The "Haiphong Effect"

Connections ^ | March 24, 2003 | Warren Pollock

[wepollock]

The "Haiphong Effect" Warren Pollock Sunday, March 23, 2003 Overview Analysis Endnote BIO Reference on Haiphong

Overview

To draw a parallel to today it will be necessary to understand the strategy rather than the media definition of "Shock and Awe" and equate that policy to the history of Haiphong. From the late 1960's to May of 1972 Haiphong was allowed to function uncontested as a port of call for weapon shipments to North Vietnam. The issue at hand relates to limiting war and thereby limiting success.

Today, war may be limited primarily by capability.

Analysis

Iraqi regulars and irregulars are integrated into the fabric of the civilian population of Baghdad. Therefore even if the United States has been dropping large amounts of ordinance it has not garnered the proportional result of making the opposing force less dangerous. To make a point I will call the tactical mistake of applying the "Shock and Awe" strategy the "Haiphong Effect."

In the early days of Vietnam the United States was reticent to bomb Haiphong harbor. The Soviet response was a major concern of that day and its potential can find a present day analogy in the risk of "theocratic politic." (The Islamic religion misused as politic, the Arab street, opinion, what have you)

The net result of failing to bomb Haiphong harbor in the late sixties caused a costly prolongation of the war and massive US casualties. In making this analogy I am not only talking about the battle for Iraq but also for the wider war which includes not only failed nations but also religiously meshed politics and the potential for devastating domestic terror. (A knock out punch)

Theocratic-politic and nations of failure such as Iraq are coalescing and will target the United States the more we "measure" and restrain our currently constrained response. The are counting on our limited resolve and they foresee that it will cascade to our international and even national demise.

The morality of the issue resides on our right as a nation state to continue. Coalescing forces exploiting religion, technology, and failed regimes thrust the immorality of war upon us.

Our actions have been tracked by necessity to unavoidable immorality therefore the failure to bomb civilian infrastructure in the battle for Iraq will through its weakness prolong the wider war and result in more US casualties in the process.

Endnote

"Shock and Awe" and events suggest a significant shortfall in capability and will in light of overwhelming requirements. War may be limited by capability.

This time around local and global political considerations, and the economic structure of the world, have greatly limited the response of the nation to the threat. Haiphong shows that half-measures will be more costly. The first and central battles of the war most people have seen were fought in NY and Washington therefore on the current course the last battle will likely occur at the same locations.

BIO

Warren Pollock has been published in the Journal of Homeland Security and is recognized as an expert on the survivability of financial-trading systems. His insights have been used in other publications such as the Intellibridge Homeland Security Monitor, Worldnetdaily, and on CNBC.

Reference

Washington Post on Goldwater http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwater30.htm "The course of the war in Vietnam served to make some of Mr. Goldwater's positions appear less radical than they initially had seemed. As he had been during the Korean War, Mr. Goldwater was bitterly critical of what he considered to be a "no win" policy in Vietnam, and he was an early advocate of bombing Hanoi and laying mines in the harbor at Haiphong, positions that were called outrageous at the time. Before the war ended, both actions were taken by U.S. forces."

Presidential Decisionmaking and Vietnam: Lessons for Strategists http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96winter/cerami.htm "Nixon alone decided on the course of action to follow. Again, cabinet officers opposed him and he knew there would be a strong domestic reaction. Nevertheless, in Nixon's words, "Defeat . . . was not an option."[51] On 5 May 1972, B-52 bombers conducted raids against Hanoi and Haiphong, and on 8 May the US Navy mined the port of Haiphong.[52] The President had decided to go all out in using air and sea power against the North in retaliation for their offensive. In his memoir, Nixon recalls a memorandum to Kissinger in which he criticized both the Pentagon and his predecessor for not understanding the use of violent means to attain policy objectives: The reticence of the military planners continued to be a problem. The bombing proposals sent to me by the Pentagon could at best be described as timid."

Vietnamese military sources only say that between 1971 and 1972 “almost all” of 125’s missions were forced to return to the north.[134] The mining of Haiphong in 1972 must have contributed to this dismal performance. This may help to explain why it was so important for the DRV to complete in December 1972 a secret oil pipeline running from the Chinese border to the southern province of Thu Dau Mot.

[struwwelpeter]

I've read this twice and still don't understand it.

[PhilDragoo]

Proceedings May 1996 "The Day It Became The Longest War": LBJ refused Joint Chiefs' request to bomb Hanoi and mine Haiphong November 1965.

