Falun Gong's New Campaign Sparks Beijing's Old Fears

STRATFOR ^ | 27 June 2002 | Staff

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Falun Gong's New Campaign Sparks Beijing's Old Fears
27 June 2002

Summary

Members of the Falun Gong spiritual group have hacked into Chinese TV broadcasts in six different cities over the past six months. This tactic attempts to counter the government's anti-Falun Gong propaganda, and it may signal the start of a new phase in the battle between the group and the government -- one that could pose a bigger threat to the Communist Party if the country's urban unemployed rise up in support of the group.

Analysis

Members of the Falun Gong spiritual group reportedly hacked into Chinese government television broadcasts in Yantai, Shandong province, and briefly aired a message June 25 that said "Falun Gong is good." The incident was the latest in a string of broadcast hijackings by the Falun Gong that have hit six cities in six months, primarily in the country's northeastern "rust belt," where unemployment and labor unrest are endemic.

The group is trying to counter the government's massive anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign, which centers on the January 2001 self-immolation attempt by a group of alleged followers in which two died. The new tactic reveals the group's technological savvy and may point to a shift in the group's focus. Given that most of the Falun Gong broadcasts focused on China's northeast, the group may be laying the groundwork for a new showdown with the government, one that could draw on the ranks of disgruntled urban unemployed.

By hacking into state television to take its case directly to the people, the Falun Gong is directly contradicting and confronting China's central leadership. This is a new strategy for a group that has thus far used peaceful demonstrations, appeals for dialogue and attention from foreign media and non-governmental organizations to try to convince Beijing to lift its ban on the group.

But these tactics have shown limited success, and Beijing is unlikely to reverse its decision. The government's inability to crush the group has only reinforced Beijing's perception that the Falun Gong is a threat to its authority. Although the group simply could have moved underground and practiced quietly after the government outlawed it in 1999, it instead chose to fight for its rights -- which has led it down the current path toward confrontation.

The Falun Gong first emerged as semi-religious exercise group in the early 1990s. It spread rapidly and across socio-economic classes, filling a spiritual void in China in a time of rapid change. Its appeal was not surprising, as it played on a long tradition of Taoist, Buddhist and Qi Gong groups and philosophies.

In April 1999, after a run-in with a local government, the Falun Gong confronted Beijing directly in one of the most impressive displays of civil action in China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. More than 10,000 followers converged along the street outside the government compound in Beijing and held a daylong silent vigil. This Gandhi-inspired peaceful demonstration, which faded quietly into the night, had precisely the opposite effect on the Chinese government as the organizers had hoped.

Rather than persuade China's leaders to legitimize the group, the incident sparked fear among the country's elite. The protest showed the Falun Gong to have a very well-developed command and communications structure, to be massive and pervasive across Chinese society and not afraid to confront the central government. After brief confusion, Beijing banned the group and began a massive crackdown, including rounding up and detaining thousands of Falun Gong supporters.

The Falun Gong quickly adjusted its tactics and began to appeal for international help. It turned to foreign supporters and drew international media attention when China was petitioning for entry into the World Trade Organization and the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. Chinese Falun Gong practitioners began appearing in Tiananmen Square, holding banners and signs in peaceful protest. The crackdown by Chinese security forces that followed was captured on foreign cameras and broadcast worldwide.

In January 2001, the group's strategy fell apart after a group of alleged Falun Gong practitioners arrived in Tiananmen Square and lit themselves on fire. Whether these were overzealous members of the Falun Gong or a group of people misled by government infiltrators to take extreme measures, the self-immolation proved a propaganda coup for the Chinese government.

Whereas previous government claims that the Falun Gong was evil and dangerous were brushed aside by many Chinese who felt Beijing was overreacting, the pictures of half-burnt young girls on national television leant credence to the government's argument.

Once again the Falun Gong altered its strategy. Protests were increasingly carried out by foreigners, rather than Chinese followers, in Tiananmen Square. Also, wherever the Chinese leaders traveled in Europe or Asia, supporters of the Falun Gong were there.

In January 2002, the Falun Gong began its new tactic of pirate attacks on government television. The first incident took place Jan. 1 in Chongqing, Sichuan province, and was followed a month later on Feb. 16 in Anshan, Liaoning. In Anshan, three Falun Gong activists tapped into the local cable line but were caught in the process, and security forces shot at least one.

