THE BUSHIES BUNGLE SOUTH ASIA.

When it comes to U.S. foreign policy, it's not true that September 11 changed everything. In the case of America's relationship with its cold war client Pakistan, it actually restored the status quo. In the months before September 11, relations between Washington and Islamabad rapidly soured as the Bush team became enthralled with India--a country that, unlike Pakistan, offered a valuable market, a democracy, and a potential strategic partner against China. Last summer Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage lumped Pakistan in with other "rogue states"; announced that our cold war friendship with the country was a "false relationship"; and worried about its nuclear program, while expressing no similar concern about India's. But September 11, and the need for Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan, moved the clock back to the cold war. Since then, President George W. Bush has lauded Pakistani autocrat Pervez Musharraf as a "leader with great courage and vision"; Secretary of State Colin Powell has praised his "courage and foresight"; and State Department officials have likened him to Ataturk.

They were closer to the truth the first time: In their rush to reembrace Pakistan as an ally against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, for months American policymakers willfully disregarded evidence that Musharraf has been a less-thanreliable partner. Hence, the Bush administration has greeted with silence Musharraf's rejection of its demand that he impose order along Afghanistan's lawless border. Pressed to account for that refusal last month, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lamely explained that Pakistan is "a sovereign nation." Silence, too, has followed Musharraf's refusal to hand over the central suspect in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl and to provide American investigators full access to Pakistani nuclear scientists believed to have had contacts with Al Qaeda. And the Bush team barely uttered a peep when Musharraf rigged a referendum extending his rule two months ago. But when it comes to Musharraf's refusal to stanch the flow of terrorists into Kashmir--a refusal that explains why South Asia now teeters on the brink of war--the Bush administration has been worse than mute. It has responded with ostentatious praise.

"You have to give him credit," Powell said of Musharraf's effort to halt Kashmiri terrorism in January; and in New Delhi one week later Powell asked his Indian hosts to give the general a "chance." Bush, too, has pressed India to "let Musharraf bring terrorists to justice," adding that the Pakistani leader has been "responding forcefully and actively to bring those who would harm others to justice" and "cracking down hard" on terrorists. Or as a Pentagon official put it to The New York Times in January, "The United States thinks that Musharraf is for real and has undertaken fundamental changes. We have been trying to persuade the Indians to take 'yes' for an answer." But "yes" was never Musharraf's answer at all. And by pretending for so many months that it was, the Bush administration may have brought the two countries closer to war.

The claim that Musharraf has been "cracking down hard" on cross-border terrorism was always a questionable proposition. After Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian parliament last December, prompting India to mass troops along the Pakistani border in response, Musharraf heeded the Bush team's demands by arresting extremists at home and by condemning terrorism in a nationally televised speech. But no sooner had the crisis passed--and the parade of administration officials shuttling back and forth between New Delhi and Islamabad came to a halt, as the Bush team turned its attention to the Middle East--when the Pakistani dictator reverted to type. The general has since released almost all the militants he rounded up in January. He has refused to hand over to India 20 terrorists linked to the attack on its parliament, and he still touts his support for "the Kashmiri struggle for liberation." Most important, administration officials concede that the flow of militants--which had subsided when snow blocked infiltration routes from Pakistan during the winter--has resumed with the spring thaw. In fact, just three weeks ago, Pakistani-backed militants murdered 34 Indians at an army base in Kashmir.

If the Bush administration has averted its gaze to Pakistani malfeasance, it hasn't been for lack of warning by Indian officials. As early as last December, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee complained bitterly about being subjected to American "sermons about restraint" while Washington turned a blind eye to Musharraf's antics. On a trip to New Delhi three weeks ago, Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca was ambushed by officials from India's foreign ministry, who told her they were exasperated by U.S. admonitions for restraint and were tired of Washington's "double standards." One week later Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain conveyed the same message to Armitage and Rumsfeld. "We told them that our patience [had] almost come to an end, and what Musharraf had promised in his January twelfth speech, he has not lived up to it," Narain said after meeting with his American counterparts. "We also felt that the U.S. had not done enough to control or advise Pakistan on this issue." And last week Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh went so far as to declare that the presence of U.S. forces at Pakistani bases would not be "an inhibiting factor in [India's] policy determinations."

Brahma Chellaney, an Indian strategist with close ties to the government, believes the present crisis might not have arisen had the Bush administration responded more forcefully to ample evidence of Pakistani misconduct. "So eager has the Bush team been to win Musharraf's cooperation," says Chellaney, "that until last week they did not press him on the issue of cross-border terrorism against India." Hence, officials in New Delhi reacted furiously when Rocca repeated Washington's praise for Musharraf last month. In fact, it was only after Rocca conveyed their anger by telephone to Powell, who in turn informed the White House, that the crisis received Cabinet-level attention--with Bush placing a call to Vajpayee, and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice phoning her Indian counterpart, Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra.

The Indians particularly distrust Powell, who even members of the Bush team admit has established a kinship of "fellow generals" with Musharraf. The chumminess has been noticed in Delhi, too, particularly since Powell has repeated Musharraf's contention that Kashmir is the core issue in Indo-Pakistani relations--something India denies. "The Bush administration and particularly Secretary of State Powell [have made] Musharraf feel that they go to great lengths to please him," complains Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, India's former high commissioner to Pakistan. "General Musharraf was so sure of United States support that he blatantly rigged a referendum and has continued to aid terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir." One of the reasons the White House dispatched Rumsfeld to South Asia this week rather than Powell was precisely, as one senior administration official puts it, "to show that we take this very seriously."

