ANTHRAX, HUMAN - USA: PAPER CROSS-CONTAMINATION

ProMED ^ | Sept. 18, 2002 | Dave Lesak, K. Harrington, and Martin Hugh-Jones

[Mitchell]

Archive Number 20020918.5346
Published Date 18-SEP-2002
Subject PRO> Anthrax, human - USA: paper cross-contamination (02)

ANTHRAX, HUMAN - USA: PAPER CROSS-CONTAMINATION (02)
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[1]
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 13:22:17 EDT
From: Dave Lesak

The rebuttal issues raised after the initial post are quite relevant. There are many issues regarding the entire field of WMD and many examples of the loss of institutional memory and reinventing the wheel.

Further, not only are the points about the paper being wrapped etc. perfectly accurate, there are other questions as well. The primary question is what makes small particulates cling to surfaces as described in the original posting? The answer is electrostatic attraction. However, reports regarding the anthrax spores in Washington, DC, the Brentwood and Hamilton Township, indicated that [those] spores had been treated with an antistatic agent.

As such, the findings in Florida raise more questions then they answer. If these spores were treated with an antistatic agent, they would not readily stick to any surface. If they were not treated, even the fans in a copy machine would have a difficult time aerosolizing the spores (the same way in which wind has a difficult time aerosolizing dust off the hood of a car).

Additionally, if the Florida spores were not treated, what caused their dispersion? Again, if the Florida spores were not treated and the Washington, DC spores were, does this imply 2 different sources or one source doing research? This situation just keeps getting more curious all the time.

--
Dave Lesak
Lehigh County Hazmat

******

[2]
Date: Tue 17 Sep 2002 2:24 PM
From: Kathleen Harrington

In the NEJM's report on the index case for last fall's anthrax cases, on the last page of this document is the statement:

"Coworkers report that the patient had closely examined a suspicious letter containing powder on September 19, approximately 8 days before the onset of illness. (This incubation period is highly plausible, given the modal incubation period of 10 days reported in the Sverdlovsk outbreak.)"

Index case of fatal inhalational anthrax due to bioterrorism in the United States. Larry M. Bush, M.D.,Barry H. Abrams, M.D., Anne Beall, B.S.,M.T., & Caroline C. Johnson, M.D. N Engl J Med,Vol. 345 no. 22, November 29,2001.

I don't remember ever seeing or hearing anything about this [letter powder] from any other source.

--
K. Harrington
Pathobiological Sciences
Louisiana State University

[Unfortunately the little information we have comes from journalists in Florida and not from the FBI, who have a crime scene investigation going, not research. And the information was not quantitative. How many spores make a contaminated copier? Is this modified by which part or parts are "contaminated"? As copiers have fans, could the copiers then be merely screening devices, indicating that the room was air-contaminated? How does this information interact with the presence or absence of spores in the air supply, the venting of each room, and the geography of the building ventilation? Earlier reports from Florida were that the spore preparation was of a different coarser quality ("brown") than those seen elsewhere. Does this latter statement still hold up?

This would seem to be a good point to cut this thread, as there is little more to be learnt at this time. - Mod.MHJ]

[Mitchell]

Some very interesting points are raised in this ProMED post about the AMI anthrax, with respect to electrostatic charges, the photocopy paper, the dispersal of the spores, and whether the copy machines were a source of spores or a trap for spores. I've emphasized these points in boldface above.

Note that the comment at the end about the Florida anthrax being "of a different coarser quality ('brown') than those seen elsewhere" is incorrect, to the best of my knowledge. The author is apparently thinking of the anthrax mailed to New York City (to the New York Post and NBC News).

[Mitchell]

Ping.

[Alamo-Girl]

Great catch! Thanks for the heads up!

[Mitchell]

This would seem to be a good point to cut this thread, as there is little more to be learnt at this time. - Mod.MHJ

Just in case it wasn't clear, this was a comment in the original article on cutting off the ProMED thread. There's no suggestion that this FR thread is already over!

[Shermy]

Out of my league science-wise. But I can reasearch the web ok! Here's an article from three months later, and you guys were on the ball.:)

The Mailed Anthrax did not come from a US Military Lab (Dec. 3, Wall Street Journal

Static Electricity Present in Anthrax Letters Made Spores Cling, May Have Saved Lives John J. Fialka and Gary Fields

Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

(Mark Schoofs contributed to this article)

03 December, 2001

Washington- Investigators say the person behind the anthrax attacks got many details right but may have missed a crucial one. They suspect the perpetrator failed to remove static electricity from the powder containing the deadly spores.