On March 5, Falun Gong activists managed to hack into eight channels in Changchun, Jilin province, the hometown of Falun Gong founder Li Hongxi. They broadcast two 20-minute films contradicting the self-immolation story and extolling the virtues of the Falun Gong. On April 21, they struck in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, reportedly airing pro-Falun Gong material for more than an hour.

The two most recent cases, on June 21 in Laiyang and on June 25 in Yantai, both in Shandong province, were shorter broadcasts, simply relaying the message that "Falun Gong is good." But in these cases, rather than hacking into cable lines, the Falun Gong managed to hijack the government satellite broadcasts -- according to Chinese security officials cited by the South China Morning Post -- something quite a bit more sophisticated than splicing a VCR into cable lines.

There are three key characteristics of these most recent Falun Gong actions. First, they all suggest that what appeared to be a headless organism has a centralized planning and organization structure. Second, the attacks indicate a technological savvy, particularly if the group managed to pirate the satellite system. The similarity of the attacks and their dispersal also suggest there is an active training network inside the Falun Gong.

Finally, the TV hijackings primarily took place in China's northeast rust belt. Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces have been the sites of active labor protests for months, and large-scale demonstrations have rocked Daqing and Liaoyang and broken out in Fushun and Anshan. Although this could be a coincidence -- the area is the traditional support base of the Falun Gong -- it also could be an attempt to bridge a gap between the group and the large pool of unemployed former state workers there.

There appears to be a realization among the Falun Gong leadership that the Chinese government will not, and perhaps cannot, change its position on the group now, particularly after a three-year nationwide campaign denouncing it as an evil cult and a socially destabilizing element. There is no way to regain the rights to practice Falun Gong through persuasion or dialogue with the current regime. The only way to re-legitimize the Falun Gong, then, is through a regime change in China -- and tapping into the disgruntled masses of unemployed former state workers may be the first step.

This presents a very troubling picture for China's leadership, particularly as the government prepares for a change in leadership at the end of this year. China's economic travails as it transitions from a centrally planned economy into one more acceptable to its fellow WTO members have triggered massive unemployment and ripped the longstanding social contract between the country's workers and the Communist Party-led government.

Since the leadership compound was surrounded in 1999, China's leadership has been frightened of the Falun Gong -- and not without good cause. China has faced threats from similar quasi-religious organizations in its past -- particularly in times of economic stress, weak central government and increasing foreign pressures.

In 1774, martial arts expert and herbalist Wang Lun, who drew on Buddhist folklore, led the White Lotus Rebellion. Its support came from restless barge-pullers and coolies on the Grand Canal in Shandong province, and it was triggered not so much by specific political or social repression but more by general dissatisfaction with the dominant forces in the kingdom and by a desire to perpetuate a spiritual cause.

In the 1840s, another semi-religious sect led what became the 1853-1864 Taiping Rebellion, the longest and deadliest rebellion in Chinese history headed. This group was led by Hong Xiuquan, a failed Confucian scholar who, after coming into contact with Western Christian missionaries, dreamt that God and Jesus instructed him to slay demons, in this case the ruling Manchus. Hong attracted the marginalized and disenfranchised, such as poor peasants and laborers, ethnic minorities, criminal gangs and ex-soldiers, as well as artisans and professionals.

In 1900, China faced another group of semi-religious martial arts practitioners, the Boxers. They first appeared in Shandong province, attracting peasants and workers hurt by the poor economic conditions created by drought and then floods. Partly out of fear, Beijing sided with the Boxers, who rebelled by attacking primarily foreigners and Chinese converts to Christianity. The outcome was disastrous for the Chinese leaders, as a combined foreign army entered Beijing, destroyed the Boxers and sent the ruling elite on a flight to central China.

While none of these precisely match the current situation, the volatile mix of zealous Falun Gong believers and hundreds of thousands of disgruntled unemployed is something the government can't ignore. If the organizational structure of the Falun Gong can harness the manpower of the unemployed, China could be in for another rebellion, one that could hasten the end of Communist Party rule if it goes unchecked.