No. Congress is banned from passing Ex Post Facto laws by the Constitution. Try again.
Well, they sure passed something. They agreed with General Jackson. There was no telegraph. He had to act. He did act.
This was interesting:
"You [this is from a newsgroup] cited Roger B.Taney's ringing denunciation of Lincoln for usurping a congressional power, based on the particular placement of the habeas corpus suspension clause within the Constitution. Two years earlier, in the famous case of ABLEMAN v BOOTH, Taney had written, "in the judgment of this court, the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States." I was wondering whether you find it as curious as I do that what Taney found to be a definitive criterion (placement of text within the Constitution) in 1861 was apparently not even on his radar screen in 1859.
It seems to me that if Taney's position in 1861 was unquestionably correct, then the Fugitive Slave Law was unquestionably unconstitutional. Or, if the Fugitive Slave Law was "fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States" as Taney had contended in 1859, then the Supreme Court was on record as saying that the placement of text within the body of the Constitution was not absolutely definitive in terms of who was assigned a particular power -- a point that Taney might have taken into account in 1861. So how about it: Fugitive Slave Law, constitutional, or unconstitutional?"
Walt
Yeah, a measure sanctioning his violation of the Constitution after he had already committed it. A law altering the legitimacy of an action after that action is committed is ex post facto, and such measures are explicitly banned in the Constitution.
There was no telegraph.
The Constitution doesn't care whether there is a telegraph, a phone line, an internet connection, or some Indian standing on top of a hill waving a blanket over a fire.
"You [this is from a newsgroup] cited Roger B.Taney's ringing denunciation of Lincoln for usurping a congressional power, based on the particular placement of the habeas corpus suspension clause within the Constitution. Two years earlier, in the famous case of ABLEMAN v BOOTH, Taney had written, "in the judgment of this court, the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States." I was wondering whether you find it as curious as I do that what Taney found to be a definitive criterion (placement of text within the Constitution) in 1861 was apparently not even on his radar screen in 1859.
It's not curious at all, as those are two different issues entirely. The habeas corpus matter is an Article I, Section 9 question, thereby pertaining to the legislature. The fugitive slave clause is Article IV, Section II and could be legislated on per Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. Further, even if what your source said were true, it bears no relevance of the case itself.
It seems to me that if Taney's position in 1861 was unquestionably correct, then the Fugitive Slave Law was unquestionably unconstitutional.
Your source is inventing a contradiction where none exists. This is called a fallacy of a false dilemma, Walt, because the occurence of one does not necessarily exclude the occurence of another, as your newsgroup incorrectly claims.
Or, if the Fugitive Slave Law was "fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States" as Taney had contended in 1859, then the Supreme Court was on record as saying that the placement of text within the body of the Constitution was not absolutely definitive in terms of who was assigned a particular power
Not really. A law is, by definition, a legislative act. If the court says a law is constitutional because the constitution permits it, that means the legislature, and not the executive, can write that law.