Right, Hamilton argued that:
(1) the congressional means must be "plainly adapted to that end," (i.e. useful); and
(2) the congressional means must be among those means "which are not prohibited" by the Constitution (e.g., the Bill of Rights).
Jefferson's view of strict necessity is not without its own problems. For one thing, any time that there exists more than one alternative means to accomplish a particular end, no one of those alternative means can be viewed as an indispensable means. If you can travel to Brazil by means of either ship or car, neither means can be said to be a strictly necessary means. A sometimes separate issue concerns what might be called extravagance. In his argument, Hamilton pointed out that the lighthouses that the government had already provided were not strictly necessary to the exercise of any express constitutional power. Marshall cited the congressional statutes providing for criminal laws against perjury. Isn't it at least a matter of opinion whether courts can function without criminalizing false testimony? And since the Constitution expressly provides for procedures in the event of a president's death or disability, how could a Secret Service protection detail be viewed as indispensable?
BTW, who did Jefferson envision would be resolving any differences of opinion concerning these issues of what is really necessary? In post 148, I listed three of the possible constitutional checks on Congress to ensure that Congress does not exceed its authority. Do you think that Jefferson would have trusted judges to choose the means by which the Congress exercised its express powers? At the time, Jefferson was arguing that President Washington should veto the legislation to establish the national bank. But the President does not require any strict definition of the term "necessary" in order to exercise his veto power. The President can veto legislation whether or not he thinks the legislation is constitutional.
You’ve made reference to Federalist No. 33. Hamilton argued there that, in the last analysis, we must depend upon the people to enforce limits on the Federal Government:
“But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the Union? I answer first that this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers, as upon the declaratory clause: And I answer in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must judge in the first instance of the proper exercise of its powers; and its constituents in the last. If the Foederal Government should overpass the just bounds of its authority, and make a tyrannical use of its powers; the people whose creature it is must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.”
Can you see why judges like Marshall might feel that it would be inappropriate in a representative democracy for the judiciary to be choosing between "alternative means" and/or deciding on the propriety of a means which is arguably just an "extravagance"? Aren't legislatures inherently better equipped than courts to resolve these issues in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people? As a general rule, our courts have felt poorly equipped to get deeply involved in these issues. As an alternative, they have attempted to utilize specific constitutional prohibitions (e.g., the Bill of Rights, the bill of attainder and ex-post facto clauses, etc.) to impose limits on the exercise of federal powers.
Under the circumstances, what more do you think courts should reasonably be expected to do?
Of the three, the judiciary is the only one whose only job is to determine whether something's illegal, rather than simply undesirable. The other two, as you started to indicate, can take action for any reason they wish. Therefore, it would seem strange to have a Constitution with all these provisions and requirements, and then leave its enforcement up to people who can just do whatever they want anyway. So that's where I disagree with Hamilton, when he said that the people would make everything right, so there's nothing to worry about. I don't know what the Greek or Latin term for it is (maybe general_re can help me out here, if he's still lurking), but it's basically a "solve everything" argument, which really solves nothing.
Under the circumstances, what more do you think courts should reasonably be expected to do?
I expect them to uphold the law. As Hamilton correctly states in Fed 33, "A law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of a State (unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of the land, but an usurpation of power not granted by the constitution." Since the judicial power, by definition, is the power to apply the law, that would have to include the power to determine whether or not a particular act of Congress is within its lawful power granted under the Constitution, regardless of how uncomfortable they might be in making such a ruling. And there's really no need for the courts to have to go into too much detail, investigating whether or not there really is a "need" for a particular measure. How much "proof" does anyone require that a government needs to be able to protect its own officers from violence and from legal harassment by lower governments? How much "investigating" does anyone need to do in order to determine that allowing perjury in courts is not a swift idea? Likewise, they can safely say as a matter of principle that in order to outlaw certain activities, it is not necessary to outlaw ancillary activities. It just isn't, and it clearly involves the creation of a new power altogether, not an adjunct to an existing power. That is what "necessary and proper" means.