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This is perhaps why it took so long to focus on Bin Ladin as Public Enemy #1.

During the last decade, when our foreign policy was being designed in Ryadh, we were supporting Islamic movements all over Central Asia. Specifically, the Chechens and the Chinese Turks. This had effect of playing to our Turkish allies as well as our Saudi pals, placing us in support of Turkey's ambitions in Central Asia.

Bin Ladin was training these forces, and providing them with refuge and was, in effect, their control agent.

As long as Bin Ladin's minions were attacking Russians and Chinese, and the occasional Indian, we were quite prepared to look the other way.

It was only when he went off the reservation, and started targeting US assets, that he became a problem to us (obviously). And we drug our feet in responding, hoping he could be reigned in somehow.

It didn't work, he escalated it to the point that we could no longer ignore him, and the effort to get him required us to get help, or acquiescence, from the same Russians and Chinese and Indians Bin Ladin had been attacking. The attack on the US in September forced us to abandon our under-the-table alliance with the Chechens and Uighars and other Chinese Turks.

We may still sympathise with the Uighars, at least, but they have been thrown over the side in the interest of a more important alliance.