Posted on 02/11/2003 9:25:20 PM PST by NormsRevenge
The failure of the Labor Party and Meretz in the recent elections brought in its wake numerous articles analyzing the reasons for their downfall. Most of them pointed to incorrect strategy and management, problematic leadership and so on.
Bearing in mind the electoral potential of Labor and Meretz, the answer to the question of whether the two parties failed depends on the targets they set themselves. If their aim was to garner the support of the Zionist left camp, their success was complete. But if their intention was to win wide public support, they failed dismally.
The Peace Index survey conducted in October 2002 found that a mere 17 percent of Israel's Jewish residents defined themselves as moderate or extreme left. This means that the electoral potential of the Zionist left among the Jewish population was "worth" only some 18 Knesset seats. It is, therefore, clear that the two parties won eight seats that came mainly from voters who described themselves as belonging to the center, together with a small number of votes from the Arab sector.
On the assumption, however, that the publicity campaigns of the two parties, especially that of Labor, were directed at the center, there was a large gap between the outcome and the reservoir of votes: The eight seats that the left took from the center were a small minority of the 36 seats that went to other parties.
The interesting question is why the electoral potential of the Zionist left dwindled - and not only in the last elections. The 36 seats that the two parties received in 1999 were very few compared to the 56 they had in 1992 (44 for Labor and 12 for Meretz) and the 43 they received in the 1996 elections (34 for Labor and nine for Meretz).
If it is possible to attach one label to the 1990s, it is the Oslo Accords, which, since their signing in September 1993, have left their mark on society more than any other factor. It is hardly surprising that these agreements have been the focal point of all the elections since their signing. But as it became clear that the diplomatic process was not bearing the hoped-for fruit, so grew the disappointment from the accords, and from the leadership of the left, which was seen as the initiator of the accords and responsible for their execution.
Thus a large majority of the Jewish public was opposed to the compromise proposals raised by then prime minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. The intifada "convinced" many that the Palestinians are not prepared to act in the spirit of the accords, and decided the fate of the left to a large extent.
Some of the central ideas of the Oslo Accords did in fact filter down into the consciousness of the Jewish public, including a considerable part of the moderate right, so that their views today on a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are much closer to those of the left than to the ideology of the Greater Land of Israel.
But the Jewish public seems to have disassociated its views on this subject from the context of the Oslo Accords and has expressed a lack of confidence in the process and the leadership associated with it.
According to the Peace Index, support for the Oslo agreement has, for a long time, stood at 20 percent; and it is not coincidental that this is also the number of voters who support the left. In other words, the Jewish public, with the exception of the extreme right, expects the left's concepts of peace to be realized by the tougher leaders of the right.
The Oslo process is just one of the factors that explains the waning of the left among the Jewish public. A sociological study reveals that Israel's Jewish society is at the height of a far-reaching transformation from structural and cultural points of view such as collective identity.
On the one hand, it has become more complex in terms of power bases and elites, and more pluralistic in terms of culture. On the other hand, it is more aware of the common base of collective identity - being part of the Jewish nation - and is prepared to make efforts to maintain this collective identity despite differences of opinion. The feeling of belonging to the Jewish nation cuts through differences and schisms in the Jewish majority and extends even to most of the non-Zionist Jewish groups, such as Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the immigrants from the former Soviet Union.
This feeling is nurtured by the concept of an external threat to Israel's existence as a Jewish state; and in this regard, there is a close connection between Palestinian terror and the strengthening of Jewish nationalism.
Against this backdrop, it is possible to understand why the Zionist left has been weakened, since its ideology stresses universal values such as equality for all human beings, alongside Jewish nationalism. Therefore, when the political struggle over the identity of the society focuses on the question of "Who is more nationalistic?" the right's starting point has a considerable advantage over that of the left.
If there is no drastic change in the security and political situation, we can expect a prolonged term of government by the right.
Prof. Yaar heads the Tami Steinmetz Research Institute for Peace at Tel Aviv University.
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