Save The Apache, Lose The Gold Plating (AH-64D Performance During Gulf War II)

Soldiers For The Truth ^ | April 29, 2003 | David Hackworth

[Mark Felton]

Hi, yeah, I understand the possibilities for mmw detection, recognition, identification, classification.

It has met with some success, but very limited. Several times the program was close to being killed as I recall due to its failures. I recall some story about testing at Yuma (I think) where it missed the target and flew several hundred meters out of the way to destroy some test facility persons truck.

I am a veteran of the "passive" target detection, tracking, recognition research. That field for over 40 years has held great promise for target recognition and identification. It still holds that promise. It ain't there yet though for reliable battlefield recognition.

I suspect the Longbow identification problem isn't quite resolved yet either. (it may be aided by off platform reports, or multi-sensor fusion, but on its own it is difficult for many, many targets).

[scott7278]

"THere should be a Heavens Gate alert when posting the Hack Hackworth. He looks like the dude that gave all his followers the kool-aid a few years back... Applewhite? Applegate? Something like that."

[Mark Felton]

" Unless you are flying over an urban area and the ZSU is down in an alley. Radar is not so effective in that situation."

That's true. radar is not much good at all. But then the ZSU is not much good either because it would have a very limited line-of-sight. It would have to be waiting to fire, and then a helicopter fly over and then for the short time the helicopter is visible it would have to train the gun and fire while the helicopter continued to move.

By their nature AAA must be in open areas with a long line-of-sight and wide field of view, which makes them exposed. Otherwise they aren't much good.

[lepton]

And with the A-10's round able to penetrate heavy armor at 8,000', and the ZSU being lighly armored, the range for an A-10 gun to achieve a kill on a ZSU is well beyond the ZSU range. Won't go into specifics, but I assure you, even with a 5-mil dispersion of the gun, the ZSU is toast.

Can the A-10s gun fire further and with more punch than the ZSUs? Surely and without question. That, however was not the point. The point was that if the A-10 was within the ZSUs range before it spotted the ZSU, then the A-10s guns extra range doesn't count for much.

From time to time, especially in cities, a guy with a knife has all the range he needs to take out the guy with the rifle. It is armor and recon that block that ability, not more range.

[lepton]

The A-10 gun is the weapon that gives the A-10 the ability to infleucne the battlefiled. The gun gives fexibility and the ability to engage all sorts of targets, on multiple passes, with less collateral damage (frag). This is why we see the A-10 doing Urban CAS and NOT the B-52.

An additional thing is that in certain situations, the bomb takes too long to get there. The tactical situation and positioning can change in the time it takes the bomb to get from targetting through launch to impact. The guns bullet/round gets to its target within seconds of launch.

[scott7278]

It was Marshall Applewhite, otherwise known as Do. He and his followers drank phenobarbital (used as a sleep aid and for the treatment of certain types of epilepsy) and vodka.

[Light Speed]

"Into Laos" by Keith William Nolan...Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719.

One chapter has ARVN fighting for their lives on a firebase hill top..a U.S. servicemen from a shot up helo is doing CAS..and keeping them alive one more night.

He dives in a Huey on orders...watches Charlie overrun the base...then gets shot down minutes later....finding himself on the next firebase in the chain..it too nearly overrun.

Yet a column of ARVN tanks sat just down the road from one firebase...smoking cigs..watching their buddies get the chop.....ARVN commanders..having their interpersonal/revenge/spite issues manifest.

A great read..and hard not to be really pissed off after..and yet recognize the bravery and determination of U.S. servicemen and a few John Wayne type ARVN units that fought bravely to the last man.

[Mark Felton]

"multi-mission lawn dart (F-16)"

LOL. You're an F-15 fan, no doubt. I'd hear that term often from my wife and friends at Boeing.

(I'm a former "gunrunner" as well. I was peddling anti-tank missiles, and sighting systems internationally during the 1990's)

[Charles Martel]

That makes me wonder if a fixed-wing like an A-10 would be all that effective. The enemy targets are fluid and dug in around civilian structures. You want something that can hover to take it out.

A-10s were used against some of the buildings in downtown Baghdad, whacking rooftop snipers and such. Infantry and SF types have to call in the strikes, but the Thunderbolt II is the best close ground support aircraft around.

The Apache is very impressive as well, they just ran into a bit more trouble this time out. We did lose an A-10 to enemy fire, too.

