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Posted on 03/20/2003 9:17:43 PM PST by An.American.Expatriate
Good Morning.
This is the continuation Thread of Operation Iraqi Freedom - Day 1- LIVE THREAD.
It is designed for general conversation about the events of the day. In depth discussion of events should be left to individual threads - but links to the threads or other articles is highly encouraged. This allows us to stay abreast of the situation in general, while also providing a means of obtaining specific information.
To all who helped this get started yesterday, thank you!
Here is thier response:
Von: Ewen Buchanan [buchanane@un.org]
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 20. März 2003 20:18
An: Me
Betreff: Re: SCUD Missiles in Irak
Is it confirmed that it was a scud?
If it was a scud it would certainly show Iraq to be lying as it has always asserted that it had no more. It would be up to the Security Council to delare a material breach.
Below is our assessment of where matters rest on scuds (from the Clusters document on our website www.unmovic.org).
I. MISSILE CLUSTERS
a. Scud type missiles
Introduction
In 1974, Iraq started taking delivery of the foreign made Scud-B, a surface-to-surface combat missile with a range up to 300 kilometres, and associated equipment (launchers, ground support equipment). At the beginning of 1987, Iraq started modifying Scud-B missiles to extend their range. After several tests, on 3 August 1987, a test missile achieved a range of approximately 615 kilometres. This modified missile was subsequently designated as Al Hussein. After this success, Iraq decided to reverse-engineer the Scud-B missile. At the beginning of 1988, the director of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) tasked a facility designated as Project 1728 to indigenously develop and produce Scud-type engines.
Background
In August 1991, Iraq declared the import of a total of 819 Scud-B combat missiles with a matching number of conventional warheads. It also declared matching quantities for the import of main fuel (818 tonnes) and oxidizer (2895 tonnes) for those missiles. Iraq further declared that it had imported 11 Scud-B missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), and had declared the indigenous production of four additional launchers (known as Al Nida) from imported trucks and 50-tonne trailers. These missiles, launchers and propellants constituted the core elements of Iraq's missile force before the Gulf War. UNSCOM was satisfied that 817 out of 819 imported Scud-B missiles had been accounted for. This finding was endorsed by UNSCOM Commissioners in November 1997. However, UNSCOM could not account for approximately 25 imported warheads.
Iraq had declared the unilateral destruction of significant quantities of Scud-B propellants. However, this was not supported by documentation. Iraq did not provide two inventory diaries, known to UNSCOM and requested by it, that had covered the time of the destruction of the proscribed missile propellants. Iraq has maintained its position that it did not have these diaries when UNMOVIC repeated the request in January 2003. In June 1998, Iraq indicated that, due to the stated limited storage lifetime of the main fuel (7 years) and of the oxidizer (10 years), they would no longer have been usable.
UNSCOM could not confirm the existence of other suppliers of Scud-B combat missiles to Iraq.
Prior to the Gulf war (1988-1990), Iraq had also made extensive efforts to develop its capability to indigenously produce Scud-type missiles. In this respect, Iraq declared that it had been able to indigenously produce a total of 80 combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies, of which 54 to 57 had been rejected due to poor production quality. Iraq had declared the unilateral destruction of the combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies. However, the methods used for this destruction prevented UNSCOM from achieving a full accounting of the 80 assemblies.
Iraq also stated in 1997 that, in April 1990, it had indigenously produced seven "training" engines, which had been delivered to an operational missile unit for training purposes. Iraq stated that these engines had been unilaterally destroyed, along with the imported missiles in July 1991. UNSCOM did not find any remnants of such engines and, therefore, could not verify this declaration. These assertions were repeated in a document provided to UNMOVIC on 8 February 2003.
In February 1998, Iraq declared that, prior to the Gulf war, it had indigenously produced 121 Scud-type warheads. This was discussed during a Technical Evaluation Meeting in 1998 and, although Iraq orally provided information concerning the production of these warheads, it did not support the information with any documentation. UNSCOM could not find remnants for approximately 25 of the declared indigenously produced warheads. UNSCOM was not able to obtain a full picture of Iraq's warhead production.
In February 1996, Iraq admitted that, before the Gulf War, it had started to construct facilities to produce Scud-B propellants and that construction had continued after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). However, Iraq stated that the facilities never became operational and were eventually converted to civilian use and submitted for monitoring by UNSCOM until December 1998.
Iraq imported key engine components that it could not indigenously produce. For example, Iraq declared that, between mid-1989 and mid-1990, it had received from a foreign supplier 35 turbo-pumps out of an initial order of 305. According to Iraq, a total of 14 turbo-pumps had been used in testing activities and the remainder had been unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. The extensive methods used for the unilateral destruction prevented UNSCOM from making a full accounting for the declared turbo-pumps. UNSCOM also obtained documentary proof that two turbo-pumps did not arrive in Iraq until six months after the date Iraq declared it had used them in static tests.
