The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these, the Union was solemnly declared to "be perpetual." And, when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect Union."
But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. On the contrary, it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States and the maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States.
When Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution or through consent of the States.
Considered as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention, and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union.
So the basis of his decision seems to be Chief Justice Chase's belief that the preamble's direction to 'form a more perfect union' meant maintaining and strengthening the perpetuity of the union called for by the Articles of Confederation. But his observation that the exit from the Union was possible either by rebellion or the consent of the states is no doubt a recognition of the Constitutional power given Congress to determine the status of states.
Happy?
The Articles of Confederation had no legal weight after the ratification of the Constitution, so its perpetuity language became null-and-void. Given the absence of any explicit prohibition against a state withdrawing, and the absence of any rhetoric among the ratification debates and Federalist Papers, to the effect that a state has no right to withdraw after joining the Union, one can make the logical inference that perpetuity was more hopeful rhetoric for the struggling new nation than law, and also in practice that perpetuity refers more to the tenets of the Constitution rather than membership in the Union by a state.
Justice Chase states: The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States. If he truly believed that, or followed it to its logical conclusion, the Union can survive with some members leaving, whereas a state cannot be considered indestructible if it does not have the ultimate recourse to the encroachment of Federal power that withdrawing provides. It would be swallowed and melted into a Union against the wishes of its citizens.
He states further: When Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. This is what I was referring to in an earlier reply as making a prohibition out of whole cloth. He simply states it as a fact, but does not cite any authority. Neither the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court, nor anyone in the judiciary has the Constitutional authority to create such a prohibition. Appealing to the Preamble, of all parts, shows the weakness of his argument.