Ayn Rand and the Intellectuals

Sierra Times ^ | 5/1/03 | Ray Thomas

[spunkets]

" Subordinating self-interest to the interest of others most certainly is altrusim. Randites avoid confronting the glaring contradictions in her "philosophy" by closing their eyes to them."

Individuals that are interested in what interests others might have are not subordinating anything, it is what interests them. IOW, it happens to be one of their many interests; that makes it a self interest. There is no glaring contradiction. There is only a denial by Rand's detractors, that an individual could possibly be interested in someone else's interests. The fact is that Rand herself was interested in the welfare of others. That's why she held and defended the noninitiation of force principle as central to her moral code.

[GSWarrior]

I've never read anything by Rand,

If you're inclined, start with 'We The Living', IMO her best and least polemic work.

[Roscoe]

Individuals that are interested in what interests others might have are not subordinating anything, it is what interests them.

It's not altruism if it "interests" them. Quite a non sequitur.

[general_re]

All knowledge includes assumptions at its base. By definition, assuptions are not proved. If you don't believe the assumptions, all that's built upon them is suspect, but nonproveable assumptions there must be.

Very true, but that kills the notion that objectivism is the only "logical" system of philosophy. If you accept the premises as axioms, then you can construct the objectivist system in a perfectly logical manner, but since there's no way to prove the axioms, there's no real reason to accept the axioms of objectivism over some other set of axioms. And if I then choose to substitute some other set of unprovable axioms - such as "God exists and he says X is wrong" - then I can construct some completely different system in a perfectly logical manner, just as logically as I can construct the objectivist philosophy.

No philosophy is completely self-contained and completely provable - it can't be, as you quite rightly point out. That doesn't make objectivism inherently inferior to other philosophies, but it ends any nonsense about it being inherently superior.

[spunkets]

"The argument is about whether we humans have a moral right to do to each other what we do to other species, and what other members of species do to each other. The evidence in this regard points to the conclusion that it is OK, "if you can get away with it."

There is no moral right to do any such thing. That is the natural order of the immoral. There is nothing moral about it.

Moral codes and their fundamental principles are created by rational beings for a purpose. They are not found in nature. Nature is governed by nonrational automatic forces. The forces involved in moral guidance are derived from their creation by rational beings.

[laredo44]

We can make all sorts of normative arguments about how we should behave, but that's not the same as establishing moral absolutes, no matter how you slice it - "useful" is not the same as "true".

There is but one moral absolute. Liberty.

[Roscoe]

There is no moral right to do any such thing. That is the natural order of the immoral. There is nothing moral about it.

It's pure self-interest in action.

[r9etb]

Why do neither you or r9etb provide us with your system of moral values?

Because we're not discussing them. We're discussing the supposedly logical, rational, proveable basis of Rand's philosophy.

You're trying to change the subject.

[spunkets]

"It's not altruism if it "interests" them."

No one can act without it interesting them. We are talking about rational beings here. There is absolutely no way any man can act, unless he is interested in doing so. That includes coercion, because the only way coercion can work is if the man wishes to avoid pain, or to live on this Earth a little longer.

If you don't think so, then explain how anyone can act if they not interested in doing so.

[r9etb]

Altruism is a suicidal form of slavery.

Prove it.

[Space Wrangler]

I'm currently reading Atlas Shrugged again, and she has the current liberal philosophy pegged to a tee. It's almost spooky. And all this from a book that was written in the 40's.

[spunkets]

It's automata; it's not moral action.

[Roscoe]

No one can act without it interesting them.

Any action fits that definition and you've said exactly nothing.

[unspun]

I posted it in the form "Why would it be not in my rational self interest to become a dictatorial superman?" and got "That's impossible" as the answer.

I guess they think that Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao, etc., didn't exist.

Nor John D. Rockefeller, nor J. Paul Getty, nor US Steel, nor Microsoft, of course. ;-`

[freeforall]