[Leisler]

Name me one type of infantry, special forces, aircraft, ship, etc or anything else that doen't have a bad day under the wrong circumstances?

[Light Speed]

Hello Virginia

Was watching CNN one night...saw an A-10 loitering in an arc...no evasive turns over Bugdud.

I can't say what the relative hieght was of that A-10....but my first response was a "Knowing"..you can't fly that low and that profile..your gonna get hit.

Next morning woke up to learn, 3 A-10's had been hit...I may have seen the guy who caught it in the engine nacel.

I did detect a certain overconfidence in some of the military logistical/recon movement.

The Iraqi's left so much stockpiled..never been out of the box stuff..it seemed they did not possess enough intelligent operators for all the goodies they still had...which means the U.S. could have sustained a way higher loss ratio.

It would appear that "Shock" warfare works today as good as it did in WW-2 with Blitzkreig...just drive on them...they fold,as they have no rally point..that is unless you let them have one..then you do pay for that..ie Karbala..and the Apache's.

I do believe the airpackage near the ground is going to have its bad day soon...because really nasty weapons do exist..which were not seen in Iraq...more likely used in the Balkans/Chechnya...with results shielded.

Kinda tragic..but am epecting that "Hunting" spirit from these regions to finds it mirror in Iraq....Islam is like that..and hunting men to their deaths is a person thrill to this crowd.

[Rokke]

Stating something was "designed for Soviet threats" does not equal your statement, "The development of the Longbow had everything to do with the Soviets and massive armor penetration through the Fulda Gap". We haven't designed a weapon system since 1945 that wasn't designed to defeat Soviet threats. In fact we still are, but now we call them FSU threats.

The requirements for the A-10 were not based on experiences from Vietnam. They were driven by the need to counter Soviet and Korean armor. If you would continue to read the GlobalSecurity source you reference that is made very clear. I quote... "In the years following 1967, the A-X mission requirements began to change as the threat of Soviet armor and all-weather operations became embedded in military priorities. In 1970, the requirements for the A-X mission were changed, and the Air Force issued a new request for proposals (RFP)."

I'll give you the last point. Your original post didn't specify which Hellfire version you were talking about.

[Tallguy]

The problem remains, how do you justify spending bucks on a single mission aircraft like the A-10, that can only do one mission really well, rather than spending the bucks on a multi-mission lawn dart (F-16) that can do various missions but not so well.

You put your finger on it. Military organizations exist most of the time in a state of "Peace." This means they have a tendency toward purchasing weapons that are economically efficient during peacetime. Multi-mission aircraft like the F-16 & F-18 are perfect examples of this kind of bookkeeping.

When the sh*t hits the fan, however, you often need that weapon system that best fits the mission. Unfortunately, this is the weapon that was deemed to costly by the beancounters because it only did one mission very well.

[Gunrunner2]

>>Hello Virginia<<

Howdy, Canada.

>>Was watching CNN one night...saw an A-10 loitering in an arc...no evasive turns over Bugdud. I can't say what the relative height was of that A-10....but my first response was a "Knowing"..you can't fly that low and that profile..your gonna get hit.<<

Possible, but not nearly as deadly as Baghdad was during Gulf War I. The A-10's over Bugbad were doing Urban CAS and protected by CAP. The ground situation is always a concern, but when you sit in an A-10, the canopy rails come about hip-high---not shoulder-high like most jets. This means you have wonderful visibility as you do your scan. This means jerky maneuvers are not required. Now, however, when being shot at, that's another story. If shot at by radar-guided stuff, pretty much you will get plenty of warning and you can do your jinks. If being shot at by missiles then the plume of smoke (heater as well) are pretty hard to miss. BUT, if shot at by unguided AAA, that is difficult. Usually unguided AAA is inaccurate, however, given enough bullets even the "Big sky, little bullet" theory can't help you. That said, the A-10's were in a relatively low threat environment, relying on ground-based units to provide Intel on location and activity of AAA and such. But, it is war and the fog of war does cause problems. So the A-10's were hit. However, not very many A-10's were hit to any substantial degree (there were many more than two A-10's flying over Bugbad). And yes, my friend, you are going to get hit if you stick around long enough, and the A-10 does stick around---it's it job. Nice thing though, the A-10 was designed to take hits and keep flying. We saw in Gulf War I that getting hit in an A-10 did not mean you were going down. In fact, the chances are really, really good you would be coming home. Other jets did not fare so well. The 'ol "speed is life" thing doesn't apply in the CAS world.

