SECTION H12: TOBIN ALLEGATIONS
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/fbilab1/20sbtobi.htm
(excerpts)
I. Introduction
This section discusses certain issues that William Tobin, a metallurgist now working in the Materials Analysis Unit (MAU), has brought to the attention of the OIG. Tobin has identified cases in which he believes other examiners, primarily in the Explosives Unit (EU), have incorrectly conducted or reported metals-related examinations.
To investigate these matters, we interviewed Tobin and several others,......
II. The Reporting of Metals-Related Examinations
Tobin identified one general area and two specific cases in which he thought metals-related examinations had been incorrectly performed or reported: (1) in reports prepared by EU examiners regarding the gauge of wire; (2) in a report in the La Familia case indicating that holes had been drilled into metal pipes; and (3) a suggestion in the Mauchlin case that a handgun barrel was made from Swedish steel. We address each of these matters in turn.
II. The Reporting of Metals-Related Examinations
Tobin identified one general area and two specific cases in which he thought metals-related examinations had been incorrectly performed or reported: (1) in reports prepared by EU examiners regarding the gauge of wire; (2) in a report in the La Familia case indicating that holes had been drilled into metal pipes; and (3) a suggestion in the Mauchlin case that a handgun barrel was made from Swedish steel. We address each of these matters in turn.
A. Improper Wire Gauging
Tobin contends that EU examiners have themselves conducted certain examinations that would be better performed by qualified metallurgists..........
With respect to the wire gauging issue, we draw several conclusions. The measurement of wire gauge is, in our view, something that appropriately-trained EU examiners can perform themselves without involving a metallurgist.
B. The La Familia Case
In the La Familia case, Tobin, who worked on the case, thought that the EU and the Firearms and Toolmarks Unit (FTU) in 1996 reported the results of metals-related examinations in a misleading or incorrect manner.
We have several conclusions concerning the La Familia case. When Tobin saw what he thought were incorrect or misleading statements in the February 9, 1996, report, he was correct to raise the issue. He should, however, have talked with Mohnal before issuing his own February 13 dictation. As a general matter, we think that examiners should first discuss issues informally among themselves if there appears to be a difference of opinion in interpreting data or reporting conclusions. Had Tobin attempted such informal communication here, it might have avoided both much of the controversy and the need for Tobin to further revise his dictation. We find unpersuasive Tobin's explanation that he prepared his dictation as he did because he knew from past experience that Mohnal would ignore his concerns.
We also find that Tobin and Ennis did not take appropriate steps to resolve their differences concerning whether the evidence indicated that holes had been drilled in the pipe nipples.
IV. Conclusion
William Tobin displayed poor judgment by failing to discuss his concerns in the La Familia case with the principal examiner before Tobin issued his revised dictation. We also think that Tobin and FTU examiner Michael Ennis should have taken further steps, with involvement by their unit chiefs if necessary, to attempt to resolve the apparent differences in their conclusions about the holes found in the pipes. Because they did not reconcile their opinions on a scientific basis, Tobin and Ennis might have contradicted each other if they had testified about the results of their examinations.
Tobin testified that by September of 1996, approximately 4-6 weeks after his arrival on the case, there was a general consensus that there was "no bomb or missile damage" evident on the TWA wreckage. At the time frame indicated in Tobin's testimony, approximately one half of TWA800 was still at the bottom of the ocean.
FBI, TWA Flight 800 Brookhaven National Laboratory Examinations. Declassified FBI Report, 1997. (excerpts)
"It became apparent by the end of November 1996......."
NOT HIS DECISION TO MAKE
TOBIN: I was ordered to.......But it was in a very emotional, very frenzied manner, so I inquired as to why.....I was told.......which again flies in the face of my interpretation of whose aircraft this was.......But, so I inquired as to why........And I said, well I'm still missing some critical information, why.......And my response at that point was, well I'm still missing some critical information. Why.........And I was told, yes, we want that overhead bin and I was continued -- told to go find that overhead bin.
"Ultimately, when there is disagreement on whether or how to proceed, the responsibility for the decision rests squarely on the shoulders of the investigators in charge of the case." Louis Schiliro
You still haven't provided the readers with any evidence that Tobin's conduct was unprofessional, much less "inept". Instead, you imply that Tobin, who reacted to the disastrously unprofessional and inept conduct of James Kallstrom much the same way as Kathleen Crowley did when confronted with similarly unprofessional and inept conduct by other FBI officials prior to 9/11, should have kept his mouth shut.
Tobin was apparently UNABLE to "keep his mouth shut".....nor it seems, to follow orders.
