First let me say it is nice when someone disagrees without being disagreeable. I appreciate that.
The quote above is an example of what I said earlier, "all of the old philosophers were never careful to identify and distinguish the difference between percepts (direct consciousness) and concepts (the identification of entities, events, and ideas...." I think Aquinas did have "perception" in mind when he used the term "apprehension." Other philosophers sometimes refer to perception as simple or immediate apprehension.
My point was that "1) the fact of its existence and 2) the fact of its essence or nature," are the very things perception does not provide. The "interpretation" of perception, that is, the assigning of an identity to what is perceived is at the conceptual level.
For example, I perceive a red circular patch. That perception provides nothing in itself except the fact of the percept. It is at the conceptual level that one can say, "I just rubbed my eyes, and the pressure produced the "red" spot," or "I've been looking at that green circle and the red spot is just the reaction of looking away now at the white wall," or, "I see an apple."
So even the "existence" of what is perceived is not directly perceived, nor can it be until what is perceived is identified. Again, I say, at the perceptual level, we know nothing.
Hank
This is the problem, as i see it anyway, of so many of the discussions here, not willing to understand how one arrived at the concept in the first place and then acting like it is some reified something out there waiting to be discovered. Assmptions Rule!
Thanks for the ping thinktwice, it was well worth it.
As what?
Again, I say, at the perceptual level, we know nothing.
Then how do we know anything? Are you a nominalist? I honestly don't understand your point.
Aquinas would identify the apprehension of existence and essence (which includes composition [the substantial unity of this particular thing] and division [this thing is not that thing]) as the "first act of the mind."