America's Eurasian reshuffle

Asia Times ^ | 3.11.03 | Francesco Sisci and Lu Xiang

[Enemy Of The State]

America's Eurasian reshuffle By Francesco Sisci and Lu Xiang

BEIJING - The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed close enough to Samuel P Huntington's forecasts in his famous The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, but the consequences for the world appear now, some 18 months after those events, completely opposite. France and Germany, the bulwark of Western civilization according to Huntington, are on a collision course against the United States; ironically, the European countries closer to the US are the ones further from Huntington's "nordic" culture: Spain, Italy and Eastern Europe.

France and Germany, partly because of their significant domestic Muslim minorities, are in fact rediscovering 13 centuries after the Arab conquest that split the Mediterranean in two, north and south, that the center of Europe is something that is only partly "European". In fact the projection of northern and continental Europe toward the southern and eastern shores of this sea is something that has been attempted routinely for centuries, from the times of the Crusades until a few decades ago, when France controlled Algeria and Tunisia. The opposite was also true, as the Arabs held Spain, in all or in part, until the 15th century, and the Turks battled Vienna in the Balkans until the 18th century.

In this case for France and Germany the opposition to the US war in Iraq could be part of a grander strategy. On the one hand Paris and Berlin, commanding the largest economies on the continent, could form the nucleus of that "Kerneuropa" (Core Europe) which could be the real pole of union for Europe. The project is even more important as the European Union is expanding in all directions, incorporating the Baltic republics and Turkey. A union, moving from 12 to 15 and then to 22 and who knows how many more members, loses focus and decisiveness. The rules in the EU are democratic and differentiate among the size of member states, in theory granting the same power for the six-month presidency to Luxembourg and to Germany encourages divisions within larger countries. Provinces, such as Bavaria in Germany or Lombardy in Italy, could feel they could get better representation in the EU if they stood as independent states rather than as part of a larger country. This is particularly true in Italy, where Lombardy is one of the richest areas in Europe but within Italy it must live with provinces that are some of the poorest areas of the whole union.

At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the east has erased the 50-year-long strategic challenge to Western and Central Europe. The defeat of the radical Muslim world in the first Gulf War has erased the other challenge from the southern and eastern Mediterranean. This second Gulf War is set to start without an open provocation from Iraq like its previous invasion of Kuwait, and likely without the much-ballyhooed smoking gun proving Saddam Hussein's evil intentions. This could antagonize the Muslims in Europe and in the Middle East, and widen the rift between the northern and southern Mediterranean.

On the contrary, a greater cooperation between France and Germany and their projection toward the Muslim world could, in time, produce the double bonus of forming a center of European decisions and extending a friendly hand to the Middle East. This friendly hand is especially important as, for the first time since the Roman Empire, there could be some degree of cultural and political agreement between the north and the south of this sea. In Europe in the same fashion France and Germany stand alone but strong within Europe, thus in effect marginalizing other countries. The position of France and Germany also offers a Western interlocutor to moderate Muslims seeking viable alternatives to radicalism. This could be especially important as Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia, is not a radicalized country, and its defeat could open the floodgates to greater Muslim fundamentalism.

All of this is not necessarily negative for the ongoing US war in Iraq, but certainly imposes a new strategic paradigm between the two sides of the Atlantic, where France and Germany do not accept playing second fiddle to the United States. However, from the US perspective, the United States was able to fight for France, the center of the present dispute, three times in the past century - in both World Wars and in the Cold War - but France is dragging its feet on a war for the US.

But it is not a matter of exchange of favors and certainly not one of civilizations: it is geopolitics. France and Germany could move up their political integration, and project themselves to Africa and the Middle East, appease Moscow while integrating Poland, the Baltic and even Ukraine into a bipolar Europe. In one there can be Framania (France plus Germany) and the dwarves who wish to join (Belgium, Luxembourg etc) and in the other everyone else.

The appeal of this design is enormous, and whatever the results of the war it could build a sizable economic nucleus that, in time, could do without the US. The present growth of the euro is also part of this appeal, as the European economy appears slower but less volatile than the turbulent economy of the United States.

On the security issue, in theory France and Germany could do without the US, as Russia is no longer a real threat, the greatest cause of conflict in the continent for centuries, the clash between France and Germany, has been solved thanks to US intervention. Furthermore Framania feels it could handle the Middle East better without the United States, or at least with less US intervention.

Go east, young man The picture of this geopolitical reshuffle is not complete without looking at the other side of the Eurasian continent. Here China, Japan, but also Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand have a greater financial integration with the US than Europe has. They have built a virtuous circle in which the US buys their products, and in turn these countries buy US debt in the form of US Treasury bonds. In this way the US keeps its inflation down and the Asian countries are able to produce more efficiently. The Asian countries boost and upgrade their production, as the US supports the continuous improvement of Asian production lines. This contract has built a mutual bond from which it is practically impossible for either side to withdraw.

