After Saddam

National Post ^ | March 24 2003

[knighthawk]

Despite a handful of deadly setbacks over the weekend, a U.S.-led army is now less than 160 kilometres from Baghdad. The war may continue for another week, or another month. But soon, Saddam Hussein's regime will fall.

But what will replace it? Speaking on Friday, U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld set forward the coalition's war aims in Iraq, a list that included: (1) regime change, (2) the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, (3) the safeguarding of the country's oil assets for the benefit of the Iraqi people, (4) humanitarian relief and (5) the liquidation of terrorist cells operating under Saddam's writ. Lastly, he said, the war effort is designed to "help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbours and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of the country."

We certainly hope Mr. Rumsfeld and his boss, U.S. President George W. Bush, are serious about that last one. The short- and medium-term goals listed by the Defence Secretary are all vitally important -- and their achievement would, in themselves, fully justify the present campaign. But they should also be looking beyond Iraq, at ways to change the political and social structure of the Arab Middle East to ensure it is no longer receptive to rogue autocrats spewing militant anti-Western ideologies. That's why creating a viable democracy in Iraq should be treated as a core war aim.

Unfortunately, it is hard to judge Washington's resolve. On Monday night, in his address from the White House, President Bush declared that "the United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region." This well-meaning but somewhat vague statement is consistent with his earlier declaration that "We'll help [Iraq] build a just government.... The form and leadership of that government is for the Iraqi people to choose. Anything they choose will be better than the misery and torture and murder they have known under Saddam." The overall message seems to be that, while a solidly ensconced democratic government in Baghdad remains the ideal outcome, Washington might settle for a somewhat shaky, U.S.-friendly administration along the lines of Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan or Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul.

Our fear of this sort of compromise grows every day -- because several factors are conspiring to make U.S. administration of post-war Iraq more difficult. First, there are increasing signs that Turkey seeks to occupy parts of Iraq's Kurdish areas, at least temporarily, in a bid to suppress Kurdish separatism on both sides of the border -- a move that could draw the United States into an awkward conflict with a fellow NATO member. Second, the United States is now facing an enormous budget deficit, and Mr. Bush is expected to ask Congress for about US$80-billion in war funding today. With humanitarian, peacekeeping and rebuilding costs in Iraq pegged at upwards of US$20-billion per year, Congress may have little appetite for a lengthy occupation once Saddam is deposed.

Mr. Bush must look past such obstacles and lead the effort to thoroughly rehabilitate Iraq and build a democratic society -- however long the project takes. Moreover, he should offer an explicit pledge to do so before the war is over. Any ambiguity as to Iraq's future gives fuel to the anti-war camp, which has consistently argued that the current conflict is an "imperialist" oil grab that will destabilize the region and do little to help ordinary Iraqis.

In fact, by clearly laying out an ambitious blueprint, Mr. Bush may be able to head off many of the problems on the horizon. If Ankara knows the United States will create a federated structure in which Kurds enjoy large autonomy but not statehood, the Turks might be less inclined to send in their troops. Likewise, Shiite militants -- in both Iran and Iraq -- would be disabused of the hope that they can carve out their own statelet through violent means merely by waiting out a short-term U.S. occupation.

Given its various ethnic and religious divisions, Iraq has the potential to become another Bosnia or Lebanon. The histories of both those countries provide cautionary tales about what could happen in Iraq if the United States leaves it to its own fate once America's immediate objectives have been met.

[knighthawk]

Ping

[boris]

"Given its various ethnic and religious divisions, Iraq has the potential to become another Bosnia or Lebanon. The histories of both those countries provide cautionary tales about what could happen in Iraq if the United States leaves it to its own fate once America's immediate objectives have been met."

And the downside is?...

In fact, this is precisely what we should do. Pull their fangs and let them return to the year 600 A.D.

--Boris