Iraq stated that, due to the lack of certain equipment, components and know-how, Project 1728 had not been able to produce a complete engine. However, in 1998, UNSCOM concluded that, by late 1990, Iraq had had the capability to indigenously manufacture, from indigenously produced and foreign parts, a limited number of Scud-type engines and missiles. It should nevertheless be noted that, in 1998, Iraq was experiencing some difficulties in indigenously producing/assembling an Al Samoud engine, a smaller liquid propulsion engine based on the same technology as that of the Scud-B.
Before the Gulf War, Iraq had the capability to indigenously manufacture warheads, airframes, and certain engine components but had to rely on imports for some key engine components as well as guidance and control (G&C) components. Iraq had attempted to indigenously produce Scud-B type propellants and was able to assemble an indigenous launcher.
UNSCOM found that Iraq had continued to engage in activities after they had become proscribed by the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). For example, Iraq had established working groups as late as November 1993 to work on Scud-B guidance and control systems. Iraq stated that the working groups were able to produce only preliminary production drawings and that they had been disbanded two weeks after having started work.
Following Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal's defection, the Iraqi authorities handed over to UNSCOM a small number of Scud-B guidance and control equipment and various other parts that had been imported for its pre-Gulf War missile activities.
Iraq stated in early 1996 that, in 1995, a foreign middleman had offered Iraq five disassembled second-hand TELs of a size much larger than the Scud-B TELs. According to Iraq, since it had had no interest in the offer, the proposal had been rejected and the parts had never been delivered.
In 1995, Iraq declared that it had not informed UNSCOM of the work it had carried out at the Al Sadiq factory in 1992/1993 for some 18 months as the work had only been related to non-proscribed missile production. UNSCOM questioned this rationale given that Iraq had declared similar work at another facility.
On 3 March 2003, Iraq provided two documents concerning the material balance for combat warheads and the local production of liquid fuel engines. Earlier, on 25 February 2003, Iraq also offered to provide UNMOVIC with metal fragments, which it had informed UNSCOM were from indigenously produced engines. At that time, it had refused to provide the items to UNSCOM as it had objected to UNSCOM seeking an analysis of the items at laboratories outside of Iraq.
In the material balance for combat warheads document, Iraq indicated its readiness to discuss the details of the unilateral destruction of the warheads in 1991, and offered to conduct a recount. It also suggested that joint excavations be conducted at the unilateral destruction site and at the site where destruction had been carried out under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq also provided the names of eight persons who it states had carried out the transport and destruction of warheads in 1991. UNMOVIC is still reviewing the information and other details provided in the document. It is still not clear whether the activities suggested could help resolve any part of the outstanding issues in this area.
As for the document on local production of liquid fuel engines, it states inter alia that Iraq did not reach the stage of producing a combat-level engine until 17 January 1991. The document also provides a list of 46 persons, in addition to the five senior staff that had been named in its 1996 FFCD, who it states were the main scientific and engineering staff in Project 1728. An analysis of the information provided is underway.
Assessment
Although UNSCOM reported that all but two of the 819 declared imported Scud-B combat missiles had been "effectively" accounted for, the stated consumption of some missiles could not be independently verified. This was the case for 14 Scud-B missiles as targets in a missile interception project. While such use is supported by some documentation contained in the so-called Scud files, it is questionable whether Iraq would have really used, what were at that time, valuable operational assets in the pursuit of such a project. Furthermore, available data could only corroborate a very small number of declared missile launches at that time. It cannot be excluded that Iraq retained a certain numbers of the missiles. The additional information Iraq provided on 8 February 2003 on the missile interception project does not resolve the outstanding questions.
Iraq's thorough methods of unilateral destruction prevented an assessment of its achievements in the indigenous production of Scud-B engines. Furthermore, the methods used prevented a clear accounting of the "training" engines and some specific key components of the indigenously produced liquid propellant engine. The lack of evidence to support Iraq's declarations on its destruction of these indigenously produced "training" engines, as well as on the key engine components, such as turbo-pumps, raises the question whether they were all destroyed as declared. Iraq could, in fact, have produced a small number of Scud-type liquid propellant engines from both imported turbo-pumps and locally produced engine components.
Moreover, the lack of documentation to support the destruction of a significant amount of Scud-B liquid propellant, and the fact that approximately 50 warheads were not accounted for among the remnants of unilateral destruction, suggest that these items may have been retained for a proscribed missile force. After investigating Iraq's statement that, due to the limited storage lifetime, the propellants would now be useless, UNMOVIC has assessed that the propellants would in fact still be usable and would therefore need to be verified as destroyed.
