do joint [command and control and ISR]?" he said. "[Particularly] the capability to collect and bring [information] together in a very timely way...so commanders can make timely decisions? This is going to continue to be a big issue for us."

Another lesson from Operation Iraqi Freedom concerns the organization and operation of strategic lift assets. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States spent roughly $48 billion on strategic lift, including the construction of a fleet of nearly 20 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off transport ships and the purchase of 150 Boeing [BA] C-17 transport jets.

"[However,] we have spent a paltry sum on the process side of how we put all the components together," Giambastiani said.

Additionally, lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom are expected to support the strengthening of joint training concepts. Giambastiani stressed that wargaming exercises, as well as real-world operations in Iraq have underscored the importance of facing anti-access strategies and developing capabilities for assured access.

Additionally, joint training methods developed after the lessons learned in Iraq are expected to include renewed focus on solving challenges in close air support and in "blue-force" combat identification, areas that were problematic for U.S. and British forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Giambastiani offered few observations of "friendly fire" incidents in Iraq, noting only that some problems remain to be solved and training may play a significant role in risk mitigation in the future.

But he also noted the presence of some technical challenges, particularly to combat identification in a complex and dynamic battlespace.

"The problem is, we have multiple systems" providing blue force tracking information, Giambastiani said.

[conservatism_IS_compassion]

When air dominance exists, intelligence and reconnaisance become essentially the sole limitations our effectiveness. Looks to me like UAV's need to get cheaper and smaller.

[glorgau]

Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States spent roughly $48 billion on strategic lift, including the construction of a fleet of nearly 20 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off transport ships and the purchase of 150 Boeing [BA] C-17 transport jets.

This is the type of line item that the Europeans need to put in their budgets if they want to become relevant. It would only be one among many. I really doubt they have the political will to do that.