Reorganizing Space Command and U.S. Strategy

Reorganizing Space Command and U.S. Strategy
2 July 2002

Summary

The Bush administration announced June 26 the merging of U.S. Space Command into U.S. Strategic Command, which controls the American nuclear strike force. The shift is part of a major reorganization of the structure of U.S. joint forces. This decision has important implications for the future of Amercan warfighting, melding space with the nuclear warfighting culture, and could well delay the emergence of a battle doctrine for space.

Analysis

On June 26 the Bush administration announced that U.S. Space Command would be merged into U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. Normally, such reorganizations are of little or no importance except to those who work in the affected organizations -- and sometimes not even then. For example, the domains of the various Commanders in Chief (CINCs) were redefined recently as "Combat Command," a useless but fairly harmless exercise. However, the merging of Space Command into Strategic Command is a rare exception. It has profound implications for the future of U.S. warfighting in space as well as the manner in which space-based assets support tactical operations.

When the Bush administration came into office, its intention was to reorganize U.S. forces to take advantage of and to reflect the realities of new technologies. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld organized a review of strategy, operations and acquisitions in which he shifted emphasis away from older technologies and onto emerging technologies in information warfare, precision-guided weaponry and space warfare. The review recognized the centrality of space in all U.S. military operations and clearly regarded Space Command, the trans-service organization that coordinates and operates each of the other services' internal space commands, as a critical piece of the puzzle. The administration appointed the commander in chief of Space Command (CINC Space) to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- not the only reason he was selected, but neither was it entirely incidental.

None of this made the Air Force very happy. In one of history's ironies, the same service that fought its way out of the clutches of the U.S. Army, making the reasonable case that the Air Force operated very differently than the Army, is now absolutely committed to owning space. In other words, the Air Force's Space Command, which represents the bulk of U.S. Space Command's capabilities and assets, is not going to be permitted to split off and form its own service, regardless of how different space-based operations are from air-based operations. The concept of "aerospace power" used by the Air Force means that Space Command is not going to pull the same maneuver on the Air Force that the Air Force did on the Army. The issue is not current; it is a generation away. Therefore, the Air Force was not comfortable when Space Command was given the responsibility for Information Warfare, and it was not happy to lose the F-22 while Rumsfeld swooned over Space Command.

In fact, the Air Force was not having all that much luck with Donald Rumsfeld until Sept. 11 changed the entire dynamic. Once the emphasis was switched to homeland defense, it meant not only the creation of a new Cabinet department, but also -- and more important -- a reorganization of the military's homeland defense structure -- something that clearly needed to happen.

The military's solution was to create an entity known as "Northern Command," that was to control all of the military assets tasked with defending the United States against al Qaeda. So, for example, in the event of another attack by al Qaeda, Northern Command was to control all of the National Guard troops that would immediately be summoned. Other military assets also were designated to Northern Command.

The single most important of these is the North American Air Defense Command, or NORAD, an indispensable element of homeland defense. It is also the only command in which there is direct Canadian participation, so its assets can operate on a truly continental basis. Since the end of the Cold War, or even since the Soviets went to a missile strategy, NORAD has not had much of a function. Its job was mostly to keep score in the event of nuclear war until NORAD itself was taken out. But, against al Qaeda, NORAD suddenly could truly affect the outcome.

Since Air Force Space Command operated one of NORAD's most important sensors, DSP satellites that sense heat and can detect a missile launch, it is reasonable that NORAD would be part of U.S. Space Command. In addition, since enemy missiles fly through space, NORAD was involved with space. The fact that NORAD had no ability to do anything about the missiles (but could deal to some extent with aircraft) does not change the picture: NORAD was part of Space Command.

Now NORAD's role has been appropriately clarified by its integration with the rest of homeland defense into Northern Command. Indeed, NORAD's old boss, CINC Space, has been named commander of Northern Command, thus rounding things out. The problem is that now CINC Space and NORAD have both been separated from Space Command, leaving behind an entity that is losing its emerging identity to STRATCOM. The joint restructuring is intensified by the situation in the Air Force.

There is an entity within the Air Force known as Space and Missile Command that consists of all the ICBMs, their silos and the men and women trained to operate them. While linked to Space Command inside the Air Force, in the event of war they are operated by Strategic Command. STRATCOM owns all U.S. nuclear strike capabilities and, in the event of war, it owns the Navy's missile submarines and the Air Force's missiles as well.