BTW: When in Gulf War I the FSO and I were briefing the Div commander on our integrated fire plan. . .you know, firing arty then hold fire as the A-10's got close and could see the arty impact, then the A-10's would egress and the arty would fire up again. That sort of thing. The Div Commander said he didn't want the arty to hold fire, instead he wanted simultaneous arty/A-10 attacks. I said, as the only Air Force guy in the tent, that I couldn't do that, that if I cleared the pilots hot they would have to be told that arty was still firing in the area and the pilots wouldn't come in. That is when the Commander gave the "big sky, little bullet" comment. I replied, "Yes sir, we will accept the big sky little bullet theory when you guys on the ground accept the big earth little bomb theory!" I was quickly escorted from the tent.

>>I did detect a certain overconfidence in some of the military logistical/recon movement.<<

Better to be outrunning your log support than being stuck in a "quagmire."

>>The Iraqi's left so much stockpiled..never been out of the box stuff..it seemed they did not possess enough intelligent operators for all the goodies they still had...which
means the U.S. could have sustained a way higher loss ratio.<<

Possibly, but consider this: no matter how advanced the system, the effectiveness of the system is based upon the operator. And as long as we have cultural morons running whatever system, that system is ineffective. For example, I bet I can take an old F-100 and beat the snot out of an Iraqi MiG-29. The F-100 is obsolete but my training, tactics and thought processes are first rate. The Iraqi, on the other hand, is mired in a 15th century thought process and into "en 'shallah" (fate is pre-determined by Allah).

>>It would appear that "Shock" warfare works today as good as it did in WW-2 with Blitzkrieg...just drive on them...they fold, as they have no rally point<<

I agree. Nothing new here but intelligence and technology and weapon systems. Concept is the same.

>>Islam is like that..and hunting men to their deaths is a person thrill to this crowd.<<

Ahhh. . .the religion of peace.

[Gunrunner2]

Yes, F-16's make a great practice target!

Cheers

[Gunrunner2]

True. . .and a sad way to do business.

[ChadGore]

What went right ?

GWB defeated the "Salidin of our century" in less time than clinton rolled tanks in Waco, Texas.

[Redleg Duke]

For once, this greyhaired dickhead isn't totally wrong...of course, with any excuse to stick it to Army Leadership, even this blind pig has found an acorn or two.

The tactics and leadership were wrong, of course...but that is a problem with the Aviation School. Call it a "Custer Syndrome".

As a former Fire Supporter, I heartily agree with moving the A-10 into the Army, where it is loved and appreciated.

As to the AH-64 being a platinum-plated porker...it was one of the reasons why the Iraqi Army did very little massing of its armor. Remember, the purpose of war is to make your enemy do your bidding. Too bad this pathetic hack didn't pay attention to Von Clauswitz!

[Gunrunner2]

>>The requirements for the A-10 were not based on experiences from Vietnam.<<

Not to quibble, but a point of order: The A-10 WAS designed based upon the experience from Vietnam. Vietnam was the most recent conflict on which to base requirements.

The lesson's learned from flying CAS in Vietnam were applied to building a new CAS aircraft. The lesson's learned included things such as a triple-redundant flight control system, dual engines widely separated and a low heat signature, armor plating of the cockpit, self-sealing fuel tanks, that sort of stuff. The gun capability was also defined, but refined later in the adjusted RFP for the reason's you point out.

>>They were driven by the need to counter Soviet and Korean armor. If you would continue to read the GlobalSecurity source you reference that is made very clear. I quote... "In the years following 1967, the A-X mission requirements began to change as the threat of Soviet armor and all-weather operations became embedded in military
priorities. In 1970, the requirements for the A-X mission were changed, and the Air Force issued a new request for proposals (RFP)."<<

And the RFP was adjusted from. . .what? The initial post-Vietnam-based RFP.

Bottom line: Not to split hairs, but the concept of the A-10 was based upon requirements defined by the Vietnam experience---facing Soviet weapons systems.

[Rokke]

The only single mission aircraft in this theater was F-15C's. They were sent home within a few days of the start of the war. Every other aircraft type performed multiple roles very well (including A-10's who flew many more missions than CAS). We even had brand new F-18E/F's flying as tankers. The issue isn't peacetime economics as much as it is real world reality. We simply do not have the runways, aerial refueling assets or logistics to support aircraft that can only perform one role.