Posted on 03/31/2003 5:56:22 AM PST by conservativecorner
The history of Islamic nations in the modern world has largely been a story of their declining power, prosperity and influence. Muslim thinkers who had for centuries credited Islam's worldly stature to its monopoly on divine truth began to ask themselves, "What went wrong?" And their next question was: "How can we regain our former estate?" Given their world view, the only reply was a call for "a return to the faith of our fathers."
Dore Gold's "Hatred's Kingdom" (Regnery, 309 pages, $27.95) describes one such attempt at return. The book opens with a lucid account of how the Saudi royal family came to power in the mid-18th century by making an alliance with the resurgent fundamentalism of Arabia's clergy. It was a time when many Muslim communities were on the defensive before strong European nation-states.
Only the Saudi response survives intact today. Only Saudi Arabia looks to a sacred text, the Quran, as its constitution, and to Wahhabism, an extreme form of Islam, to promote the Kingdom of God on earth. Mr. Gold describes how the kingdom's home-grown, fundamentalist ideology -- backed by oil wealth -- outlasted foreign "exotics" in the area (e.g., Arab socialism) and created a domestic atmosphere favorable to the rise of al Qaeda.
Mr. Gold argues persuasively that contributions from some of Saudi Arabia's wealthiest families, and from charitable arms of the Saudi government, were important in al Qaeda's evolution. Did the Saudi government itself give the terrorists direct assistance? The answer is probably "No," but such distinctions are hard to draw, given the commingling of public and private funds within Saudi Arabia's ruling elite.
As for the kingdom's Wahhabi fundamentalism, the end of the Afghan war in the late 1980s certainly helped renew it. Soviet defeat produced "international brigades" of motivated, fanatical young Muslims, many of them Saudis. In their eyes, Islam had triumphed against one superpower. What might it not achieve, they wondered, if directed toward other Muslim goals? A transformation of the Saudi kingdom? A weakening of the remaining superpower -- i.e., the U.S.?
With the tacit approval of Saudis, and help from them, al Qaeda flourished.
The accession of King Fahd to the throne in June 1982 played a role in renewed Wahhabism, too. America was pleased with Fahd: We saw him as relatively progressive, and we found his views on the U.S.-Saudi military tie congenial. But Fahd lacked the authenticity of King Faisal and King Khalid, his predecessors. His indulgences were not the traditional ones of Saudi princes: days spent in falconry and nights in quickie "marriages" to daughters of local head men. They were . . . larger.
Fahd's physical self-indulgence -- his weight would creep up toward 300 pounds -- and his taste for foreign luxury-yachts and European vacations raised eyebrows even in the plusher precincts of Riyadh. Meanwhile, efforts to spruce up his Islamic credentials were received with amused reserve. When the king gave himself the title "Protector of the Two Holy Places" -- or "Khadim al Haramayn al Sharifain" -- wags twisted the title to "Khadim al Hariymayn al Sharifain," or "Guardian of the Two Holy Harems."
In other words, the ulama, or holy men, had his number, and they pressed their advantage. The price that King Fahd paid to keep a somewhat forbearing style of government, and to preserve his all-important relations with the U.S., was to give Wahhabi extremists the leeway and the resources to promote their reactionary views, at home and abroad. Under their wing al Qaeda flourished.
A stroke in 1995 left King Fahd incapacitated, prompting Crown Prince Abdullah to take over the kingdom's day-to-day operations. Abdullah is a Saudi nationalist. He is seen as a good Muslim. He has "authenticity" and moral authority. Observers close to him believe that, as king, he would restrain religious extremism and work for economic and political reform. But Abdullah, now 79, is only crown prince. Any suggestion that he is expanding his prerogatives in a kingly direction would be opposed by other powerful members of the royal family. So the future of the House of Saud is uncertain, along with its tacit support of the extremists in its midst and elsewhere.
Sponsorship aside, one has to wonder whether current events in Central Asia and on the Arabian Peninsula will affect the future of the extremists. In short: What direction will al Qaeda and its sympathizers take after recent setbacks in, for example, Afghanistan and Pakistan? Will the extremist attraction in general pall after the defeat of Saddam Hussein? Will Mideast Muslims reflect on the failure of their response to modernity? If they do, there may be time for them to rejoin the mainstream currents of our day.
Meanwhile, though, as Mr. Gold reminds us in "Hatred's Kingdom," we are at war -- intellectual, religious and material -- against an adversary that believes radical Islam to be destined to win the coming clash of civilizations. Saudi Arabia will be a principal player in that drama -- whether for good or ill is hard to say.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Horan served in Saudi Arabia as deputy chief of mission (1972-77) and as U.S. ambassador (1987-88).
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