Posted on 03/19/2003 9:51:18 AM PST by Stand Watch Listen
CAMP DOHA, Kuwait - An Iraqi MIG-25 conducted a daring mission last month when it streaked to the Saudi border at 50,000 feet and then raced back to its base in central Iraq. American officials now believe that the Iraqi plane was on a photo reconnaissance mission, searching for American forces.
During the Persian Gulf war, the Saddam Hussein regime was caught by surprise when a United States-led coalition rumbled out of the western desert to outflank Iraq's Republican Guard. So Iraqi authorities appear to have dispatched the MIG to see if there was an allied force similarly gathering somewhere out of sight. The Iraqis may have been surprised at what they did not find. At more than 150,000 the American-led invasion force in Kuwait is substantial, but it a far cry from the land force that was commanded by Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf in 1991.
The adversaries that have squared off this time have not changed. But that is where the resemblance between this war and the last one ends. This is a sequel, not a re-run. There are more differences than similarities between the upcoming conflict and the gulf war, including terrain, allies and the final objective. But the absence of a huge ground force is one of the most important of them.
As United States forces make their final war preparations here it is worth taking a look back. The doctrine the Americans applied in Gulf War I was one of overwhelming force. The Pentagon sent General Schwarzkopf forces he did not even request. There were more than 500,000 Army, U.S. Marine, British and other allied troops. The ground war was preceded by a 39-day bombing campaign. The war itself was intended to be everything that Vietnam was not. Instead of a long, gradual use of force the goal was to overpower the enemy and quickly withdraw. The concept was known as the "Powell" doctrine, after Gen. Colin L. Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the current Secretary of State.
But the looming conflict with Baghdad not only seems intended to topple Iraq's government but to establish a new military lesson, one driven by Donald H. Rumseld, the hands-on Secretary of Defense. Mr. Rumsfeld, who has had an important influence on the plan, has touted air power and new reconnaissance systems and is not an enthusiast of heavy ground forces and armored divisions. This time the United States is planning to prevail with a smaller force and little on hand in the way of reserves.
If the United States military and its British and Australian allies achieve a quick and decisive victory it will demonstrate that the Americans are able to exploit their superior power on the ground and their supremacy in the skies without the sort of huge deployment that accompanied the 1991 war.
It would be a testimony to air power, the military's ability to synchronize air and ground attacks, its training and its push to better integrate operations by the military services. The war would influence decisions about military operations and force structure for years. It would give a boost to Mr. Rumsfeld's "transformation" agenda: the development of precision weapons, reconnaissance and command and control as a means of transforming the armed services.
But it is also a strategy that entails greater risk. If the Iraqi regime does not easily shatter, the lightning offensive the United States is hoping for might be drawn out.
There is an insurance force should the military need more divisions, but it is not here now. It is the armored divisions and regiments that are shipping out from the United States and Europe and which are not scheduled to arrive until mid- to late April to stabilize a post-Hussein Iraq.
The size of the force is just one way, of course, in which Gulf War II will differ from Gulf War I. There will be other important differences as well, and as I have moved around Kuwait and Bahrain in past week I have made a list.
The terrain, for starters, will be very different. The 1991 war was decided in the open desert, but the denouement for this campaign will occur in downtown Baghdad. Some of the routes to Baghdad will also pass by canals, marshy areas and relatively narrow routes, depriving the American and British land forces of the room to maneuver they had last time.
The sequencing of the air and ground campaign will also be different. In 1991 the United States carried out more than five weeks of air strikes before the ground attack. This time the air and ground campaigns will be more closely aligned. Allies are also another issue. In 1991 the United States had a broader military coalition, including Arab armies and the French. This time it is the Americans, the British and the Australians.
Finally, of course, the objective is different. The mission is not limited to the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the destruction of the Republican Guard, a goal not fully completed last time. This time it is "regime change," the toppling of a foreign government and the considerable nation-building exercise that will follow.
But the size of the force may be the most important difference along with the Bush administration decision to opt for a "rolling start" in which the attack will begin even as more forces are arriving in Kuwait.
There are two major ground forces on hand. One is the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which includes about 50,000 marines. The marines also have command of a hybrid British division of some 25,000 troops. The second major American ground force is the Army's V Corps. It consists of the 3rd Infantry Division and the Army's 101st Airborne, some 42,000 troops when the 101st is completely ready. The V Corps includes an attack helicopter regiment and some smaller units. Lieut. Gen. David McKiernan, the land war commander, also has a brigade of the 82nd Airborne at his disposal, and other troops will probably be inserted into northern Iraq.
It is an impressive but not overwhelming force given the need to push deep to Baghdad without losing momentum. Besides possible urban warfare the troops will need to guard supply lines, corral prisoners, provide for the needs of Iraq's population and hunt down weapons of mass destruction.
The future of the American military is at stake. A quick win in Iraq would not be the end for the use of heavy armored forces. There is still the matter of the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea has a million-man army. But a decisive victory in Iraq could bury the Powell doctrine. By the same token, a war that turned out to be longer and more hard-fought than expected would raise serious questions about the judgment of the Pentagon's civilian leadership and its plans to remake the American armed forces.
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