The PRC Faces The Challenge Of Post-Jiang Leadership

Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily | July 2, 2002 | Dr. Peter Kien-hong Yu

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In the Autumn of 2002, at its 16th National Congress, the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will officially endorse a new leader to replace Pres. Jiang Zemin. Some 10 years earlier, then-leader Deng Xiaoping personally picked Hu Jingtao. Hu was also supported by many, if not most, party elders at that time. Since Jiang is still adhering to Deng’s line, it is expected that he would carry out the Deng’s policies at the macro-level at the 16th Congress.

It does not matter whether the new leader is Hu or someone else: he or she will face many challenges. If the person cannot surmount them, he or she can be easily forced to step down after a period of time, for Jiang will also install a person whom he trusts in a strategic position.

First, there are not many people who wholeheartedly support the Party. Since early 1992, fewer people in mainland China — the PRC — are willing to listen to the CPC. The situation is dramatically opposite from the late 1940s when the mainland was taken over by the communists. At that time, many people felt that they could rise up again. They thanked the CPC for giving them a chance. There was a ray of hope.

Moreover, the CPC had the power and resources to pacify many, if not most, people. For example, the CPC could permit certain people to enter into college or university. Upon graduation, they could have good or well-paid jobs in Government or State-owned enterprises (SOEs). This, however, has not been so since September 1997 when the Party officially endorsed the market economy line. This meant that the graduates of higher education had to search jobs by themselves. They are no longer grateful to the Party.

By now, only those who have received benefits and enjoyed privileges during the process of transforming many SOEs into small and medium private enterprises support the party.

By the same token, some 50 years ago, the peasants for the most part felt grateful to CPC Chairman Mao Zedong. They felt that it was the Chairman who liberated them from the semi-feudal system.

However, the fervor, love, or appreciation for the party began to drastically dwindle after the Party started to conduct political campaigns, culminating the disastrous Cultural Revolution. The CPC demonstrated that it could not really take care of the peasants. Most of them do not receive medical benefits, for example. It was as a result of this that they turned to Falun Gong movement for help.

Second, the ideology framework has already collapsed at the provincial and local levels. Perhaps to this day, only the CPC’s Central Committee members are adhering to it, despite the fact that more people — including the capitalists — have joined the party. The CPC used to rely on the "Democratic Centralism" framework to dictate what its members should do. This unity brought enormous power, but in the current environment the growing population of entrepreneurs and businessmen are reluctant to lose financially in order merely to abide by CPC political instructions.

Third, the center simply cannot command the local. The situation is expected to become worse when Jiang steps down. It has been often said that whenever Beijing makes a policy, the local people know how to circumvent it. One finest example is that of the joint industrial park conceived and created by Singapore and the PRC Government. Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew was frustrated when the Suzhou provincial Government officials refused to cooperate and coordinate with the Singapore officials. So, in the end, Singapore gave up a lot of its stake in the park.

Fourth, Hu and many senior officials do not have much working experience overseas. So, their vision is limited to what they read and hear. Visiting a country here and there does not really help. So, when Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin visited the mainland some years ago, Pres. Jiang told a group of PRC academics assembled at Zhongnanhai, saying that, while he had the connections with many foreign leaders, his successors cannot conduct public relations with foreign dignitaries.

Fifth, corruption is still very serious. In 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) — which controlled the Nationalist Government — was uprooted in mainland China and forced to move to Taiwan. Much of the success of the communists in removing the KMT was because of the rampant corruption which had been allowed to flourish. In the past few decades on Taiwan, the KMT forgot its bitter lesson and many of its members became corrupt again. As a result, it eventually lost its ruling power status in Taiwan. The CPC will most likely follow the footstep of the KMT. In the past, anti-corruption campaigns were carried out. The first "Strike Hard/Severe Strike" anti-crime sweep campaign was launched in the PRC in August 1983 and ended in January 1987. The second one began in April 1996 and the third one in April 2001. In July 1979, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law were adopted by the 5th National People’s Congress. But they were not helpful in deterring corruption. It is very doubtful that Jiang’s successor can stamp out corruption.

Sixth, the demand for more freedom and democracy will continue to increase. Power resided in the hands of a few party members before the late 1970s. Now, as more people own private enterprises, some of them can be expected to enter politics. This means that they would sometimes say and do things differently from the center. At other times, they can be expected to even challenge the CPC. According to one mainland academic, it was expected that within 10 years even newspapers — now solely the prerogative of the State — could be privately owned.

And, according to another (US-based) Chinese-American professor, the CPC would only receive about 30 percent of votes if a national election was to be carried out.

In sum, the CPC is very much on the defensive. It is only thinking about giving itself an extra lease on life. To cover up its weakness, it will continue to make propaganda. Its propaganda may persuade some (former) foreign officials. Thus, one former US official in January 2002 urged his Government to sign a fourth joint communiqué with Beijing. This person’s understanding of the internal matters of mainland China is certainly limited. To be objective, Jiang’s successor simply cannot solve or resolve many existing problems.

Peter Kien-hong Yu, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the Contemporary US-Asia Research Institute, New York City. He has written on Asian issues in the past for Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy and for Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily. Dr Yu is also Professor and Chairman-designate, Department of International Affairs, Wenzao Collge, Kaohisung City, Taiwan, Republic of China.

[DeaconBenjamin]

It does not matter whether the new leader is Hu or someone else.

Or as we might say, it does not matter Hu the new leader is. Thanks for the article.