Questions also arise with respect to activities related to proscribed guidance and control systems that Iraq had conducted from 1992 to 1995. It is difficult to accept Iraq's statement that they were for non-proscribed missiles. Of particular concern are the guidance and control working groups that Iraq says had been established for a very short period of time in November 1993. The concern is that Iraq may have been conducting reverse engineering of proscribed guidance and control systems as part of its missile activities even after the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that Iraq has retained such guidance and control equipment.
Another indication of possible proscribed activity is the offer that Iraq said it received from a middleman for five disassembled TELs. Some parts were already shipped to an adjacent country. Although Iraq said that it had rejected the offer, no evidence has been provided in support. These parts might have allowed the assembly of one or two TELs, which would have been another piece for a reconstituted Scud-type missile force. In this connection, Iraq has, so far, been unable to locate a 50-tonne trailer that it declared it had imported for the indigenous production of the Al Nida mobile launcher and which it claims had been stolen. Iraq also did not provide UNSCOM with the parts of an imported Scud TEL, which it states it had disassembled.
The 2002 CAFCD and its supporting documents, the most recent semi annual declarations, and the material submitted to UNMOVIC on 8 February 2003 provide no significant new information relevant to the aforementioned issues.
The following action is required to address the foregoing issues:
To clear up the uncertainty as to whether Iraq has engines and key engine components that could be used for the production of proscribed missiles, Iraq should submit the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were "training" engines, to UNMOVIC to allow for their analysis and verification. The examination and analysis of these remnants could help determine the origin of the material used in the manufacture of the engines as well as their nature. Iraq should also submit to UNMOVIC the melted remnants of the destroyed key components for analysis. This could assist in the verification of Iraq's declaration of the destruction of the turbo-pumps.
Iraq should also provide documentation such as production records and quality control documents to support the information it had submitted during the Technical Evaluation Meeting in 1998. This information could allow UNMOVIC to establish the number of indigenously produced warheads.
In order to address the broader question of the existence of a possible Scud-type missile force, Iraq should provide specific documentation in support of its declarations. An example would be the two reports written by the missile force commander on 30 January 1991 and in May 1991 that, on the basis of Iraq's own declarations and outside information, are known to exist. The first report could help clarify the state of the combat missile force at the end of the Gulf War. The second report could allow clarification of the status of the missile force just after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq should also provide technical documentation concerning the interception missile project in order to support its declaration on the use of Scud-B missiles as targets in the project. The provision of the two diaries that relate to the unilateral destruction of the proscribed missile propellants should also be provided. Iraq's most recent response to UNMOVIC's request on these matters provides no further clarification.
As for the activities related to guidance and control systems, such as gyroscope reverse engineering and procurement of various guidance and control components, Iraq should also provide UNMOVIC with all the Scud-B guidance and control drawings and hardware and documentation that it may still have.
Iraq's intent in conducting proscribed missile activities or procurement after the adoption and its acceptance of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991) needs to be clarified. In addition, the scope of these activities cannot be fully established until convincing evidence and answers are provided by Iraq.
Guidance and control activities, including research and development, will need specific attention due to their particular dual-use nature.
Actions that Iraq could take to help resolve the issue
- Present any retained proscribed missiles and associated equipment, including the 50-tonne trailer declared to have been stolen and the parts from a disassembled imported Scud TEL.
- Present the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were "training" engines, for analysis and verification. As proposed by Iraq on 8 February 2003, the fragments found by Iraq on 4 August 1997 should also be presented for analysis.
- Present the melted remnants of the destroyed key components, including the turbo-pumps for analysis.
- Present documentation or other evidence to support the information it had submitted during the TEM in 1998 on the number of indigenously produced warheads.
- Present other specific documentation, such as the two reports written by the missile force commander on 30 January 1991 and in May 1991; technical documentation, such as videotapes and tracking data, concerning the interception missile project; and the two diaries that relate to the unilateral destruction of the proscribed missile propellants.
- Present any remaining Scud-B guidance and control drawings, documentation and hardware.
- Explain and present credible evidence on why it had conducted proscribed missile activities and procurement after the adoption and acceptance by Iraq of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).
To: "'info@unmovic.org'"
cc:
Subject: SCUD Missiles in Irak
20/03/2003 06:37
Good Morning,
curently it is being reported that Iraq has fired at least one SCUD missile against US Forces in Kuwait.
Would Iraq's possession of SCUD Missile(s) [a banned missile system] finally constitute a material breach of the various resolutions with which Irak was supposed to comply?
Why were these not found earlier?
Best Regards
Sure it would constitute a material breach, but so did a lot of other things Blixie found, that's not saying they would do a darn thing about it!
Reason they weren't found, well, Saddam just misplaced them, I would guess!
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