Posted on 04/28/2003 11:59:36 AM PDT by knighthawk
The leaders of four European nations who opposed the US-led war in Iraq were meeting tomorrow to expand defence co-operation, prompting fears of more divisions within Nato and the EU.
French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Luxembourg Premier Jean-Claude Juncker will join Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who announced the meeting in Brussels last month at the height of their dispute with Washington on how to deal with Iraq.
The meeting has drawn criticism from countries like Britain, Italy and the Netherlands whose governments supported the US-led war and back Nato as the core of Europe's defence.
"Belgium and France will not guarantee our security," Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said recently. "Germany will not guarantee the security of the Netherlands. I cannot imagine a world order built against the United States."
In interviews published today, Verhoftstadt insisted the plan was not to undermine Nato but to strengthen Europe's contribution to the Atlantic alliance.
"This summit is not directed against Nato or the United States," Verhofstadt said.
"We do not benefit from a Nato that remains a group of one super power with 18, larger or smaller dwarfs trailing behind," he added. "We need to move towards a Nato with a strong European pillar."
The half-day meeting is expected to focus on plans to better co-ordinate defence spending, acquiring high tech equipment sorely lacking in European armies and modernising forces to give Europe a sharper military edge.
Much of that has already been agreed by all 19 Nato allies. At a summit last November, they pledged to pool resources to fill the gaps in Europe's arsenal and create a rapid response force to tackle threats around the world.
However, some in Europe want to go further, creating a European military headquarters separate from Nato, a European army and a mutual defence clause in a proposed European Union constitution similar to Nato's pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all.
Pro-Nato nations fear a wasteful duplication of Nato's resources or an erosion of alliance unity.
With Germany and France seeking to avoid further alienating the US and repair relations after the Iraq war, diplomats expect the more radical suggestions to be dropped from tomorrow's agenda.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair today warned forcefully against building up a European power to compete with the US.
"Some want a so-called multipolar world where you have different centres of power, and I believe will quickly develop into rival centres of power," he told the Financial Times.
"Others believe, and this is my notion, that we need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America."
If people want on or off this list, please let me know.
When France developed its own nuclear weapons, we looked the other way at the "force de frappe", since we could trust the French, and they'd be there if we needed them. When France then left Nato in 1965, we chuckled at their Gallic pride, telling ourselves that they would be there if we needed them. When France sheltered the Ayatollah, we looked the other way, since France would be there if we needed them. When France opposed deployment of the MX missile, we knew it was just the French being French, but that they would be there if we needed them.
When we bombed Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack on a German nightclub, the French refused our overflight request, forcing the pilots to go many hours out of their way to get to their target. We were unhappy about it, but did not make too much of it, since the French were known to be difficult, and they would be there if we needed them.
On September 11, 2001 the US was attacked by a terrorist group using airplanes. 3,000 Americans died. We were lucky; it could have been 20,000, and it could have been the President if the White House had been hit. The terrorist group was backed, we now know and always suspected, by an Iraqi thug named Saddam. Saddam has, as France knows, biological and chemical weapons, and is very close to having nuclear weapons. Saddam is willing to use them on the US. On September 25, 2001, France was giving Saddam intelligence about the likely US response to the attack, and there is every reason to believe that the duplicity and aid given to Saddam continued up to the start of the war, if not after.
The French gave Powell a hard time in the Security Council on 1441, but in the end, we got a resolution. It was just the French being French, but we knew they'd be there when the time came.
Folks, they were not there for us at our time of need. Never had any intention of allowing us to remove Saddam from power, of freeing the Iraqis and giving us a big gain in the war on terror. Now, retrospectively, I don't think they would have ever been there for us had we needed them in the cold war. I think one of our major assumptions all along has been shown to be suspect. Let's just thank God that we never before needed the French, and let's make sure that we never consider them a friend or ally again.
France under its current regime has become an opponent, not much different from the Chinese, in that they lack the power but not the desire to create a region free from American influence and therefore are willing to do things to interfere with US interests, cause us loss, harm our interests and develop long term strategies for our defeat.
Never again will we chuckle at the "French being French". From now on, until decades of honorable conduct prove otherwise, we will grit our teeth at "French being ungrateful, treasonous weasels." When they screw with us, we will know--if we need them, they won't be there. Their residual goodwill will therefore cease to exist. Actions will have consequences.
