Posted on 06/27/2002 7:02:47 AM PDT by Stand Watch Listen
US Recognition Of Ravalomanana Challenges France In Africa; Provides US With Naval Facilities Options In The Indian Ocean
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. With input from GIS Stations and sources.
The United States Government on June 26, 2002, formally recognized the legality of the election of Madagascar President Marc Ravalomanana in a move which seemed designed to pre-empt French entry into the Malagasy civil war. Former President Didier Ratsiraka had been lobbying the French Government for support and for the position that the presidential elections of December 2001 should be vacated and new elections held, with an interim administration put in place immediately.The US recognition, which came in the form of a letter from US Pres. George W. Bush to Pres. Ravalomanana late on Wednesday, June 26, 2002, by US Ambassador Wanda Nesbitt, effectively upstaged any French move. The US and France had for some years — since the end of the Cold War — jockeyed for influence throughout Africa. It seemed clear that the French Government had given a nod of support to former Pres. Ratsiraka, who had longstanding relations with France (the traditional great power ally of Madagascar), and had discreetly "not disapproved" of the recruitment by Mr Ratsiraka of French mercenaries to fight for his position in Madagascar.
[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, June 21, 2002: Madagascar Turmoil Continues, But Pres. Ravalomanana Gaining Dominance; and Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, June 25, 2002: Madagascar’s Former President Returns to Press Claims; No Resolution Imminent, plus earlier GIS reporting on the issue.]
Indeed, the US move may be decisive, and could also usher in a period of US strategic influence in Madagascar, which has naval facilities available in the Indian Ocean at a time of greater US deployment there. The French Navy had long used Diego Suarez — particularly in the first half of the 20th Century — as a key base in the Indian Ocean. It was possibly significant that Didier Ratsiraka, who has dominated the Presidency for most of the time since he seized power in 1975, was a naval officer (a commander at the time of his first accession; now an admiral). Madagascar’s position is that it is geopolitically situated in astride the Cape of Good Hope sea lanes going up the African coast to and from the Persian Gulf, and from the Cape up to Asia. Any potential closure of the Suez Canal, again, due to a Middle East conflict would make the Cape sea route even more important to the US, apart from normal US naval requirements based on projecting maritime power to support its current Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and in other regional operations.
The French Government is now on the defensive on the Madagascar issue, and the civil war could be decided almost directly as a result of US recognition of Pres. Ravalomanana. On June 26, 2002, Pres. Ravalomanana challenged France to recognize his Government, approved by the Constitutional Court, as legitimate. France had been reluctant to abandon its links, developed painfully and at some cost, with former Pres. Didier Ratsiraka. To continue to support Ratsiraka now would provide a direct challenge to the US and would, almost certainly, be futile in any event: Pres. Ravalomanana has demonstrated in May and June 2002 that he had the military superiority to prevail in the incipient civil war.
The most significant option open, following the US move, was to attempt to restore (or put in place) good relations between Paris and Pres. Ravalomanana.
Mayor Ravalomanana — he was mayor of the capital, Antananarivo — was sworn in as President in May 2002 following a recount of votes cast in the disputed December 2001 elections but his inauguration was only tentatively internationally recognized at the time, with deputy heads of diplomatic missions attending the ceremonies, rather than ambassadors. On June 26, 2002, however, ambassadors from all the major aid donor countries, except the former colonial power France, attended an independence day speech by Pres. Ravalomanana.
But the US position was crucial, given the fact that most of Madagascar’s cash reserves are held at the US Federal Reserve bank. They had been frozen during the six-month dispute since the December 2001 election, but would clearly now be released by the US to the Ravalomanana Administration. This would enable Pres. Ravalomanana to pay debts to oil companies, buy additional fuel and essential medicines. US Ambassador Wanda Nesbitt said on June 26, 2002, that it would take up to 14 days to unblock the $80-million of foreign reserves.
As a sign of the weakening of former Pres. Ratsiraka’s position, blockades by his supporters of the ports of Mahajanga and Toliara had been dismantled by June 23, 2002,and on June 25, 2002, the first major shipment for several months of petrol arrived in the capital.
By early May 2002, of Madagascar’s six provinces, four — Toamasina, Antsiranana, Toliara in the south-east and Mahajanga in the north-west — were controlled by Ratsiraka loyalists. The two densely-populated central provinces — Fianarantsoa and Antananarivo, home of the capital and economic hub of the country — were controlled by Marc Ravalomanana’s supporters.
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