Posted on 03/04/2003 5:58:16 PM PST by Axion
Troop Deployments Raise Questions on War Timing and Strategy Summary
Mar 04, 2003
While equipment for the U.S. 4th Infantry Division languishes off the coast of Turkey, the Pentagon has announced the deployment of the 1st Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Other units already have been ordered to the region and are backed up in an increasingly congested pipeline. Though the White House and Pentagon have suggested that the failure to win Turkish approval for U.S. deployments could delay the war by a month or more -- corresponding with the arrival of the new deployments -- the overall political and military situation still argues that a war will begin in the next few days.
Analysis
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has ordered the deployment of the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The order comes despite the fact that more than 12,500 soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division are still at Fort Hood awaiting approval to deploy to Turkey -- their equipment waits off the coast of Turkey in more than 40 cargo ships.
The 1st Armored Division, based in Weisbaden, Germany, includes some 26,000 soldiers, 317 M1 Abrams tanks, 317 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and 39 M3 armored cavalry vehicles. The division's 3rd Brigade combat team received orders to deploy in mid-February, and approximately 2,000 could be en route for the region already.
The 1st Cavalry Division, based at Fort Hood, Texas, has been ordered to deploy with some 17,000 soldiers, more than 275 tanks and 281 Bradleys, and backed by 7,000 reserves. The 1st Cavalry originally was earmarked to support the 4th Infantry Division and Task Force Ironhorse in Turkey and northern Iraq. A helicopter squadron and chemical unit from the 1st Cavalry already have deployed to the Gulf region.
The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, from Fort Polk, La., has been ordered to deploy with some 10,000 troops. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, from Fort Carson, Colo., received orders to deploy to the region in mid-February, but reportedly was not expected to be fully deployed until late March. Another unit in the pipeline is the 173rd Airborne Brigade, part of the Southern European Task Force, also ordered to deploy in late February.
The Turkish Parliament's failure to approve a U.S. deployment appears to have thrown the White House and Pentagon into a state of confusion. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer admitted at a press conference that the Turkish vote had made military planning more complicated. Senior Pentagon planners have leaked to the media that settling on and implementing an alternative plan could delay the start of a war until late March or early April.
However, the decision to deploy two heavily armored divisions and a cavalry regiment in the wake of this apparent setback -- along with a steady trickle of intelligence from within the Gulf region -- suggests that a delay is unlikely. Rather, not only are these troops likely to serve as follow-on forces, but the fact that light forces were not among those deployed March 3 suggests that the alleged scramble to create a northern front might be little more than a distraction.
First, there is the logistical question. Though the figures likely are either exaggerated or confused, some 40 to 50 ships reportedly are en route to Turkey or waiting off its coast to unload equipment for the 4th Infantry Division and other units. Additional vessels are en route to the Persian Gulf, laden with equipment for the 101st Airborne Division, whose soldiers arrived in Kuwait on March 1 and 2. Still more vessels are at sea, returning to U.S. and European ports after depositing their cargo in the Gulf region.
The U.S. Maritime Sealift Command has grown substantially since Operation Desert Storm. Even so, the burden of moving equipment for the more than 200,000 troops already in the region has required nearly all of the available fast sealift and roll-on/roll-off vessels as well as some chartered civilian ships. The units deployed March 3 are all heavily armored and therefore place heavy demands on the already stretched cargo fleet. The units are unlikely to draw on prepositioned stocks of equipment in the region, since much of that reportedly already has been distributed to the 3rd Infantry Division and U.S. Marine Corps units in Kuwait.
This means that, unless there has been an extremely secret and efficient deployment of heavy equipment in recent months, the units called up March 3 will need to transport their equipment to U.S. and European ports for loading, shipment and unloading in Kuwait -- which already is bursting with U.S. and allied forces. At best, assuming they can scrape together enough ships, this would take no less than a month.
That would coincide with word out of the Pentagon of a four- to six-week delay in the war. The heavy armored units would arrive about the same time as the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, en route aboard the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and the USS Nimitz Carrier Battle Group. A delayed war could take place with a much stronger punch. It would need to: Paradoxically, the longer a war is delayed, the more time Iraq has to prepare for it and the more forces the United States will need to have in place to ensure a quick and decisive victory.
But the March 4 decision to deploy heavy armored units is important, given the units that were not ordered to deploy. Following Turkey's rejection of a 62,000-strong U.S. mechanized force deployment, the Pentagon has begun leaking a backup plan involving airlifting 10,000 to 20,000 light infantry to the north, with airpower replacing armor. But that barely would serve to tie down Iraqi troops, and perhaps not even that if U.S. troops were caught between feuding Turkish and Kurdish forces. It also would use up valuable transport aircraft for logistics and combat aircraft for close support of what ultimately would be a peripheral mission.
