IRAQ: Washington Prepares for Another War

CDI ^ | April 30, 2002 | Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker, USN

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Much has happened in Iraq since December 1998, when UN inspectors left that country. Saddam Hussein has had more than three years to covertly further research and enhance the development of chemical and biological weapons. The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush fears that Iraq will serve as a conduit for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing terrorists the means to wreak destruction on innocent civilians in the United States or other free civilized societies abroad.

Because the world has been held at more than arm’s length for such a long time, the location of the majority of Iraq’s alleged WMD facilities is unknown. If all peaceful efforts to resume inspections in Iraq fail throughout this year, there may be only one sensible option for the United States: a military campaign that allows the extensive searches required to achieve true awareness of the presence of chemical and biological weapon facilities.

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s around-the-Gulf visit last month to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and Oman certainly had Iraq on the agenda. He may have shared the latest top secret U.S. intelligence concerning existing chemical and biological development at facilities in Iraq, including the capabilities of Iraq’s Al-Abbas rocket, a ready-to-go weapon of mass destruction that could hit any U.S.-friendly state in the region.

Besides the desire to strengthen the U.S. relationship with these countries, Cheney hoped to establish a baseline for offensive actions in Iraq. The administration wants to convince many countries — especially Britain, France, Russia, Turkey, Israel and Jordan — that the United States is serious, and that Washington is working on a winnable plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime while eliminating a horrendous threat to world peace. The on-going bloody conflict occurring between Israel and Palestine is, however, on the front burner with the leaders of the Middle East. There are also indications from the Arab League summit meeting in Beirut on March 29, 2002, that Iraq is being slowly accepted back into mainstream Arab affairs.

Of prime importance if the United States plans to conduct a major military operation in the region is the need to convince the Fahd family that the threat to Saudi Arabia is real, and that the United States must directly counter Iraq’s production and proliferation of WMD before it’s too late. The Saudi people will also have to be persuaded that a successful Iraqi operation can be conducted that will not bring additional turmoil to the area. The perception among many Saudis that sanctions unfairly harm Iraqi civilians remains a sensitive issue that has hampered American access in the Kingdom.

Some in the United States fear that a Saudi veto of basing rights would be a showstopper for any military campaign against Iraq (it is not); all other neighboring countries currently have their bases and pre-staged areas being filled close to capacity. That said, the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia would ensure that the other nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would follow suit, reconfirm their support for any U.S. offensive, and provide access to their critical airports and military facilities. Ongoing efforts to improve the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar will provide an alternative command center. The NATO bases established at Incirlik, Turkey, and Vincenza, Italy, would see heavy usage as well. Dialogue with Iran would also be important so that Tehran understands it is not the target of any build-up of U.S. forces in the region.

The United States may already have made up its mind about war with Iraq. On the other hand, it may not — the subject has been a matter of intense debate within the Bush administration. Plans are far from complete and all contingencies/options will be looked at intensely over the next several months. There are a number of scenarios that likely would tip the debate decidedly:

1) A major terrorist attack (not necessarily against the United States) occurs, and hard, credible evidence indicates it was supported (at least in part) by Iraq.

2) Same as #1, but the act is discovered and prevented.

3) An ‘inspections crisis’ triggers a small surgical campaign executed against several suspected WMD facilities in Iraq. (The scenario that could unfold this year is that Saddam has repeatedly resisted months of political pressure to let UN forces into the country for inspections, to the point that the United States cannot stand it any longer). U.S. Special Forces assault teams are inserted into select sites and obtain quantitative proof for the world that WMD production is occurring in Iraq and that evidence is used to escalate to a full campaign against Iraq.

Assuming that throughout the spring, summer and fall of this year, all diplomatic attempts, international foreign policy pressures, and UN actions to resume weapons inspections fail, the United States is likely to feel compelled to invade Iraq. The U.S. administration does not envision significant allied help and is ready to do this alone, but probably will seek and obtain logistical help such as air-to-air refueling from Britain and hopefully base access rights throughout the region.

