Europeans Would Duck War on Terror

INSIGHT magazine ^ | April 29, 2002 | Hans S. Nichols

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Remarks such as "No man is an island — and that includes the United States" might be expected from the insular and jealous parochialists of Europe or as ululations from the "Arab street." But the author of this one is a Conservative former British foreign and defense secretary: Sir Malcolm Rifkind.

During an April 22 speech delivered to a distinguished audience at the Royal United Service Institute in London, Sir Malcolm waded through many of the current European postures, especially concerning Iraq, that might wreck President George W. Bush's current military coalition. As the war on terrorism enters its seventh month, these criticisms, which are given increasingly frequent airing, are a source of some concern among U.S. diplomats in both Washington and across Europe. But other U.S. officials profess not to be concerned, recalling that Bush said he would "go it alone" if necessary.

While the first, and still ongoing, phase of the war on terrorism has received the help of many allies — and, in the case of Iran, a former foe — there are serious questions as to what sort of support the United States can expect as it extends operations farther afield. More than three months after Bush told Congress that North Korea, Iran and Iraq constitute an "Axis of Evil," many U.S. allies still are questioning whether those countries pose an imminent terrorist threat. Whatever their reasons, they are trying to avoid joining in phase two of the war on terrorism.

Meanwhile, there is a growing divide between the Bush administration and Europeans on how to end the ongoing bloodshed in the Middle East. Despite the administration's attempts to keep its war on terrorism separate from the Israeli resistance to terrorist bombing attacks, "there is a certain amount of spillover," concedes a Western diplomat.

As foreign leaders become more vocal in criticizing Bush for not stopping the conflict in the Middle East (as if there were anything he or anyone else could do about it), they are less likely to support future phases of the war on terrorism, some U.S. officials worry. Add to this that some European politicians don't feel adequately consulted on either situation, and especially on any potential military strike against Iraq. "Our ignorance about the American intentions is fueling much of our anger," says a Conservative member of Britain's Parliament. The complaint is a common one. Without this type of information, it's becoming increasingly difficult to persuade their own populations that "Bush isn't out to settle old scores with Saddam," the member of Parliament tells Insight.

"It's generally agreed that the first phase went far better than the second," notes Robert McGeenhan, a professor at the Institute of U.S. Studies at the University of London and an American who's been living in London for more than two decades. He cites a March poll in the United Kingdom indicating that 51 percent of Britons were opposed to taking action on Iraq. When someone such as Sir Malcolm, not known for his dovish views, also questions the utility of an Iraqi phase, the criticism can't be explained away as noise from Europe's political left, notes Sir Timothy Gordon, a professor at the Center for Defense Studies in London and a retired three-star general in the Royal Air Force.

The problem is that "the British government, and in part the Americans, haven't done an adequate job of convincing the public that action against Iraq really is necessary," says Sir Timothy. Part of the difficulty is that both governments are "trying to sell something before the policy has been decided and before it's ready to happen," he tells Insight. With a lack of concrete developments to report, the press then starts to speculate and, predictably, public opinion leans in the opposite direction.

The result is that "Hussein is just not that clearly identifiable with terrorism over here," McGeenhan explains. "There's almost unanimous agreement that the Bush administration had better give much more evidence that Iraq is engaged in terrorism instead of just good old-fashioned territorial expansion. Is he aggressive? Yes. But a terrorist? That hasn't been proved. In fact, there's more of a case to be made against Iran, as far as terrorism is concerned."

To many American diplomats the lack of European support for future phases of the war on terrorism is nothing to worry about. While 14 European countries were involved in the Afghanistan campaign in one way or another (five, all NATO members, provided combat support), such participation probably can't be expected in the future with many countries shrinking their defense budgets. On a nonlogistical note, there's a certain "Who cares?" attitude emanating from the White House through the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, say informed congressional and administration sources.