I believe that it's impossible to achieve moral perfection according to divine standards, and that it's only possible for short stretches under human standards. As with any other learned skill, keeping it honed to utter perfection flies against man's nature. Michael Jordan missed baskets. Da Vinci made bad brushstrokes. Einstein was goofy at arithmetic. No great moralist—Rand included—ever led a perfectly ethical life. Learned skills can be polished, but never perfected. Does that mean that men have "feet of clay" and that, therefore, moral ideals are pointless? Hardly. No rational man believes that failure to achieve perfection negates the necessity for standards of right and wrong. Standards are ideals toward which to strive.
I regard thinking as more flexible than dogmatism. Principles belong in the field of thinking, whereas rules tend to fall in the field of dogmatism. This is not always true, but in practice it tends to work out that way. For example, we've all heard of the boss or coworker who is so rigidly rule-oriented that he becomes unreasonable. He is unable to adapt to a shifting context. On the other hand, a principled man can adapt, because he knows that principles are always contextual. The rule-slave will not be charitable to a late coworker because the rule is that you arrive at work on time - period. Never mind unexpected traffic jams or other factors, that's the rule! On the other hand, while the principled man will view timely arrival as a good idea, he'll understand that it only makes sense in normal situations - that is, unless the underlying context changes.
One of the factors that has undermined conceptual thinking in America is the failure to appreciate the true usefulness of principles. Part of that usefulness is their flexibility, their resilience in the face of the vagaries of real life. Take another example. A rule-oriented man who accepts the dictum, "Though shalt not kill," can easily be led to pacifism. He will never kill for any reason. He takes the rule as a rigid, noncontextual absolute. The principled man, on the other hand, will look at the commandment and question it. After all, he knows that a person has the right of self-defense, which may occasionally require him to kill an aggressor. That is also why the original version of the commandment was, "Thou shalt not murder," a principle, not merely a rule. Over the eons, the original has been corrupted to the point near nonsense.

I know that not everyone looks at the difference this way, but I think it's the distinction that makes the most sense. This is not to deny that principles can, at a certain level, also be absolute. They are absolute in the sense that one can, to the best of his ability, put their application into full context for a particular situation. On the other hand, actually achieving full context is an enormously difficult thing in the fray of daily life. It's so easy to miss facts and other relevant ideas in the heat of stress and motion. Hence, most philosophers (Rand and a few others excepted) don't think that it makes sense to talk about applying principles absolutely. Theoretically, sure. But to act in an absolutely - i.e., flawlessly - principled fashion, no.
Now, if Rand meant that it's possible to do the right thing - to act perfectly at times or in certain situations - like bowlers can hit 300 games or golfers can shoot holes-in-one - sure, who could disagree with that? But to achieve perfection overall in one's moral life? I've yet to meet the man who's done so. I think it's inconsistent with human nature. Part of our nature is to learn by trial and error - i.e., from our constantly generated imperfections.

[r9etb]

All knowledge includes assumptions at its base. By definition, assuptions are not proved. If you don't believe the assumptions, all that's built upon them is suspect, but nonproveable assumptions there must be.

Right. But Rand claims claims that her assumptions are correct, and that all others are wrong -- which implies that she's got some means of proving her unprovable assumptions.

The problem is, what happens if I invoke what I see in nature and explained by the theory of evolution, as the basis of some other system? For example, I could choose, "what's best for the species," or "might makes right," either of which can be defended by observable evidence, and both of which are anathema to what Rand claims.

In that case, we see that Rand's "assumptions" have some real problems -- and at the very least her system is not objective.

[general_re]

There is but one moral absolute. Liberty.

Just don't worry about objectively proving that - instead, take it as axiomatic, and we'll be okay ;)

It all depends on your axioms, in the end. The devout Christian will tell you that hedonism is wrong because God says so. And despite a lot of noise otherwise, the objectivist answer really boils down to not much more than saying that hedonism is wrong because Rand says so. The casual reader may be excused for failing to see how the second is an objective improvement over the first...

[Roscoe]

It's automata; it's not moral action.

Acting in self-interest is "automata", rejecting self-interest is "moral action"?

Her theology's internal contradictions have got you arguing against yourself.

[unspun]

I'm currently reading Atlas Shrugged again, and she has the current liberal philosophy pegged to a tee. It's almost spooky. And all this from a book that was written in the 40's.

If you'd like to read something even more interesting, try The Abolition of Man by C.S. Lewis and How Should We Then Live by Francis Schaeffer.

[laredo44]

That doesn't make objectivism inherently inferior to other philosophies, but it ends any nonsense about it being inherently superior.

Inferiority and superiority depend on the value of the axioms underlying them. A good axiom, one that will lead to a superior philosophy, is one that is so obvious people stare at you as if to say, "Well, of course that's true, why would you even mention it." When you get axioms not rooted in cultures, you're getting somewhere.

Can you get to one philosophy that is superior to all others? It will have to be pretty generic. The only axiom I can think of is it must be based on liberty.