The political fallout of an unsuccessful campaign would be simply unacceptable to the Bush administration. Thus, any offensive would be an all-out, unrestrained war that would use overwhelming force and every conventional asset in the U.S. inventory to assure success.

A military plan is under construction, but not ready yet. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) already has the basics of a major campaign put together. Component commanders of each service are now at their forward headquarters in the region with more than 1,000 war planners, logistics experts and support specialists.

Such an operation would be no ‘cake walk’; it instead would be very complicated militarily and politically. It will take time to get U.S. forces in place and plans at a satisfactory level of detail and readiness to execute. However, if all other avenues to confront Iraq hit dead ends, offensive operations will almost inevitably result.

Again, this likely will not take place until at least the mid-fall of 2002 or, more probably, in the early months of 2003. There are several reasons for this, besides the need to build up a political justification. For example, the U.S. inventory of precision-guided munitions has been depleted substantially from operations in Afghanistan. In addition, up to 100,000 U.S. troops and 25,000 support personnel would need to be pre-staged throughout the Gulf for a major ground offensive — something that would take time.

There are a number of challenges facing any U.S. campaign. As the high value target list is refined, the Scud II would be of the highest priority. The threat of biological or chemical weapons targeting Israel, neighboring countries, or U.S. troops will be a major concern. Handling this threat will be one of the hardest, most challenging missions in Iraq. Fortunately, the capability to find and destroy mobile missile launchers has increased to the extent that U.S. force may actually have an effective capability, something that was non-existent throughout Desert Storm.

Kurds to the North – The Kurdish issue in northern Iraq is problematic for several reasons. The Kurds might be willing to participate in an operation to unseat Saddam, but formal autonomy would assuredly be their price for cooperation. Turkey has its own restive Kurdish minority to worry about, and such an accommodation could jeopardize Ankara’s support for an operation. The CIA is currently actively sorting out and assessing potential help from the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

Shi’ites to the South – Both the United States and Saudi Arabia are suspicious of any potential Shi’ite government in Baghdad that might overly identify with their coreligionists in Iran. However, Shi’ites are the majority in Iraq, and any future regime will have to take this into account.

Iranian Reaction – The Iranians might have been more disposed to help before they were included in Bush’s designated “axis of evil.” Now, large-scale U.S. military operations in the Gulf will be viewed with even more suspicion. Tehran’s greatest concern will be to ensure stability in Iraq, preferably with the creation of a Shi’ite government friendly to the Islamic Republic.

Potential of Anti-Saddam Forces in Country Being of Assistance – The 3.6 million Iraqi Kurds may be less enthusiastic about another move against Saddam. They do not view themselves as a comparable force to the Northern Alliance. The United States will have to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to Saddam’s downfall in order to get the Kurds fully on board.

The Southern Shia Arabs rose against Saddam shortly after the Gulf conflict, only to be brutally suppressed by the security forces as the international coalition looked on. Thus, they will view any new attempt by the United States to unseat Saddam with a certain amount of cynicism. Again, Washington’s ability to convince the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq that it is fully committed to Saddam’s departure will be an important factor in enlisting the group’s cooperation.

Destabilizing the Entire Arabian Gulf – Once Saddam’s out, who’s in? Many of the Gulf States believe that instability would be the likely product of Saddam’s downfall. They see Saddam as the devil they know, and there is no common vision of the kind of government that should replace him. There are a number of tribal, ethnic, religious and political fissures that could easily generate tensions once Saddam’s iron thumb has been removed, and these have the potential to spill over national boundaries. The financial and political investment in a post-Saddam Iraq will have to be substantial. Long-term U.S. security interests in the region demand some form of a stable Iraq that can protect itself after Saddam. This is a very critical problem and should not be underestimated.

To engage Iraq in a war will be the hardest decision Bush will make to date. If all other options prove fruitless, the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on Feb. 15, 2002, will continue to weigh heavier on the president’s mind: “We now, after Sept. 11, have a graphic, clear understanding of what commercial airliners can do. We can’t wait until we have a graphic, clear understanding of what biological weapons or nuclear weapons can do before we do something about breaking that connection.”