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Well, I think your notion that "Shock and Awe" is "only" a land war tactic (and that I was thereby "confused" about it) is a bit narrow/tunnel vision. I think (and so interpreted) Boyd's work as potentially being larger than that. Yes, Rumsfeld did say that the tomahawk/bomb attack was only part of a larger pattern of shock-and-awe. And yes, 3rd Inf. did use a great deal of shock-and-awe during its campaign. However, I suggest you guys are a bit too critical and fail to realize journalists (or anyone else writing an analysis) must necessarily keep things relatively simplified. My larger point was that Rumsfeld et al promised one thing, but delivered something else--and that those who failed to understand that this was basically a form of psy-ops, mind****ing, were consequently disappointed. And I was interested in the problem of a public official (the entire administration) saying one thing but doing something substantially different--(in this case, for perfectly valid Boydian "psy-ops").
I would define Shock and awe not only as the application of force (as yoiu suggest), but also the THREAT of such application, the treat being so massive or self-evident that you achieve Boyd's "break-their-spirit" objective.
I actually think the treat aspect worked pretty well, though there's no evidence one way or another, until we begin detailed interrogation of what the other side was thinking and perceiving (and we won't know that for a while yet). And in any event, what I really wanted to see was some public discussion of all this doctrine, use of boyd's tactics/ideas, etc. So far, the only thing I've found is this specific chat--and not much discussion of Boydian stuff even here.
I think your defining "shock-and-awe" narrowly to "only" land warfare doctrine just makes it the same old "shock" tactics of the Blitzkrieg, the April 1918 German counter-attack, and some Napoleonics. If that's so, then Boyd has "only" re-stated earlier work. But I think he did more--and it seems (from the "we're bogged down and under-manned" critics, a lot of the ground guys (don't know if you are one, or not) still don't understand it/him.
your larger criticism of the media reporting "leaks" (didn't seem like "leaks" to me--seemed like press conferences) that created false expectations, and then knocking down those expectations, is very accurate, though. however, that's the stuff I'm now referring to as part of the psych disinformation war.
i'd be interested to know if you agree or disagree with my observation that the US clearly gave the impression it was going to bomb the crap out of baghdad.
my problem is this: to me, Baghdad really did seem to be "shocked" virtually from the beginning in how it reacted (actually, failed to react). if you agree with that premise, how then to explain it? how to explain the failure (if that's the right word) to use chemical weapons? (was it fear of consequences?).
my other problem is this: how does "shock-and-awe" (or any other psch. warfare) apply to people who are essentially irrational/fanatical? it seems to me S&A/Psywar necessarily applies only to people who are more or less rational and paying attention. but can you psych out a wacko, or if so, do you use the same tools as you'd use with somebody more-or-less rational? I dunno, but I'm inclined to doubt it.
your thoughts?

but can you psych out a wacko, or if so, do you use the same tools as you'd use with somebody more-or-less rational?

I think it's a matter of levels. Eventually the situation becomes sufficiently overwhelming that it provokes the flight response in even the most deluded human being. But I agree that it's easier to psych-out those who have a firmer grip on the "actions/consequences" paradigm.

I'm not sure I said that "shock and awe" was exclusively a land warfare theory, and I know I didn't say YOU were confused. I believe I indicated that the author of the article had adopted the media's use of "shock and awe" as a term for bombing campaigns. The most widly circulated use of the term that I'm familiar with is in some military publications that address land warfare issues. The first reference I saw to its use regarding the Baghdad aerial campaign was in a news story quoting a leak from "an informed Pentagon source" or some such. You'd have to reconstruct its evolution from that point, but my recollection is that Rumsfeld's role was more along the line of refusing to confirm or deny than it was in touting some specific number of bombs that were going to be dropped.

The sense I have is that our psy-ops was more focussed on making sure they had no idea what the heck we were actually going to do than it was on attempting to intimidate an essentially unintimidatable psychotic. We kept having leaks that purported to be the "real battle plan", with each one having completely different specifics. About the only thing that was confirmed consistently was that there'd be a period of bombing before the land war started. :-)