All target lists were sanitized by LBJ in his fear of engaging USSR or PRC in WWIII.

This "Hanoi Syndrome" resulted in politicians losing the war, not the military.

When we approach Baghdad, never send a unit where a bomb will do.

A large, large bomb.

[stylin19a]

Some North Vietnam leaders have now admitted that had the Christmas Bombing lasted 24 more hours, they would have surrendered.

Here is a different take, using some of the same analogy, with the difference being the man in charge.

Curing the Vietnam Syndrome
Enough quagmire talk.
By William R. Hawkins

As war looms ever closer in Iraq, more references are being made by critics that this new conflict risks "another Vietnam." The first Gulf War of 1991 was widely hailed at the time as having put the "Vietnam Syndrome" behind us, but it didn't. It was reported that "Desert Storm" was a decisive victory because, unlike Vietnam, the military was given carte blanche to develop a winning strategy without the confining rules of engagement that allegedly cost America victory in Southeast Asia.

In truth, the Gulf War and Vietnam were more similar than not. In both wars, the United States was on the strategic defensive; either trying to keep Saigon out of Hanoi's hands or liberate Kuwait from Iraq. Within the designated theater of operations, there were few constraints on military operations against enemy forces. But in neither case did Washington assume the strategic offensive with the aim of removing the enemy regime that was committing the aggression that American troops were combating. The aim was simply to restore the status quo ante bellum.

It was this political aspect of "limited war" thinking that made both the Vietnam War and the confrontation with Iraq into such prolonged conflicts. If determined opponents can stay in power, able to reconstitute military forces over time as they draw on their national resources and support from other powers, their wars will continue. And as long as they remain on the strategic offensive, they will dictate the pace of the conflict and hold the initiative.

Eventually, Hanoi wore down the United States through protracted struggle; and prior to September 11, 2001, a similar process was favoring Saddam Hussein as arms inspections had ceased and economic sanctions were collapsing.

The "one hand tied behind our back" argument for why Vietnam was lost has been dominated by the issue of restrictions on the bombing of North Vietnam; particularly that Hanoi and Haiphong harbor were off limits for most of the war. But it is doubtful that any level of bombing would have solved the basic strategic problem.

Consider when President Richard Nixon escalated the air campaign in May 1972 in response to a major North Vietnamese ground offensive into South Vietnam. It reached its pinnacle with the "Christmas bombing" that December. Hanoi and Haiphong were finally hit directly by B-52 heavy bombers as restrictions were lifted. This seemed to break the negotiating deadlock, leading directly to the Paris Accords which were signed on January 27,1973.

This apparent victory of air power proved hollow. The Hanoi regime had signed a piece of paper, but had not changed its outlook. The Paris Accords even allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in those parts of South Vietnam they had seized. With American ground troops subsequently withdrawn and U.S. aid to South Vietnam curtailed, Hanoi was able to launch a successful ground offensive only two years later. The war only ended when one side was destroyed. Tragically, it was Saigon that was subjected to a regime change.

Saddam agreed to far more stringent terms in 1991 than Hanoi had accepted in 1973, because there was a U.S.-led coalition army only 60 miles from Baghdad which could have removed him from power. Saddam was thus willing to agree to measures such as U.N. weapon inspections and the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction. Yet, by the time Iraq signed the U.N. ceasefire resolution, the withdrawal of the 545,000 deployed American troops had already started. There would be no army of occupation to escort or support the U.N. inspectors. Like North Vietnam two decades earlier, Iraq went to work to negate the terms to which it had agreed at the point of a gun, as soon as the gun was put away.

Subsequent years of "no-fly" zones and occasional bombing campaigns, the most ambitious being that of "Desert Fox" in 1998 against suspected Iraqi weapon labs and factories, failed to change the regime in Baghdad or alter its ambitions.

The 1998 air campaign was much like that of 1972, its main purpose being to cover an American retreat with a barrage of fire and smoke; another spin of declaring victory, then getting out. The dictators in both Hanoi and Baghdad knew that once the bombers had flown away, whatever had been demolished could be rebuilt.

It is when President George W. Bush says, as he did again in his press conference March 6, "if we go to war, there will be a regime change" that the break from the legacy of Vietnam is heard. He has said that if American troops go into Iraq, they will not stop until the country is liberated, and he devoted a major speech to building a post-Saddam Iraq at the American Enterprise Institute dinner February 26.

