MAINSTREAM MEDIA BAFFLED BY 'WESTERN WAY OF WAR'

"Perspectives" (University of Dayton) forthcoming, and on-line at "Campus News" ^ | 4/8/03 | LS

[LS]

With a gazillion armored personnel carriers, trucks, and radios supplied by Uncle Sam; with more than 30% of German TOTAL WAR RESOURCES diverted to fighting Allied bombing raids in the west; with complete dominance of the sea lines of supply to Russia for endless tons of food and supplies.

The Russkies made tanks very well, although we still gave them 15,000 Shermans, too; but they had no Jeeps (to this day, there is no Russian equivalent of a Jeep, or a "jeepski"); they got most of their trucks and personnel carriers from us; got aeroplane engines from the Brits.

There is no question the Soviets had lots of tanks and artillery, but without the allied bombing in the west, you could look, in 1943, for example, at 40% more air power from the Luftwaffe being directed at the east. That is enough to turn the tide at Kursk or other such battles. Stuka tank-busters with 37mm guns were deadly on Russian tanks, except that basically the Germans ran out of planes because they had in 1943 20% of their air power tied up over France, and in 1944 pre-D-Day some 40% of their aircraft engaged in anti-bombing missions.

[LS]

That is a tremendous compliment. Thanks.

[LS]

The problem with that aspect of your analysis is that western armies that used drafts fought pretty much just as well: the Union Army in the CW; the US in WW I and II. I think a volunteer army is better, not because it is necessarily better motivated than a free nation's drafted army, but because it is better trained, as people tend to specialize in what they like.

[Jimmy Valentine's brother]

Please, when you get time, you could post your complete analysis here.

At the end of the day. It looks like the forces on the ground were the right size. Reading about General Fred Franks experience with the 7th Corps during Desert Storm. The impression I get was that our size was such that maneuvering to minimize blue on blue and resupply was more of a challenge than the enemy forces. Franks was berated for going to slow.

[LS]

The parts they cut were mainly the (much commented-on) separation between the "real world" embedded reporters and those idiots at CENTCOM, like Michael Wolf, who asked the most inane questions day after day.

I think I said that Rick Leventhal would quickly emerge as the new journalism star, and maybe Greg Kelly.

But what was cut was nothing more on the "western way of war," which is pretty much the domain of Victor Hanson. I did not want to so much rehash his views as to show how they applied to the media, and how the media has apparently never read him or understood him.

[Valin]

How was the Red Army able to beat the Wehrmacht?

Numbers.

[an amused spectator]

Are you the author?

LOL! You the man, LS.

I was reading down the thread wondering if anybody was going to catch on. Even most of the posters on the re-post didn't catch it.

Glad Varmint Al reposted your piece. I missed it the first time around. It's nice to know that there are still exquisitely literate people teaching history. ;-)

[an amused spectator]

In addition to the other reasons posted as replies to your question, Hitler insisted that territory acquired was to be retained, at the cost of fluidity in operational action.

The Soviets also had the advantage of deliberate one-way equipment mismatches (railway gauges, ammunition incompatibility).

And there was the twice-yearly terrain meltdowns to consider...

[an amused spectator]

I almost forgot: Stalin butchered the cream of the Soviet officer corps in the years prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and he also butchered the cream of the Polish officer corps that he had captured in 1939.

I don't know how he got away with his criminal negligence. Millions of Soviets paid the price, though.

[LS]

He got away with it because a) he ran a terror state himself, so there was little information available, and even less dissent; and b) for many Russians, the word got out about Hitler's thugs, and that they were no better than Stalin's. Better the "devil you know . . . ." Lastly, many simply were defending Russia.

But the overwhelming size and population of Russia made a difference, as, most assuredly, did American aid and the "second front."

[Valin]

I don't know how he got away with his criminal negligence
K
G
B

[FreedomPoster]

At the end of the day. It looks like the forces on the ground were the right size. . . . .The impression I get was that our size was such that maneuvering to minimize blue on blue and resupply was more of a challenge than the enemy forces.

Early on in the campaign, FReeper wretchard made a post that bears directly on this, which I found to be incredibly insightful at the time, and only moreso with the passage of time.

Wretchard's 3/28 post:

All of the operations against H2, H3, Talil, Bashur and Umm Qasar were preplanned in anticipation of the actual logistical requirements that Tommy Franks envisioned. He knew he would need them at the outset. Why? The manual calls for 150 lbs/day/soldier for consumables alone. That's 4,500 tons daily to support the present force. When the 4th ID arrives, it will require another 2,000 tons per day. At the end of a 300 mile line of communications.

Franks sprinted to Baghdad with a single mech infantry division because he couldn't do it with two, even if it were on hand, because the logistical tail from Kuwait wouldn't support it. The whole purpose of getting 3rd ID to Baghdad was to nail down the IRG so that the logistical objectives could be seized with impunity. The IRG can't go north to Bashur, for example, to lever out the 173rd brigade because of where 3rd ID is. And this was forseen. The press is treating these logistical seizures as nonevents, when in strategic terms, they are the main events. They are the whole point of the dash to Baghdad.

Tommy Frank's command is not combat power limited. At present, it is logistically limited. A third of the command (101st Airborne and 82nd's 325th Brigade) haven't even seen action. Adding 4 ID without developing the logistics bases would add exactly nothing to V Corps. The US Army knows logistics, if knows nothing else. Dropping troops without a logistical plan is something the French army does (6,000 paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu without any line of supply except a dirt airfield). It is not what the US Army does.

The final comment on the French was just icing on the cake. ;-)

[FreedomPoster]

And yes, if you have a longer version of your article, please do post it and ping us.