According to scientists who have made anthrax for use in weapons in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, the presence of an electrostatic charge may have saved American lives. While some of the charged particles can still become airborne- where they are the most deadly- much of the material tends to cling to surfaces.

Investigators going through 600 plastic garbage bags loaded with congressional mail found about 23,000 microscopic anthrax spores clinging to the inside of the bag containing an anthrax-filled letter sent to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy.

The sticking tendency may have made cross-contamination of mail more likely, according to one senior Federal Bureau of Investigation official involved in the investigation, because the spores would have been prone to attach themselves to envelopes and surfaces.

However, the spores would be less likely to float. “Electrostatically charged materials are very hard to disseminate.” explained Bill Patrick, a scientist who helped develop anthrax-loaded weapons for the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s.

While Mr. Patrick said he hasn’t personally seen samples of anthrax sent in a letter to another senator, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, a scientist working on the investigation, he said, has described it to him.

“It’s purified like our material and it has a small particle size, just as we did, but it has an electrostatic charge,” he said.

The charge must be removed with a secret combination of chemicals, he said, to make effective biological weapons. Otherwise, “some of it can still get up in the air,” he said, “but it’s not predictable.”

Some scientists cautioned that the electrostatic charge in the powder could have grown as it was handled. Richard Flagan, a professor of chemical engineering at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena whose specialty is aerosols said the mail-sorter machines could conceivably have transferred an electric charge by jostling the letters containing the powder.

An FBI official said agents have been checking the backgrounds and histories of people working at military-level labs who might have the capability of producing the kind of anthrax found in the letter. The probe includes private labs that might work with the military. Investigators are looking at the backgrounds of current employees and the whereabouts and backgrounds of past employees. They are also asking research facilities and universities about security and whether any of their anthrax has been stolen in recent weeks and months.

The U.S. biological-weapons program was disbanded by President Nixon in 1969, but it became an issue last month as investigators discovered that the Ames strain of anthrax- the strain found in most of the recent cases- later used by the U.S. in defensive military experiments, was held in a few government and university laboratories. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a microbiologist who heads a biological-weapons working group for the Federation of American Scientists, asserted the anthrax used in the letters “was almost certainly derived from the U.S. weapons program.”

That, she said, would narrow the search down to a few individuals.

“She is flat wrong,” Mr. Patrick said.

David R. Franz, who headed the defense-related biological-research program for the Army at Fort Detrick, Md., between 1987 and 1998, said the defensive experiments the Army conducted with the Ames anthrax used the bacteria in a liquid slurry and not in the powdered form. During that period, he said, the U.S. obtained information from a British military research laboratory that did experiments with Ames anthrax in the powdered form.

_______________________

If not electrostatically charged, (unless it came from machines), would this mean a less sophisticated person created it?

And besides Babs and reporters reporting about Babs or repeating received truths, has any govt. official said that the anthrax came from an American weapon program?

[Shermy]

However, Mr. Patrick said seeming the opposite shortly after the attacks. Perhaps new information came down, and they ran it through more tests.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/556066/posts
Contradicting Some U.S. Officials, 3 Scientists Call Anthrax Powder High-Grade (October 25)


Scientists in and out of government said yesterday that the anthrax strike on Capitol Hill involved an advanced, highly refined powder that is quite dangerous and not the primitive form of the germ that some federal officials have recently described.

Three top scientists — all with experience in germ weapons and knowledge of the federal investigation — said in interviews yesterday that the powder was high-grade and in theory capable of inflicting wide casualties.

And, two of the scientists said, the anthrax was altered from its natural state to reduce its electrostatic charge, a process that prevents small particles from sticking together and to nearby objects, thus making them more likely to become airborne.

The experts noted that turning anthrax into a weapon of mass destruction still required added steps, like making the powder in quantity and learning how to disseminate it effectively. One expert said that only the United States, the Soviet Union and Iraq were known to have developed the necessary technique. But the experts said some officials were playing down the powder's potency out of ignorance or an impulse to reassure a frightened public.

