Posted on 04/10/2003 10:54:48 PM PDT by Diddley
Shocked Iraqi spokesmen refused to believe the Third Division could be where coalition reports said it was, while Pentagon officials hailed it as the longest and fastest armour attack in military history
Even his own officers thought Major-General Buford Blount III's plan for the battle of Baghdad was overly optimistic -- many in fact could not believe it.
"We thought they were kidding when the battalion commander said we're going to drive tanks into the middle of Baghdad," marvelled Captain Jason Conroy, one of the members of Maj.-Gen. Blount's Third Infantry Division.
When Saddam Hussein's capital fell to coalition forces yesterday, it was largely the result of Maj.-Gen. Blount pulling off an almost unprecedented military gamble and turning conventional military thinking on it(sic) head: taking a major urban centre with tanks and without a lengthy, costly siege.
Maj.-Gen. Blount, known as "Buff" to his contemporaries, is a 32-year army veteran.
John Pike, a military specialist at Global Security.org in Alexandria, Va., called the general's attack "the 'thunder-run' tactic -- basically taking the city all at once rather than trying to take it one room at a time.
"They appear to have correctly conceptualized that the assault on Baghdad was essentially a coup d'etat. When you have a coup, you basically grab the airport, grab the main government buildings downtown, grab the TV station, claim that you're in charge, and dare anyone to dispute you."
(Excerpt) Read more at globalsecurity.org ...
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the infowarrior
I haven't commented on the matter previously, because I don't wish to be a perpetual killjoy, but there's a great risk of people taking the wrong lessons from this Iraq campaign. Future nations such as Iran & Syria, by 'random' example, cannot be assumed to mount such a spectacularly incompetent military resistance as did the Iraqis. Indeed, the Lebanese held the Israelis out of Beirut for 83 days with the most basic of resistance - just because they understand the concept of barricades.
Tossing up a simple barricade would've halted our initial thrusts into Baghdad & Basra cold; just a six foot span blown out of a little bridge on the Diyala tributary to the Tigris held up the Marines for three days (that's why the 3rd ID got into Baghdad so much quicker, though they began with the same basic distance & obstacles to cover). We went into Iraq with only two pontoon bridge units. What would we have done if all the bridges had been blown the first day?
Anyhow, that's my 2¢ - take it or leave it.
John Pike, a military specialist at Global Security.org in Alexandria, Va., called the general's attack "the 'thunder-run' tactic -- basically taking the city all at once rather than trying to take it one room at a time.
"They appear to have correctly conceptualized that the assault on Baghdad was essentially a coup d'etat. When you have a coup, you basically grab the airport, grab the main government buildings downtown, grab the TV station, claim that you're in charge, and dare anyone to dispute you."
Who is going to have a dispute with an Abram Tank?
Bah.
Watching the way this war unfolded was like watching Art of War come to life. Anyone paying attention could sit and look-up verse as the battle plan unfolded.
Sun Tzu couldn't have improved on this plan. It was perfectly, really "old school".
The loss of bridges would have added a couple days at best.
And this is one of our military's major strengths; even with a plan, when cicumstances warrant, the plan can be changed by local commanders, something that rigid-control armies (such as Soviet) cannot do.
God bless us, Dubya, and our military.
We went into Iraq with only two pontoon bridge units. What would we have done if all the bridges had been blown the first day?
Do you know how many bridges we used in our military operations? I counted 17....
My thoughts also.
Deceit. Bait and Feint. Act stymied and confused. Act like things are not going right. Use misinformation. Do the unexpected ALL OF THE TIME. Attack where/when he is unprepared. ... ...
And even still...one wouldn't have needed 17 pontoon units....just one on each tip with enough equipment to build every bridge that was planned on being needed....which may very well have been 4 or 5.
Good analysis. Actually, a brilliant analysis.
I'll take it.
You make some good observations.
I believe that a major factor in our "ease" in this campaign was the work that Special Forces did before and during the war; destroying things, working with disidents, confusing the leadership, etc.
But, as you say, all battles aren't the same (and the whole world was watching how we did this one).
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