But, as far as credit for staying with the US, Germany stood by us because they didn't want to be soviet slaves. As soon as the soviet threat vanished, suddenly they're telling us to take a hike? Germany did 1/50th per capita of what the US did to win the cold war. We do appreciate the use of the bases and Kohl and Schmidt were stand up guys. But you couldn't defend yourselves, and you did not contribute much to the "correlation of forces".
I hope it will be the last time, too, my friend. Please keep the leftists out of power if you can. I understand that absorbing East Germany changed the demographics of the voter base, and caused this situation; now you just need to grow out of that phase.
Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift, Korean War, Guatemala, Iran, and countless other minor skirmishes, Vietnam, Cuba, Cuban Missile Crisis (which put the lives of all Americans on the line), Grenada, Afghanistan.
We weren't just manning the ramparts with Germans in Europe, we were there in Turkey, in the Greek and Italian turbulence in the 50s, in Korea for 50 years, in Japan with bases to cover the far east, in countries like Malaysia and the Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, Iran (til 1978), constantly battling communism in South America, creating Norad, Anzus, Seato, bases in places like Iceland and Guam and dozens of places I have left out. We were there in all those CIA agents, many of whom died in the course of keeping the Soviets from dominating the planet, as they currently would absent a country called the USA.
Money--In addition to the military aspect, we spent many times per capita on defense what Germany spent during the cold war.
That said, having Germany on our side was certainly a help, especially during the MX missile debates. That was a decisive factor in the end of the Soviets. But the Germans were one small aspect of the global battle against a Russian dictatorship.
Well, as for the many CIA missions: one has to decide wether they were useful or not. Same for Vietnam. The Korean war was a good thing, no doubt about that.
But let´s face it: The German question was not the "small aspect" but the decisive for the fall of Iron Curtain and the failure of Soviet communism.
I´d rather say that these other "missions" or "incidents" are very small aspects (don´t tell my that Moscow cared much about the Phillipines - but they did about Leipzig demonstrations).
My point was and is, that my country fully fulfilled its obligations since it is a NATO member and shouldered its part of the burden.
If you keep on saying that this last sentence is not true, then I want facts, figures (e.g. a proof for your statement that Germany paid much less in percent per capita for defense till 1990). Regards, Michael
An excerpt:
Defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which measures the share of a country's national income devoted to defense, is a widely cited measure of defense burdensharing. Throughout NATO's 50-year history, the United States has spent a larger share of its GDP on defense than have most of its allies. In 1985, at the height of the Cold War arms buildup, the United States spent 6.7 percent of its GDP on defense, compared with the European allies' 3.5 percent of their collective GDP spent on defense. By 1999, those figures declined to 3.0 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Twice as much. And then there's this:
Defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product measures the portion of a country's overall economy that it devotes to defense. It indicates the burden that defense places on the economy of each country, automatically adjusting for differences in national income. The percentage of GDP spent on defense also measures a country's overall level of effort, regardless of how it allocates its defense budget--some countries may spend more on personnel and have larger troop strength, whereas others may focus on training, equipment modernization, or research.
The United States has consistently spent a greater share of its national income on defense than have its allies, except for Greece and Turkey. In general, spending as a percentage of GDP by the United States and its allies rose through NATO's first decade but fell in the 1960s and 1970s. In the Europeans' case, some of that spending pattern is attributable to their rapid economic growth in those years, which reduced the burden defense spending placed on their economies.
In the early 1980s, alliancewide defense spending climbed again, though the increases of the Reagan Administration were not matched to the same degree by the allies. As a result, by 1985 the United States spent 6.7 percent of its GDP on defense, compared with 5.3 percent spent by the United Kingdom, 4.1 percent by France, 3.2 percent by Germany, and 2.7 percent by Italy. Only Greece, a relatively poor country, spent a greater share of its GDP on defense in 1985 than did the United States, 7.1 percent (see Figure 1; for additional information, see Table A-1 in Appendix A).
Vietnam was a resounding military victory, but a political defeat. The point was that we lost 50,000 men in one skirmish in the cold war, one of many. How many dead Germans contributed to the end of the cold war? (For that matter, how many East Germans contributed to the cost of the Cold War?) How can you calculate the value of those men when we talk about the relative contributions of the 2 nations?
Nobody said that Germany did not "fulfill its obligations". The discussion was over the relative contribution to the end of the cold war. There's no way to quantify it, but I stand by my point, which is that the US contribution per capita was many times that of the German citizenry. You are a good fellow, and I hope you are able to bring more people over to your way of thinking. Is there any way that Schroder can be brought down before his term is up, or do we have to wait 3 more years for a new government?
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