Federal officials and weapons experts have given varying descriptions of the powder in the 10 days since an aide to Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota, the majority leader, opened a letter containing the anthrax.

Some federal officials have said the germs were an unrefined preparation of microbes, while others have warned that they were potent and easily turned into a cloud that could infect many people. Anthrax spores in the powder contaminated at least 28 people in Senate offices.

None of these people have become sick, but federal investigators said the Daschle letter may have leaked anthrax in transit from New Jersey and infected postal workers there and in Washington. Two Washington postal workers have died of anthrax.

William C. Patrick III, a microbiologist who designed germ weapons for the United States before President Richard M. Nixon renounced them in 1969, said he had learned details of the federal inquiry from a senior investigator. The Senate powder, Mr. Patrick said, was quite potent and capable of sailing far through the air to hurt many people.

He said the makers of the anthrax spores sent to Mr. Daschle's office had produced a dry powder that was remarkably free of extraneous material.

"It's high-grade," said Mr. Patrick, who consults widely on making germ defenses. "It's free flowing. It's electrostatic free. And it's in high concentration."

Experts on germ weaponry agree that the removal of electrostatic charges is a major step toward making an effective munition. The Soviet Union and United States developed sophisticated ways of diminishing this attraction and helping the particles float more freely, increasing their ease of dissemination and likelihood of inhalation.

Mr. Patrick said that whoever sent the Daschle letter had clearly achieved this step. "It's fluffy," he said, quoting experts who examined the powder. "It appears to have an additive that keeps the spores from clumping." Removing the charge, he added, is a black art, few details of which are known publicly.

Assertions by some federal officials that the material was not the type that would be used in weapons are "nonsense," he said. "The only difference between this and weapons grade is the size of the production. You can produce a very good grade of anthrax powder in the lab. The issue is whether those efforts can be expanded in scale, so you can make large quantities."

Richard Spertzel, a microbiologist and former head of biological inspection teams in Iraq for the United Nations, said he, too, had talked to federal investigators about the Senate powder.

"There's no question this is weapons quality," Dr. Spertzel said. "It has all the characteristics — fine particles and readily dispersible." Particles must be small to penetrate deep into human lungs, where they can start a lethal infection.

Al Zelicoff, a physician and expert on biological weapons at the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, who is developing a computerized system to allow epidemiologists to track suspicious disease outbreaks, said his conversations with federal investigators had alarmed him.

"These people know what they're doing," Dr. Zelicoff said of the anthrax terrorists. "I'm truly worried. They have the keys to the kingdom."

He cautioned, however, that the federal investigation was continuing and had produced results that were preliminary, with no firm conclusions.

"But if they have indeed perfected the aerosolization process," Dr. Zelicoff said of the terrorists, "it's strongly suggested they can do large-scale dissemination when they wish."

[Shermy]

Let me repeat:

"... One expert said that only the United States, the Soviet Union and Iraq were known to have developed the necessary technique."

[Mitchell]

We don't have a great deal of information to go on, but it appears that the anthrax mailed to Daschle and Leahy was free of electrostatic charges. The anthrax at AMI was so widely dispersed throughout the building that I believe that it was likely to have been uncharged also. (The anthrax mailed to New York was of lower quality; it may not have been treated to remove electrical charges.)

[fire_eye]

Removing the charge, he added, is a black art, few details of which are known publicly.

I doubt that. It probably only requires a surfactant such as detergent, which is used to "destatic" surfaces in electronics manufacturing.

HOWever... I doubt that the average raghead *knows* that aerosolized powders have to be "de-static"ed... unless they've been working in a real germ lab, such as the one being run by Saddam's "Dr. Germ" (I forget her name...).

But of course now, with the help of the media and lots of blathering by "experts" looking for their 15 minutes of stupidity oops excuse me fame, Abdul and Jamal are one step closer to getting it right, right there in their rathole hotel room...

[Shermy]

This May 5 article from Monbiot is interesting. Riddle of the spores, The FBI and Anthrax

Besides the Rosenberg frame up (how interesting to look back at its evolution) facts (alleged) about the strain and the like.

Also, check out My Identity's great links at posts #2 and 29.

Besides the one mention by Patrick, changed later, I've seen no scientist say that the anthrax was electrostatically treated.