The bond has grown stronger after the defeat of Japan in its challenge to the US in the late 1980s and the weakening of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar. Furthermore, the region has weathered the 1997 financial crisis in which Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji refused to devalue Asia's second-strongest currency, the yuan, and break the peg between it and the dollar. In 1998, Washington and Beijing intervened together to stem the continuous devaluation of the yen, which was making life difficult for the yuan and its peg to the dollar. Now in times of a weak dollar, it can be argued that the peg of the yuan, sustained by the buoyant Chinese economy, helps support the greenback against the euro. And even while thinking of a greater integration in Asia with the Asian Cooperation Dialogue, promoted by Thailand, the ACD has launched an Asian bond, which is denominated in US dollars.

On a strategic level, while the US is not necessary in continental Europe, as internal conflicts have subsided and clashes with the Muslim world could be solved possibly, thinks Framania, with less US intervention, the United States is more necessary than ever in East Asia.

The North Korean crisis shows the reality of threats from the peninsula to the islands of Japan. Before these threats, China was not able to control them, and the mutual suspicion between Beijing and Tokyo is light-years away from the entente cordiale between Berlin and Paris. Therefore either the US intervenes and spearheads a solution, or Japan could very well rearm, something that would prickle many sensitivities in China and the rest of Asia. Similarly, if not worse, problems exist between China and India, where there is an unsolved and difficult border issue, and the open wound of Kashmir and low-intensity war with Pakistan, a traditional Chinese ally. Whereas both in Beijing and Tokyo in the past decades there have been many movements, largely aborted, to improve the political climate, such gestures have not even started to be exchanged between Beijing and New Delhi, where the list of problems is dauntingly long. In Southeast Asia the situation is better, but only in appearance, because these nations are torn between contradictory loyalties, to Beijing, Tokyo or New Delhi, with each country harboring its own agenda, priorities and suspicions. For example, Vietnam is more wary of China than Thailand is.

Even China, considered by the US to be the biggest threat to the region, would have a very difficult time doing without a US presence in East Asia, as it would be left without a net to deal with Japan and India. Tensions could quite easily arise, which could potentially derail Beijing's ultimate concern of economic growth.

East Asia is far from the lack of strategic flashpoints of Western Europe, which managed to stand up, with the US, to the communist threat for 50 years and the war in Yugoslavia for 10 years without breaking up. In Asia for instance, the simple withdrawal of the US from its protection of Taiwan could ignite several conflicts. Without US protection, would Taiwan resist the temptation to declare independence and thus provoke Beijing into a war? Would China resist the temptation to pressure Taiwan more? In both cases, whatever the outcome, Japan would feel threatened, and Japan is the single largest economy of Asia, making up alone most of the dollar value of the regional production and trade. Japan therefore is not like Britain, which is a large economy but does not make up the largest part of the welfare of Europe. Differences of political regimes in different countries hamper further trust and political integration. The resolution of political systems and the soothing of wariness could take at least 20 years. In the meantime the US is the only huge buffer among the many potential conflicts of the continent.

In other words, differently from Europe, there is an economic and strategic integration across the Pacific far larger than across the Atlantic. Moreover, whereas in Europe there are objective interests to decrease the US presence, none of these interests are present in Asia, nor will be for the next two decades.

The war in Iraq could well be a catalyst of both trends. It could deepen the Atlantic divide, and strengthen the Asian reliance on the United States. Framania might be tempted to show greater difference with the United States whereas Asia would fear a US pullout from the continent, which would do away with the huge buffer provided by the US. However, especially in the case of US failure in Iraq, Asia might look with greater interest at Framania, as a counterbalance to the buffer role of the United States in the region.

It all depends on the results of US actions in Iraq. Iraq is no Afghanistan. In Afghanistan it is just important to take Kabul and make sure the many tribes won't host foreign fundamentalists, something that most would gladly do, as they saw Osama bin Laden and his cohorts as some kind of foreign interference or invasion. In Iraq, one must rebuild a state, and in recent times there have not been many successful examples of state rebuilding. But the very idea of rebuilding a state comes from the US, which after World War II successfully rebuilt Japan and Germany. In theory, Washington could do it, provided it does so in earnest and considers the concerns of other countries in the region and throughout the world.

The success of peace in Iraq could as well set a new tone in relations across the Atlantic, but could it really unwind the new notion of Framania? The concept of European union pales in comparison of the new Framania. And Italy, naturally straddled halfway between the Middle East and Europe, can hardly resist the sirens of Framania singing the tune of bridging the gap with the other shore of the Mediterranean. With Italy, France-Germany would stop being simply "Framania" and would become something very much like a new version of the Roman Empire.

Then, what would be the relations across the Atlantic? There are many "ifs" in this story, but one certainty: after a short period of glory, is definitely time to say adieu to Mr Huntington.

[DB]

The EU won't be able to talk its way out of Islam. They are fools for thinking they can.

[Malesherbes]

France and Germany, rather than being a "core" (Kern) for Europe are simply two countries in social and economic decline, with shrinking and aging populations - augmented only by Islamic immigration.