Air Force Space Command is linked to Missile Command because missiles fly through space. But the real function of the Air Force and Navy Space Commands is to operate the satellites that enable warfare. They operate communications satellites, remote sensing satellites and the critical NAVSTAR constellation of satellites called Global Positioning Systems, which enable B-2s to launch JDAMS, U.S. Army Special Forces teams to orient themselves and uncountable other civilian and military systems to operate. Space Command and its civilian sister organization, the National Reconnaissance Office, which launches and operates U.S. spy satellites, provide the critical foundation for U.S. warfare.

For the United States, control of space is, along with the control of the sea, the foundation of power. Control of space allows the United States to see, speak and operate globally. Precision Guided Munitions are precise only to the extent that there is clear intelligence on the location of an enemy target. Whether that target is identified by an infantryman on the ground, an unmanned aerial vehicle or a satellite, at some point in the cycle that intelligence was enabled by space-based assets. Without those, U.S. warfighting capability would be seriously compromised and, perhaps, even crippled.

At this point, U.S. space-based assets are secure, simply because no one has attempted to destroy them. There is little question that in a future war against even minimally technically capable enemies, the United States will face what Donald Rumsfeld's report called a "space-based Pearl Harbor." Any country contemplating war with the United States understands that unless the it is blinded in space, it has an overwhelming advantage. We suspect that this is something that al Qaeda is discovering as well. Therefore it follows that, at some point in the next generation, U.S. space-based assets will come under attack, and -- treaties or not -- the United States will operate against the satellites of other countries.

Space Command right now is a service organization, servicing everything from strategic to tactical operations. But as a service organization it is not seen as what it ultimately will become: a warfighting organization. Space Command's current task must be the maintenance of existing systems, the development of follow-on capabilities and -- most important -- the development of doctrine and technology for defense and offense in space. If control of space is as important to U.S. power as we believe it is, then this last function represents Space Command's most crucial mission.

The foundation of that mission is the merger of all levels of warfare into Space Command's operational support structure. In the 1980s a program called Tactical Employment of National Capabilities was created. It involved taking all of the space-based assets that had been developed to support strategic (nuclear) warfare and refocusing them on the actual wars the United States was fighting. This program had much to do with changing the mindset of what was strategic and what was tactical.

Under the administration's latest plan, Space Command, which had so much to do with refocusing space capabilities on the real needs of the military, is going to be handed over to STRATCOM, a command whose focus is on U.S. nuclear capabilities. STRATCOM's mission is to remain ready to fight a nuclear war. The United States may one day again face the kind of nuclear war STRATCOM is prepared to fight but right now it is an anachronism. Indeed, referring to STRATCOM as "strategic" raises the question: In what sense are nuclear weapons strategically decisive today? The heart of the matter is that STRATCOM has a nuclear mission. Space Command supports every service at every level, yet, after more than a decade of making space into something that transcends nuclear warfare, it is being handed over to STRATCOM.

Rumsfeld appears to have been forced by events to refocus from his earlier interest in supporting the development of advanced technologies, particularly in space. Rumsfeld's interest in integrating space-based assets with tactical operations around the world has taken at least an institutional hit. He is returning Space Command to a place where (by his own definition) it does not fit. Apart from the cultural differences, the differences in mission and resource requirements, placing Space Command under Strategic Command means that the development of a warfighting doctrine in space will be carried out by an institution committed to thinking that nuclear weapons are strategic.

It is not clear what impact this will have on the various services. We now have Air Force Space and Missile Command reporting to the same place: STRATCOM. While that is neat and clean, it also means (among other things) a probable exodus of young officers from Space Command, if it becomes clear that they will have to spend a tour sitting in a missile silo. It also will mean that the growing élan and self-confidence of Missile Command, redolent of the Army Air Corps in the 1920s, will be severely affected.

The pilots who run the Air Force are undoubtedly pleased with this event. Schriever Air Force Base, where the operators of Space Command reside, has no runway and does not need one to facilitate tactical communications in Kosovo, watch for SCUD launches over Iraq or guide a missile to its target in Afghanistan. But the problem remains. U.S. control of space is a foundation of U.S. power. That control will be challenged in the coming generation. The doctrines and capabilities needed to fight a space war need to be developed now. Has the war on al Qaeda forced an institutional shift that is incompatible with the coherent development of U.S. strategy and doctrine?

It may be that this reorganization, like most others, means little or nothing. But the fact is that Space Command is in the hands of last generation's warfighters, while its mission is to plan the next generation's wars. We expect the Air Force to exploit this evolution aggressively, containing and controlling its own space command. Therefore, this reorganization, unlike most others, is capable of having profound, long-term effects -- unless STRATCOM shows itself to be extraordinarily sensitive to the requirements of space and its non-nuclear users. That is the challenge this move poses and it is not yet clear whether the challenge can be met successfully.