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Well, I could go on at length about why the round out brigade concept is a very bad idea, based on both first hand and other experience, but I won't bore you and the other good folks on this thread. I do know, from folks who observed the Louisiana Guard debacle, that they weren't even ready for train-up, that their tactical skills from the squad level up to battalion were so lacking they should have had a train-up for their train-up. Again, based on what I've heard from folks who observed the situation, the Louisiana boys didn't like the food, the barracks up in North Fort Hood (open bay style w/ no privacy whatsoever), or the fact that they had to train longer than eight hours a day. Boo-hoo!

No, they weren't screwed over. Those who went AWOL couldn't deal with the demands of their service obligation (IOW, once they're called up, they're "in the Army now", and their part-time attitudes and sensitivities won't fly), and they didn't like the way Regular Army types looked down on them. Again, boo-hoo. Of course RA looks down on the reserve components...they're part timers trying to play full-time Army in the full-timers' backyard. Guardsmen have to work harder to prove themselves to those who live the life full-time. Hope I'm not stepping on any toes by saying that.

From what I hear from former OPFOR guys at NTC, the Georgia brigade had a good attitude toward the training, but just lacked basic skills that they needed to have before starting a rotation there.

From my own observations as a former squad leader in the scout platoon of the 2-123 Armor (KyARNG), and a trainer/evaluator at Camp Shelby (while assigned to 1st Cav), Guard units just do not have enough training time, nor do they have the expertise and sometimes even the professionalism to maintain the tactical skills necessary for cavalry, mech and armored units. I understand the Guard support and artillery units deployed to the Gulf did a great job, and I cannot vouch for light infantry Guard units. But the DoA would do well to convert it's heavy divisions and brigades to something else, and expand the heavy capabilities of RA divisions (maybe bring back 2d Armor/24th Mech, etc?). After all, Regualr Army units train a heckuva lot more often, and even they aren't always proficient. But there are politics involved, so that ain't gonna happen. Heck, Guard units should at least spend their field weekends working on squad/crew skills, and save the company and battalion maneuver stuff for summer camp. After all, how's a Cav troop/mech company going to survive if it's individual crews can't reload it's Bradley TOW launchers in under two minutes, or call for fire properly?

Sorry for the length, but this subject is a minor pet peeve of mine. Be good.

Scouts Out! Cavalry Ho!

"Well, I could go on at length about why the round out brigade concept is a very bad idea, based on both first hand and other experience, but I won't bore you and the other good folks on this thread."

The round-out brigade concept was developed to satisfy two objectives. The first was cost. More importantly, it was specifically designed to ensure that in the Guard would have to be called up prior to any hostilities. This was one of the lessons of Vietnam, that we should not be involved any where there was insufficient national committment to justify a mobilization.

I believe that the regular Army always hated this concept for a variety of reasons, some sounder than others, but it was the national strategy. The Army opposition became more pronounced when it was perceived that active duty slots were going to be cut as the cold war wound down. I wonder if these units really got a fair shake.

"I do know, from folks who observed the Louisiana Guard debacle, that they weren't even ready for train-up, that their tactical skills from the squad level up to battalion were so lacking they should have had a train-up for their train-up."

I won't dispute this but I'm reminded of a young captain from the 24ID who told me similar things. He blamed this on the fact that his division decided not to be strict on their capstone trace elements. He didn't seem to understand that if they always gave their trace units glowing training evaluations then the active duty unit bore at least some of the blame for the lack of training. I really found his criticism to be more an indictment of the active unit than the guard unit who relied upon the active component for assessments of their readiness.

"Again, based on what I've heard from folks who observed the situation, the Louisiana boys didn't like the food, the barracks up in North Fort Hood (open bay style w/ no privacy whatsoever), or the fact that they had to train longer than eight hours a day. Boo-hoo!"

That really wasn't my point. From what I heard, this unit was called from their homes, sent to Fort Hood, and then told that the Army didn't want them, that nothing they could do would change that, and the only reason they were there was because Congress insisted upon them being activated. Many of these troops were suffering severe financial hardships due to the pay differntial. I don't find it at all surprising that they developed a morale problem. Do you? That isn't how you treat troops. Maybe there are two sides to this story?

"Again, boo-hoo. Of course RA looks down on the reserve components...they're part timers trying to play full-time Army in the full-timers' backyard. Guardsmen have to work harder to prove themselves to those who live the life full-time. Hope I'm not stepping on any toes by saying that."

Say what you want, I asked for your perspective. While I was commissioned infantry, that was a long time ago and I spent my guard time in the Signal Corps. We've got a full brigade here in North Alabama. I found that in general, our troops knew more about how to install, operate, and maintain communications than our one active duty battalion. We often taught them how to do things. They found it unusual to keep a three man team together for six months. We had teams that had been together on the same signal van for five years.

"From what I hear from former OPFOR guys at NTC, the Georgia brigade had a good attitude toward the training, but just lacked basic skills that they needed to have before starting a rotation there."

My captain friend would have agreed.

From my own observations as a former squad leader in the scout platoon of the 2-123 Armor (KyARNG), and a trainer/evaluator at Camp Shelby (while assigned to 1st Cav),

Good old Camp Shelby. I thought I never wanted to see that place again until I pulled four Team Spirits in a row. After that, even Shelby would look good.

"I understand the Guard support and artillery units deployed to the Gulf did a great job, and I cannot vouch for light infantry Guard units. .... if it's individual crews can't reload it's Bradley TOW launchers in under two minutes, or call for fire properly?"

Admitidly true. Perhaps my guard unit was different or maybe it was the mission. I Corps simply cannot fight with out my old brigade. And, with signal it's very hard to hide whether your doing your job. The phones either work or the don't. And, whent the phones don't work at the Corps TOC, well, you get all sorts of attention. Every Team Spirit from 86 to 91, we provided at least half, if not all, the signal for ICorps. We knew we had to train year round to make it work. But, signal maybe one of those things that works well in the NG.