Posted on 03/26/2003 10:16:07 PM PST by TigerLikesRooster
KANAN MAKIYA'S WAR DIARY
March 26
A new word has entered the English language: de-Baathification. Originally coined by Ahmed Chalabi, and honed by Ali Allawi, myself, and other Iraqi contributors to our Transition to Democracy report, the word has become part of Bush administration's vocabulary as it prepares to overhaul the state set up by Saddam Hussein's Baath Party in 1968. If you think about it, this is a very big victory for the democratic wing of the Iraqi opposition as it fights to make its case for what needs to be done the day after the shooting stops in Iraq.
But this victory could easily be fleeting. While there is broad consensus in the administration that some form of de-Baathification must occur, no one has yet worked out the criteria by which it will take place. Nothing is yet finalized, but some in the administration appear to have thought of de-Baathification primarily in terms of removing the most senior functionaries in the regime and eradicating the apparatus of Saddam's tyranny. This is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient. As the "Transition to Democracy" report argued, de-Baathification in Iraq needs to be defined as a holistic social process--a composite series of actions involving the dissolution of some institutions, segmentation of others, and, crucially, the complete discrediting of Baathist ideology.
To understand why this is so, consider the nature of Saddam's regime. The primary structures of his control are not housed neatly in government ministries. In fact, outside of the departments of interior, education, and defense, Saddam's ministries are largely technocratic bureaucracies that are either harmless or useless. The most insidious presence of the Baath Party is in the schools, the universities, the trade unions, the women's organizations, and the youth groups. It is reflected in curricula and in the way teachers have been trained to think; it is evident in the affairs of the mosques--especially the subordination of the appointment of clerics to political considerations; it figures prominently in the practices and mindsets of hundreds of thousands of police officers and army personnel. To further complicate things, seniority in the Baath Party does not always translate into a position of power in government, and conversely, not all officials who are guilty of crimes are high up in the Baath Party hierarchy. How are we Iraqis even going to begin to sort through all that?
As the opposition recommended in the "Transition to Democracy" report, we can use history to guide us. Following the Second World War, German Nazi Party members were classified into one of five categories, ranging from "major offender" at one end of the scale to "exonerated" at the opposite end. An individual's ability to work in sensitive government positions, or to recover compensation from the government, hinged on exoneration. The transitional government in Iraq needs to likewise determine levels of criminal complicity with the regime. In Germany, the state and federal authorities then prosecuted the top categories of offenses--while the most egregious offenders were pursued by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. This blend of joint national and international adjudication may be an appropriate model.
As in Nazi Germany, Saddam's decrees have the force of law, giving state terror the cloak of legality. Therefore, just like in postwar Germany, there must be significant judicial and legal reform in Iraq. In order to rebuild civil society and prevent score settling disguised as justice, de-Baathification must follow the rule of law, and there will have to be laws developed for all these purposes. A law must declare the Baath Party illegal, and prevent convicted Baathists from holding office. There must be a legal definition of victimhood at the hands of the Baath, and it must be broad enough to include members of the Baath Party who were themselves victimized by the regime. Such a definition might give "victim" status--and a basis for compensation--to anyone oppressed because of political opposition to the regime or because of race, religion, or ideology; and to anyone who as a result suffered loss of life, limb or health, loss of liberty or property, or who experienced professional or vocational damage.
This is not mere semantics. There is an important difference between Baathists and Baath members. Some party members joined because there were no other channels for social advancement (and, in some cases, survival). De-Baathification must proceed accordingly: It cannot mean dismissing all two million party members from their jobs. Baath membership is highest among government employees, and such a draconian measure would decimate the entire civil service, educational system, and other essential institutions. The transitional government must try to preserve as many as possible within the rank and file and "middle management" levels of government for the sake of continuity and efficiency, while providing stages of oversight and avenues for appeal.
Institutionally, there will be some broken china. Ministries like Information and Religious Endowments (Awqaf) are nothing but tools for political manipulation and should be abolished. The police force needs to be removed from the Interior Ministry and placed in the Ministry of Justice. Most importantly, the state and party security services must be abolished, including the Revolutionary Command Council, the Baath Regional Command, the National Assembly, the Special Republican Guard, and all other security organizations, militias, and paramilitary organizations. This is a very delicate task: Hundreds of thousands of people employed by the security apparatus may well receive amnesty but will likely be socially ostracized and encounter discrimination in employment and elsewhere. They could easily become a destabilizing element, particularly if they are left without work and are unassimilated into a new Iraqi society. It is my understanding from conversations with Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith that the administration is committed to dissolving all Iraqi security institutions and rebuilding them from scratch. But outside of that, there is no firm agreement in the administration about how de-Baathification should occur.
Implementation is also an uncertain proposition--and in de-Baathification, process is substance. At the moment, a team of some 100 to 150 Iraqi professionals living in the West is being assembled by my close friend Emad Dhia, one of the organizers of the Detroit-based Iraqi Forum for Democracy. Their job will be to ensure that the central ministries and local government offices are revived and running smoothly after the disruptions of war. They will be part of Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance; many are already with him in Kuwait, and others are on their way as I write. They will help with the vetting of government ministries for active or former Baathists in the immediate term; in order to ensure fairness, the hope is that they will sign contracts to prevent their own involvement in the political process. As Garner's team finishes its work in each ministry, its counterparts in the Iraqi opposition are expected to take over in stages. But in between this transition lies the as-yet-to-be-determined shape of what the administration is calling the Iraqi Interim Authority. As things stand at present, the Iraqi Interim Authority is unlikely to fit perfectly with the expectations that have arisen during the Iraqi opposition's recent conferences in London and Salahuddin. Herein lie the sources of potential friction that it is my job--as I am still present in the center of decision-making in Washington--to minimize. For the sake of Iraq, I have little margin for error.
Sounds kinda liberal doesn't it. Amazing how such concepts of liberal and conservaive have vastly different meaning in practice outside of American Politics.
For instance a "Conservative" movement in Iraq could most likely mean a holding onto some of the old ways eg: baathist type rule.
Start with 3000 degree heat.
Let simmer for 40 days and 40 nights.
The solid glass base is a far more suitable foundation to sifting sands.
Let cool for 10,000 years.
Populate with humans.
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