There is no talk of "limited war" in this administration, only plans for "decisive war." This resolve should assure the American people that their sons and daughters in uniform are not being sent into a quagmire, but on a noble enterprise akin to that of World War II in its clarity of purpose - the rooting out of evil at its source.

William R. Hawkins is senior fellow for national-security studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council.

[Starrgaizr]

It is saying that we are too humane. Our enemies sneer at our efforts to spare civilians and civil infrastructure. We need to be willing to obliterate their cities, etc.

Of course, if we are pushed to the wall, one can imagine us losing our restraint. It is, after all, a very recent historical development after close to a century of "total war" doctrine.

[struwwelpeter]

I guess I would have to agree that fear motivates better than hugs.

[Dajjal]

BTTT

[KeyWest]

Sometimes history teaches us the wrong lesson, as in this article. There are other articles concerning the fact that our bombing is directed at the leaders more than the populace. The larger question is will this have an effect on both this war and future wars. It is a radical change in warfare, when the leaders could send others into battle and know that the elite on the other side would spare them. Made war cheap for the leaders. That no longer holds.

[Jim Noble]

To conquer Baghdad he thinks we need to nuke 'em glowing and shoot 'em in the dark.

Our theology has influenced our tactics, which anticipates cheering crowds when we roll into Baghdad.

Occupying a hostile Iraq may require infantry resources beyond what we have deployed, or even can deploy.

(Not even MHO, just a translation).

[Jim Noble]

>>Of course, if we are pushed to the wall, one can imagine us losing our restraint<<

I can't and I'm worried about it.

[FreedomPoster]

"Less restraint" bump.

[metesky]

Whether your anaysis is correct or incorrect, this self referencing article, which is merely a hype for your own web site, should be posted as a vanity.

[wepollock]

Thanks for the two great replies which were the Hawkins article and the Proceedings May 1996 "The Day It Became The Longest War."

No doubt that Iraq will fall because they don’t have a supply line. However the war has wider implications that is
why I call Iraq a battle. Based on the feedback I amended the article;

Overview

To draw a parallel to today it will be necessary to understand the strategy rather than the media definition of "Shock and Awe" and equate that policy to the history of Haiphong. From the late 1960's to May of 1972 Haiphong was allowed to function uncontested as a port of call for weapon shipments to North Vietnam. The issue at hand today relates to limiting war and thereby limiting success.

Endnote

"Shock and Awe" and dramatic current events suggest a significant shortfall in capability and will. The nation may now be facing overwhelming requirements for both internal defense and force projection. War may be limited by capability which we allowed to errode during times of prosperity.

This time around local and global political considerations, and the economic structure of the world, have greatly limited the response of the nation to the threat. Haiphong shows that half-measures will be more costly. The first and central battles of the war most people have seen were fought in NY and Washington therefore on the current course the last battle will likely occur at the same locations.

Today, war may be limited primarily by capability.

Washington Post on Goldwater
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwater30.htm
"The course of the war in Vietnam served to make some of Mr. Goldwater's positions appear less radical than they initially had seemed. As he had been during the Korean War, Mr. Goldwater was bitterly critical of what he considered to be a "no win" policy in Vietnam, and he was an early advocate of bombing Hanoi and laying mines in the harbor at Haiphong, positions that were called outrageous at the time. Before the war ended, both actions were taken by U.S. forces."

Presidential Decisionmaking and Vietnam: Lessons for Strategists
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96winter/cerami.htm
"Nixon alone decided on the course of action to follow. Again, cabinet officers opposed him and he knew there would be a strong domestic reaction. Nevertheless, in Nixon's words, "Defeat . . . was not an option."[51] On 5 May 1972, B-52 bombers conducted raids against Hanoi and Haiphong, and on 8 May the US Navy mined the port of Haiphong.[52] The President had decided to go all out in using air and sea power against the North in retaliation for their offensive. In his memoir, Nixon recalls a memorandum to Kissinger in which he criticized both the Pentagon and his predecessor for not understanding the use of violent means to attain policy objectives: The reticence of the military planners continued to be a problem. The bombing proposals sent to me by the Pentagon could at best be described as timid."

Addressing concerns;

The public opinion has so much media, format, and cultural bias that it has become blind. Eventually "blind" people in the United States will just become dead lets just hope that the number will be as limited as the WTC.

The survivors will wonder how things got that way as they think of CNBC, FOX, the NYT, and Washington Post.

I am going to the great effort to compile and disseminate information and analysis.

If I can help through a sincere effort to bring people closer to the issues then some very small part of America will begin to think to the defense of this nation.