"The administration did the right thing from the beginning because they didn't invest in coalition thinking; they never claimed to be in this for the sake of a coalition," says Eliot Cohen, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University. That's why this campaign is entirely different from the Persian Gulf War where at times there was a "coalition for the sake of a coalition," he says.

In fact, many foreign-policy experts polled by Insight argue that the White House is better off without the burdens of a coalition. While it may be technically true, as McGeenhan says, that "we're going to have big problems with the Europeans on Iraq," as a practical matter it's uncertain how much military assistance is needed from NATO allies. Sir Timothy marvels at the technological advances the U.S. military has made since the gulf war. He thinks these advances make the United States less beholden to assistance from other countries.

But despite high-technology, ground troops always are needed, say military planners. Here, Britain has been helpful, having pledged 25,000 troops to mop up al-Qaeda stragglers in Afghanistan. But Iraq, many British diplomats stress, is a different matter altogether and British support is far from assured. In such a campaign, the big logistical question about what air bases might be used is vexing to both diplomats and strategists alike. Saudi Arabia has indicated that it would object strenuously to any U.S. warplanes launching missions against Iraq from its bases, even though they are in fact U.S.-owned and operated. Kuwait has registered similar concerns. Since you can't launch a "full-scale war from an aircraft carrier," the U.S. Command would have to rely on bases in Turkey and Qatar, predicts Sir Timothy.

So where does that leave diplomatic relations? "I've always thought that after the first shock, in short order we would get into political differences," explains Cohen. His prediction has been borne out. "There have been harsh words on both sides of the Atlantic," concedes Jonathan Faull, a spokesman for the European Commission, understating some of the comments from European leaders. But this escalating rhetoric belies the nitty-gritty of diplomatic legwork, he says.

As a Western diplomat explains to Insight, "The European papers seem to take this naïve view that if you solve the problems in the Middle East then the terrorism will just go away." But, he adds, "The diplomats that are working on this on the ground know that just isn't the case." He points to a recent agreement reached between the FBI and Europol, the European Union's new law-enforcement agency, as a tangible example of the kind of cooperation that's very helpful but may not grab headlines.

In fact, it is in intelligence-sharing and law enforcement where European allies have the most to add in the war on terrorism. "We just don't have eyes and ears on the ground in places like Hamburg, and we need that," says a U.S. law-enforcement specialist. Thus far, there have been few complaints about cooperation on these matters. But on a related issue, the freezing of terrorist assets, the United States was expecting more help from its European allies.

For example, there is concern that European agencies have not been active enough in freezing the assets of 192 alleged terrorist financiers. In fact, France has acted on 140 of the accounts, but hasn't added any other names to the list. Great Britain and Spain have made their own contributions to the list, however they don't deal with al-Qaeda but rather with factions of the Irish Republican Army and Basque separatists in Spain.

"We don't feel that we're getting everything from the American side," a German intelligence official told the Wall Street Journal in April. "Intelligence-sharing should be mutual, but we seem to be giving and only getting very basic things in return." Some of these concerns were addressed when the G-7 finance ministers gathered in Washington in late April.

Of course, much of the intelligence against Iraq is of a highly sensitive nature and the White House is leery of sharing this information with anyone who can't be entirely trusted. That may include some U.S. allies. Bush even has to exercise caution in sharing intelligence with his most steadfast ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, because "he's isolated in his own Cabinet," says Sir Timothy.

If European allies are unwilling, or unable, to help the United States dismantle Saddam Hussein's apparatus for producing weapons of mass destruction, there still are other areas where America may call on its allies to contribute. Not the least of which is nation-building once the bombs have stopped falling, suggests Charles Doran, a professor at Johns Hopkins. For that reason, in the court of world opinion "the legitimacy of the use of force is crucial, especially if we want allied help in building Iraq back up, post-Saddam."

Hans S. Nichols is a reporter for Insight.

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EURO-PEONS DUCKED WW2 AS WELL!