The perception of American bias has been made worse by the reality of American ineptitude. "The administration doesn't have a plan, just a crisis management policy," says The Brookings Institution's Stephen Cohen, author of India: Emerging Power. "They haven't been engaged at all." After meeting with Musharraf in February, Bush said, "I hope we can facilitate serious and meaningful dialogue between India and Pakistan"--this, despite the fact that India loudly opposes third-party intervention. The next day, however, Rice said, "[W]e don't believe this is something that mediation or facilitation is going to help." In a similar vein, the National Security Council's director for Asian affairs, Harry Thomas, announced in March that Pakistan should either try suspected terrorists or hand them over to India. A week later the State Department said that was a matter for the countries themselves to decide.

Adding to the disarray, relations between the American Embassies in India and Pakistan have become almost as tense as relations between the two countries themselves. Wendy Chamberlain, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, and Robert Blackwill, the U.S. ambassador to India, have spent the last few months bombarding Washington with cables--arguing, in Chamberlain's case, that Musharraf has done everything in his power to halt incursions into Kashmir and, in Blackwill's case, that he has done nothing of the sort. According to one official, "Their reporting completely distorts our picture of what's happening on the ground." And if the presence of Chamberlain and Blackwill has confused administration policy, their sudden absence could muddle the picture further: Chamberlain has just vacated her post to join her children in the United States, and Blackwill--the subject of a State Department inspector-general review for what an official called in The Washington Post "treat[ing] his staff like furniture"--may soon be departing the region as well.

But this much is clear: The Bush team needs a new road map for South Asia. U.S. officials readily concede that if war breaks out on the subcontinent it will be because India invades to counter Pakistani provocations in Kashmir. The obvious administration strategy, then, would simply be to address the source of India's complaint. After all, the Bush team knows the charge has merit: "Musharraf," says an official directly involved in managing U.S.-Pakistani relations, "could clamp down on infiltration in a minute if he wanted to. He's certainly done so before." Even the Clinton team, which generally made a hash of South Asia policy, understood the proximate cause of Kashmir's woes. In a recent paper published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania, Bruce Riedel, a special assistant to the president, recounts Bill Clinton's response when faced with the possibility of a nuclear exchange over Kashmir in 1999. Reasoning that to do otherwise would reward Pakistani aggression in Kashmir, Clinton placed the blame squarely where it belonged--publicly demanding a Pakistani withdrawal from Indian-controlled Kashmir; assuring Vajpayee that he was "holding firm on demanding the withdrawal [of Pakistani troops] to the [line of control]"; and turning down repeated pleas to intercede with India on Islamabad's behalf. The Pakistanis backed down.

Today, of course, there is a new ingredient in the mix: America's need for Pakistan's assistance in flushing out Al Qaeda forces. But that imperative hardly justified the Bush team's boundless solicitude for Musharraf. Having created and sponsored the very government that harbored bin Laden, Pakistan had little choice last fall but to cooperate with the United States in the war on terror or face its wrath--a message Armitage bluntly conveyed to Pakistan's intelligence chief last September. To do otherwise would have led to Pakistan's international isolation, wrecked its already spiraling economy, and--as Musharraf himself argued--drawn Washington and New Delhi closer than ever. The logic still holds true. Rather than coddle Pakistan, then, the administration might take New Delhi's warnings a bit more seriously. Alas, even today many in the administration suspect that India's current buildup is aimed merely at frightening them into applying pressure on Pakistan. "This is really a case of the boy who cried wolf," says a senior State Department official. "[India's] strategy ever since September eleventh has been to prevent us from getting too cozy with Pakistan, and so they're always complaining about Musharraf and threatening to take action if we don't." But it really shouldn't take a war to get Washington's attention.

The Indians particularly distrust Powell, who even members of the Bush team admit has established a kinship of "fellow generals" with Musharraf.

WHy does Powell always sympathize with the terrorist side ?

Why do we have double dealing strategies with other nations who need to get tough with terrorists ?

Sympathy for the devil, that's why.

During the cold war, India was a client of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was a client of the United States. India is the world's largest democracy and has a stable civilian government with a professional army -- never a coup. Pakistan has a long history of coups with a very unprofessional army (ie, there are rogue elements not under civilian control).

Don't be too hard on Bush. He didn't know any better. He's just figuring out that peace in the Middle East is a vital national security interest.

Apparently Kaplan hasn't figgered out that the PakiIndics were just about due for a blowup anyway. When you have so many world economies using South Asia as a military playground, stuff like this is bound to happen. X42(i) allowed conditions all across the Mideast-to-South Asia to deteriorate to the point where once the terror attacks on the US began, the rest of the region would be on high powder-keg alert. It's Kaplan who needs a dose of reality.

Michael

Blackwill--the subject of a State Department inspector-general review for what an official called in The Washington Post "treat[ing] his staff like furniture"--may soon be departing the region as well

He sat on his staff? How undiplomatic. If the State Department doesn't like him, he's probably an honest guy.

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