Nuances of US China-Taiwan policy

Taipei Times ^ | 6/24/02 | Chris Wu Œfi–}

[Enemy Of The State]

Nuances of US China-Taiwan policy

By Chris Wu \î¤Z
US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is one of the "hawks" in the George W. Bush administration. He advocates a hard line toward Beijing and is friendly toward Taiwan. But beginning on May 15, in several public statements, Wolfowitz expressed the China policy of the Bush administration by saying, "Washington has no intention, has no desire to separate Taiwan from the mainland ... [This is] another way of saying we're opposed to Taiwan independence."

He emphasized that the US has a "one China" policy that includes two premises: the US does not support Taiwan independence and opposes the use of military force by China against Taiwan. He maintained that the US believes that under this kind of framework, a positive outcome to the cross-strait problem can be reached.

`US conglomerates absolutely do not want to see economic, diplomatic or military conflicts arise between Beijing and Washington, and they would like to reduce tension in the Taiwan Strait as much as possible.'

From the above statements by Wolfowitz, we can see that the Taiwan policy of the Bush administration has already been adjusted from a tilt toward Taiwan back to the bottom-line policy of previous administrations -- a US-style "one China" policy in which "China does not attack militarily, and Taiwan does not declare independence."

The US government and the authorities in Taipei have repeatedly indicated that US policy toward China and Taiwan has not changed. In fact, an obvious policy adjustment took place between the time Bush first come into office and declared the US would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan and the recent declarations of the "one China" policy. Why is the Bush administration adjusting its policy toward China and Taiwan?

Winning over China's support for the `war on terrorism'

The key factor in the Bush administration's adjustment of policy toward China and Taiwan lies in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The basic point of departure is that the US hopes China will side and cooperate with it on the "war on terrorism," and not aid countries supporting terrorism.

For the US, the war currently takes priority over opposing Communist totalitarianism. In order to win over China, the US must offer Beijing definite benefits. There are two benefits that the US can give China. First, it can maintain its "one China" policy if previous US administrations -- ie with the condition that China does not attack Taiwan, and Taiwan does not declare independence -- while encouraging contact and negotiations between Beijing and Taipei to settle the cross-strait problem peacefully. This amounts to adjusting a policy position that had tilted toward Taiwan.

Capital and technology

Second, the US can continue pumping capital into China to help keep its economy expanding by the reported 7 percent a year.

This is something US conglomerates and the Republican Party also desire.

The adjustment of US policy toward China and Taiwan hasn't met with major opposition within the US because this adjustment accords with US interests. The US can both win over Beijing and get the access to China's market desired by US conglomerates.

An unexpected result of Sept. 11

The Sept. 11 attacks caused radical changes in international relations. Russia took the initiative to support the US, and US-Russian relations improved dramatically.

Russia seized this opportunity to establish a joint council with NATO and to cooperate closely with the US and NATO in military, economic and political matters. In this way, the strategic partnership Beijing had long cultivated with Russia in order to counter the world's superpower -- the US -- was stillborn.

Russia desperately needs capital and technology from the US and the EU to stimulate its economy. Thus, Russia must reduce confrontation with the US and Europe.

At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to follow in the footsteps of Czar Peter the Great by doing his utmost to draw Russia toward Europe. Ultimately, Russia wants to join the EU. This also accords with the historical trend of the past 300 years in which Russia has sought to get in step with the prevailing currents of Western culture.

At the same time, following the breakup of the USSR, Russia has become a democratic country. Politically and psychologically, Russia relates easily with democratic countries like the US and the European nations. It is easier and more natural than interacting with totalitarian China.

Furthermore, since the breakup of the USSR, Russia's population has dropped precipitously. The Russian government is very worried about China, with its enormous population, and the rapidly growing population of Chinese in Russia's Far East and Siberia -- fearing that these Chinese will ultimately constitute a political problem. Russia hopes to counter this "yellow peril" with aid from the US and the EU.

Thus, Russia took the opportunity to ally with the US and the EU, causing the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership to exist in name only. After Russia and NATO formed an alliance and established a joint council, Putin sent Russia's defense minister to Beijing to meet with Jiang Zemin (¦¿¿A\Á) and discuss matters pertaining to Chinese-Russian military exchanges.

This action was intended to maintain a hold on China, which is a major purchaser of Russian arms and oil.

A new pattern

The following pattern of relations now exists between the US, China and Russia. The US and Russia have formed an alliance, and both are tugging at China. The US is tugging at China to help with its "war on terror," and Russia is tugging at China in order to sell weapons and oil.

One can predict that this situation will last for quite a while -- until China's military industry develops to the point where it can independently develop and produce advanced weapons or until Russia's economy recovers to the point where it no longer needs Chinese capital.

Stirring up conflict

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks also stirred up conflict between India and Pakistan in South Asia. Certain officials of the Pakistani government and radical Islamists have long sympathized with and supported the Taliban in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization.

One reason the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has heated up is because of provocations from bin Laden's terrorist organization and his supporters in Pakistan. Their goal is to provoke a war between India and Pakistan in order to disrupt Pakistani and Indian aid for the US "war on terror" in Afghanistan.

To Beijing, the conflict between India and Pakistan is beneficial to weakening the US strategic encirclement of China in South Asia. After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, US relations with Pakistan and India gradually improved and the two mortal enemies joined hands in helping the US with the "war on terror."

But Pakistan is Beijing's long-term ally. Naturally, Beijing is unwilling to see Pakistan pulled over to the US side. This running diplomatic battle between the US and China to win over Pakistan will continue for a long time.

Since Sept. 11, an unexpected windfall for the US has been the stationing of US military forces in Central Asian countries. In the name of the "war on terror," these forces will remain in place for the long term. It is also easier now for the US to have a hand in the development of oil resources in Central Asia and the transport of oil to the US and Europe, thereby gaining control over the world's second largest oil-producing region.

From the above, one can see that given the improvements in US-Russian and US-Indian relations and the incursion of US troops into Central Asia, the US has in fact affected an initial strategic containment of China -- as long as the status quo can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing does not use military force to invade Taiwan.

Thus, the US reiteration of the "one China" policy under the premise of "China not attacking Taiwan and Taiwan not declaring independence" has not in any way harmed the strategic interests of the US. Moreover, the US can enjoy the benefit of winning over Beijing by satisfying Beijing's wish to strictly adhere to the "one China" principle.

ChinA's entry into the wto

After 13 years of negotiations, China finally entered the WTO late last year, and Beijing proclaimed a political victory. The authorities in Beijing are well aware that the reform of China's economic and financial systems will depend on the impact of outside forces under WTO rules.

Psychologically, WTO entry has satisfied their desire to link China with the rest of the world. However, entering the WTO entails a heavy economic burden, especially in the agricultural and financial sectors.

For its part, the US has finally opened the door to China's market, and with its advantages in capital, technology and management knowledge, US merchandise and capital will gradually penetrate every corner of China in the coming five years.

To maintain these advantageous conditions, US conglomerates absolutely do not want to see economic, diplomatic or military conflicts arise between Beijing and Washington, and they would like to reduce tension in the Taiwan Strait as much as possible.

For the sake of maintaining open access to China's market, they don't want the US drawn into war between Taiwan and China.

Since China's WTO entry has benefitted both China and the US, it has become easy and natural for the US to reiterate its "one China" policy vis-a-vis Taiwan for the sake of long-term political and economic interests.

Chris Wu is editor in chief of China Spring and China Affairs magazines. This is the first part of a two-part article. Part two will appear tomorrow.

Translated by Ethan Harkness