Moreover, it would demand the risky airlift of valuable light infantry elements, needed for combat operations in the south. Some have suggested the 101st Airborne Division could be airlifted to northern Iraq, but both it and the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team are needed to secure the bridges over the Euphrates in southern Iraq. Other proposals involve stripping elements of the 3rd or 4th Infantry Divisions of their heavy equipment and deploying them to northern Iraq by air. But the 4th ID is trained not only for mechanized warfare; it is the first fully digital division, and deploying the 4th as light infantry would be a waste. Likewise, the 3rd ID is trained in mechanized warfare and is needed for a southern offensive.
Other elements of the 82nd Airborne Division are tied down in Afghanistan, but it is interesting that the 10th Mountain Division, on alert and perfect for a light infantry deployment, was not called up. The Pentagon did not even call up the 1st Infantry Division, which already had been earmarked for northern Iraq. Using available cargo capacity to deploy armor to the region, rather than light forces to support the purported backup plan, suggests Washington is not serious about moving much into northern Iraq, leaving combat there to Turkish forces, much to the chagrin of the Kurds. Reports that the tempo of U.S. operations has slowed in Turkey appear to support this conclusion.
If the question of a northern front is no longer a question, there appears to be nothing further holding back a war. Intelligence reports and battlefield logic continue to argue that war will not be delayed and is in fact imminent.
Stratfor sources report that naval air assets are preparing for combat operations within days and that ground units have been issued maps and other material indicative of fast-approaching action. Logistics units reportedly are working around the clock to prepare for U.S. Air Force combat operations, and Special Operations forces are active in southern Iraq in unprecedented numbers.
Iraqi defenses are improving. Iraq has stepped up defensive preparations, digging trench networks around Baghdad and other key cities and redeploying key units toward Baghdad from the north.
In addition, the weather window is inflexible. Sandstorms are expected across western and southern Iraq by the end of March. These will interfere with laser and optical targeting systems, will increase the wear on engines and sensitive equipment -- including helicopter turbines and rotors -- and will compound the discomfort of ground troops. Conditions for the ground troops also will deteriorate as the temperatures begin to rise in mid-April. While the phase of the moon seems an archaic concern on the modern battlefield, the waxing moon will diminish U.S. advantages in night-vision equipment and stealth aircraft technology later in March.
There is no guarantee the political situation will improve for the White House if combat is delayed, despite talk in Turkey of another vote on the proposed deployment. Washington has bought and cajoled all of the votes it can expect in the U.N. Security Council, and the remaining holdouts are no more likely to support action tomorrow than today.
Dithering over a backup plan for northern Iraq and talk of a four- to six-week delay in the war could be diversionary. Discussing delay, especially as Iraq seems to be playing the political hand well with the U.N. inspectors, could slow Iraqi defensive preparations. It also could give the Iraqi military the confidence to deploy more units to the south in order to defend against the main U.S. thrust. This would not be a negative development for the United States, provided it could catch the deployment while it was under way.
U.S. interest in tying down Iraqi troops in northern Iraq might be changing with an evaluation of victory conditions. If the war is expected to conclude with a decisive battle in Baghdad, then it is in the U.S. interest to keep major Iraqi forces tied down in the north. If, however, there is a chance the Iraqis could lose Baghdad and continue their resistance in the north, then Washington would want to encourage the Iraqi army to redeploy -- but only just before air strikes begin, so that the Air Force has a chance to catch the northern forces on Iraq's highways. Whether intentional or not, Iraq appears to be taking advantage of a U.S. delay by redeploying its forces, thus presenting an opportunity and a need for the air war to begin.
I wish that trite old phrase was true, but it is not, as too many people talk all the time. While their babbling might not appear in print, an astute enemy doesn't need too many details to piece together the story. Fortunately, that where good ole disinformation comes in to muddy the waters...
Hmmms. . . I WONDER where "someplace other than Iraq" could possibly be? Think! Think! Hmmmm. . .
;-)
Probably but when?
As an example we are just beginning to understand the screw up on Schwarzkopf's part that resulted in the no fly zones. That was more than 10 years ago and it's just becomming public knowledge.
I'm convinced you are right.
Those of us that still remember the Iran hostage crisis, still hold a grudge.
Maybe, but this is a block party. There's another opportunity right across the street.
Yep. It's gonna be fun to watch the looks on all the "pundits" faces.
Or it COULD be that some of those armoured divisions are secretly shipping out to someplace OTHER than Iraq. . .Hmmms. . . I WONDER where "someplace other than Iraq" could possibly be? Think! Think! Hmmmm.
The Iraqi army is going to fold up like a cheap Three-Card Monte table. They will literally not know what hit them. I think the service chiefs are being overly cautious, as they should be, but I think the President wants a huge mailed fist in the region to deal with the Syrians or the Iranians, and, in addition, to lean hard on the Saudis.
It is possible, just possible, that Saudi involvement in 9-11 and the Al-Qaeda enterprise were far, far deeper than has publicly been acknowledged by the Administration.
However, just as likely is that these units are being activated for the Pacific Theater. Kim is getting a tad funny in the head, you know.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
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