Get it?
No, and neither do you, apparently. As I type, my Molly nudges my hand, because I have stopped patting her. Molly is a cat, and would be extremely insulted if you or I called her a reification.
"a cat" is a referrant of the concept, cat. Such referrants are actual material existants. A "universal" is a referrant of the concept universal. For universal, there are no actual material (or any other kind) of existants. A universal is a class of concepts, and nothing more, useful in formal logic, and nothing else. The "universal" is an ontological/epistemological mistake.
Hank
"a cat" is a referrant of the concept, cat.
On the contrary, "cat" is a real category of animal. If not, then why do you assume that I know the thing to which you are referring?
Such referrants are actual material existants.
Huh? The term "cat" is a material existant? Does "cat" refer to the specific furry thing at your elbow or an abstract category in your mind? If only the former, then I can know nothing about the thing to which you are referring because I have no sensory information regarding it. If the latter, then I can know nothing about the thing to which you are referring because the abstraction "cat" is wholly within your mind, abstracted from your lived experience. I can have no certain knowledge of any ideas in your mind.
A "universal" is a referrant of the concept universal. For universal, there are no actual material (or any other kind) of existants. A universal is a class of concepts, and nothing more, useful in formal logic, and nothing else.
But "cat" is a universal. "Molly" is the particular.
Again, what is a C-A-T? Let me assume for a moment that a furry material existant is rubbing your elbow. You seem to be assuming that I understand the real category of animal to which you are referring.
If this category is a subjective abstraction in your mind created from your lived experience, how can you assume that your abstraction would conform to an abstraction in my mind?