[Shermy]

Maybe it spread because it was so fine. Throw in people, things, airconditioners, copier fans, what have you, spreading it around. And if it weren't so treated, but were, maybe would have spread significantly enough like an actual weapon, and lots of people would have got inhalation anthrax, as feared, but did not happen.

[Shermy]

I have a feeling that some of these high tech requirements stated are not so high tech, and not so unknown. Russia, England, Iraq, elsewhere. And that there's simpler ways of achieving these things.

[Mitchell]

I have a feeling that some of these high tech requirements stated are not so high tech, and not so unknown. Russia, England, Iraq, elsewhere. And that there's simpler ways of achieving these things.

The high purity of the Daschle and Leahy anthrax argues that it was made under unusually clean laboratory conditions. This stuff wasn't made in somebody's basement.

Also, while there may be easier ways of doing some of the weaponization, how are you going to discover them unless you're working on a long-term program in a regular laboratory, on an ongoing basis, for quite some time? Research is an extensive trial-and-error process.

I do not believe that this could have been carried out in a clandestine lab in the U.S. or the U.K.

[Mitchell]

Maybe it spread because it was so fine.

Maybe. The AMI case is confusing. But I'm doubtful.

[Lion's Cub]

FWIW, I'm of the opinion that there were probably 2 separate batches of anthrax. The one that was not as potent was either made by al-Qaeda or given to them in a less potent state.

BTW, I don't have it at my fingertips to give you the link, but I remember one article saying that the AMI guy had very poor vision and had to hold the letter almost to his nose to read it. That may explain why he was the only one to die.

It would also make sense that the copier was contaminated. If you got a suspicious letter, wouldn't you copy it before turning it over to anyone?

I believe the really lethal samples that went to congress were received from Bagdad via diplomatic courrier channels. I suspect that the message was more or less that Hussein had given al-Qaeda a less lethal sample, but that he would give them the really potent stuff if it became necessary.

Hussein and al-Qaeda have to be allies and enemies at the same time. He's not stupid enough to give them his really lethal stuff until he knows he's going to die anyway. He knows they would eventually assassinate him when they didn't need him anymore--afterall, they want Iraq to be a "pure" Islamic state.

If the high grade stuff shows up again, I think it will come through the Iraqi embassy and will only be given to Iraqi "infiltrators" who have been keeping an eye on al-Q for Hussein.

I think the same would apply to any other really lethal WMD, including nukes. Hussein might give al-Q a dirty bomb, but never a nuke. Anything that could be used to topple him will stay in Iraqi hands.

I hope we plan to raid the Iraqi embassy and sweep up all its known operatives just before the war starts in earnest.

[Fred Mertz]

BTTT

[Mitchell]

FWIW, I'm of the opinion that there were probably 2 separate batches of anthrax.

Maybe three.

I remember one article saying that the AMI guy had very poor vision and had to hold the letter almost to his nose to read it.

Oh yes, he was very near-sighted. He held the J-Lo letter almost to his nose, as you say, and he probably held many other letters that close to his face also.

Even so, I wonder if that suggests that the writing on the letter was relatively small.

If you got a suspicious letter, wouldn't you copy it before turning it over to anyone?

Or just a kooky letter that you wanted to bring home a copy of, for general amusement. (I'm not sure this is true any more, but this was before the publicity surrounding all the anthrax letters.)

Hussein might give al-Q a dirty bomb, but never a nuke. Anything that could be used to topple him will stay in Iraqi hands.

I agree, but I think the truth goes beyond this. Saddam Hussein trusts nobody, Iraqi or not. When he supplies such a weapon, it will be to a small group of people who are charged with watching one another; none of them will know which of the others watching them so closely are Saddam's loyal agents, so they'll have to stay on the (Iraqi) straight and narrow.

I'm also not yet convinced that Iraq is responsible for the anthrax mailings. It's one strong possibility, but it's not the only one. (There's Pakistan or ISI, as well as somewhat more remote possibilities such as Iran, China, Islamists in southeast Asia, or even North Korea or Cuba.)

[Lion's Cub]

Interesting possibilities. Sometimes I wonder if we'll ever learn the truth.

[Mitchell]

Sometimes I wonder if we'll ever learn the truth.

Maybe, maybe not. And if we do hear the truth, will we able to recognize it as such?

[keri]

Bump for #13, and the question in #19.